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ABSTRACT 
Reforming Categories of Science and Religion in the Late 
Ottoman Empire 
Kenan Tekin 
This dissertation shows that ideas of science and religion are not transhistorical by 
presenting a longue durée study of conceptions of science and religion in the Ottoman 
Empire. I demonstrate that the idea of science(s) was subject to a tectonic change over the 
course of a few centuries, namely between the early modern and modern period. Even 
within a specific epoch, conception of science and religion were in no way monolithic, as 
evidenced by the diversity of approaches to these categories in the early modern period. 
To point out continuity and change in the ideas of science and religion, I study 
classifications of sciences in the early modern Ottoman Empire, by comparing two 
works; one by Yahya Nev‘î and the other by Saçaklızâde Muhammed el-Mar‘aşî. Nev‘î 
wrote from the context of the court in Istanbul, while Saçaklızâde represented the 
madrasa environment in an Anatolian province, thus providing a contrast in their orders 
of knowledge. In addition, the dissertation includes a study of the concept of "jihat al-
waḥda" (aspect of unity) of science, as discussed by commentators from the early modern 
period. After first providing a textual genealogy, I argue that this concept reveals the 
dominant paradigm of scientific thinking during this period. The last two chapters of the 
dissertation deal with modern Ottoman history. The third chapter analyzes Ahmed Cevdet 
Pasha's (d. 1895) translation of Ibn Khaldun's Muqaddimah into the Ottoman Turkish in 
order to show the shift in the conception of science in the mid-nineteenth century. I 
demonstrate both continuity and a break between the thought of Ibn Khaldun and Ahmed 
Cevdet Pasha. In the fourth chapter, I draw upon archival documents, a scientific journal, 
and a correspondence between two intellectuals namely Fatma Aliye and Ahmed Midhat, 
to point out that science, religion, and politics were separated as a consequence of state 
regulations over publications and civil societies together with other institutional reforms 
and educational policies. The dissertation raises questions about the historiography of 
science in the modern period, which takes the modern idea of science for granted and 
projects it back on to the earlier periods. Noting the anachronistic and presentist approach 
to the early modern period, the dissertation calls for a new kind of historiography that not 
only goes beyond our modern biases but learns from past experiences by seriously 
engaging them.  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On April 3, 1919 the Şeyhülislam (Grand Mufti) of the Ottoman Empire wrote to the 
Sadrazam (Prime Minister) complaining that the number of hours allocated for the religious 
sciences (ulûm-ı diniye) in the curriculum of public schools (mekâtib-i umûmiye) were 
insufficient. He added that the teachers of these classes were not adequately trained, and that 
some of the instructors of natural and mathematical sciences (fünûn-ı tabiiye ve riyâziye) went 
out of their way during lectures to either explicitly or implicitly oppose religion. According to the 
Şeyhülislam, the contentious place of religion in the educational system exacerbated the 
disregard for Islam (Müslümanlık) among the youth. In order to remedy the situation, the 
Şeyhülislam recommended that the number of religious courses be increased, and that the 
teachers should not be allowed to diverge from the subject matter they were supposed to teach 
during their lectures by discussing ideas that could harm students’ Islamic identity.   1
 Although this document shows that Şeyhülislam was struggling to secure a respectable 
place for classes on religion, and accused the state of ignoring religious sciences it also reveals a 
 See Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives, from now on BOA), BEO. 4565/342317. 1
Note the different terminologies (ulûm and fünûn) used by Şeyhülislam in his reference to religious sciences and 
natural-mathematical sciences respectively. While ulûm was used commonly to refer to sciences, fünûn was used to 
also refer to branches of various disciplines as well as the arts. It is possible that Şeyhülislam used these terms in 
order to make a statement about the epistemic virtues of religious and natural-mathematical sciences. However, it 
was also common to use these words as synonyms. By providing a long-term history, this dissertation will unpack 
the meanings of these concepts, which will shed light on their contested meanings in the early modern and modern 
period.
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modern tension between science and religion. This tension was not particular to that 
correspondence, which immediately preceded the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, rather it is 
quite prevalent in the modern period, as many have taken for granted that science and religion 
are essentially separate, if not oppositional matters. In this dissertation, I seek to challenge the 
essentialist claims regarding ideas of science and religion by studying the history of the concept 
of sciences (ulûm) and its relation to religion, and especially religious disciplines, in the Ottoman 
Empire. I argue that the dichotomy and opposition between science and religion as manifested in 
the above mentioned document came to the fore at a particular period, and that this has wrongly 
been projected back on earlier periods. Pointing out the meaning of science as it was articulated 
in the early modern texts, I show that it was quite different and encompassing of religious 
disciplines. Therefore, one should not look for such clash between science and religion in the 
earlier periods where these concepts were not juxtaposed but rather were co-constitutive. 
 Notwithstanding the earlier understanding of science, which encompassed religious 
disciplines, a strict separation between science and religion, with regard to the Ottoman context, 
came about in the nineteenth century. I argue that the separation between science, and religion, as 
well as politics, came about as a result of an interplay between state regulations, interactions with 
European discourses on these issues, and the contingencies of a multi-ethnic and multi-faith 
Empire. The state, I assert, played a key role in objectification of science, religion, and politics by 
regulations on printing presses, publications, scientific societies, and controlling schools and curricula. 
The discourses in Europe on these matters date at least to the critique of religion during the 
Enlightenment and increasingly solidified with the rise of secular universities in Euro-America, 
in the nineteenth century. Hence Western scholars increasingly wrote about science and religion 
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as inherently in conflict. They projected backwardly a modern understanding of these ideas, and 
wrote histories of science that excluded religious disciplines, and in fact humanities at large. 
Suffice it to mention two books from the late nineteenth century, by John W. Draper, and Andrew 
Dickson White in this regard, which were quite influential as they were translated into many 
languages.  Draper’s book was translated into French, which then was translated into Ottoman 2
Turkish, by Ahmed Midhat Efendi (d. 1912). In his critical commentary interspersed in the 
translation, Ahmed Midhat rejected the idea that there was a conflict between science and Islam. 
However, he was one of the leading Ottoman intellectuals who adopted the new understanding of 
science in the late nineteenth century and propagated it, as I will point out in chapter four. In 
short, even those who protested that the conflict thesis was not accurate, still held on to a new 
understanding of science as different from religion, even if compatible with it. Since then many 
scholars continued writing histories of sciences in a way that reflects the narrow idea of science 
as emerged in the modern period.  
 However, in the last several decades some scholars have cast doubt on this older 
narrative. My critique of the concepts and their historiography builds on these recent theoretical 
contributions to the history of science and religion. In the last half-century, scholars of science 
studies and religious studies have indicated that categories of science and religion are the 
products of a certain history. Religion in its post-enlightenment sense as a category was 
constructed in the seventeenth century or thereafter, while the contemporary concept of science is 
 See John W. Draper, History of the Conflict between Religion and Science (New York: D. Appleton, 1874); Andrew 2
D. White, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom, (New York: D Appleton and Co, 
1896).
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a product of the nineteenth century, although some trace it back to the seventeenth century as 
well.  3
Contemporary scholars have pursued a sociological and cultural approach towards the 
term “science,” particularly in the field of history of science, and science and technological 
studies. Initially social studies of science did not question the category of science as such, but 
rather challenged the idea of objectivity and cumulative progress in science. Ludwik Fleck’s 
study of medical ideas as being products of a collective style of thought, and as being informed 
by older cultural ideas on matters that seemingly have been dissociated from science became 
influential via its impact on Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  We see the 4
emergence of a new paradigm in the history of science thereafter.  Building on these scholars, 5
sociology of scientific knowledge, and later science studies adopted what Golinski named “the 
constructivist outlook”.  Accordingly, this later generation of scholars questioned, not only 6
 See Peter Harrison, “Science and Religion: Constructing the Boundaries,” in Science and Religion: New Historical 3
Perspectives, eds. Thomas Dixon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). For a wonderful study that 
demonstrates co-constitution of science and politics in the seventeenth century England, see Steven Shapin and 
Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life  : Including a Translation of 
Thomas Hobbes, Dialogus Physicus de Natura Aeris by Simon Schaffer (Princeton University Press, 1985).
 See Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); 4
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 1996). Fleck’s writings are 
considered as the turning point for a new history of science, which adopts a sociological approach. For more on 
Fleck, see Jan Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of Science (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 32–35. It is worth noting Karl Popper’s contribution, which also tackles a 
similar question that concerned Kuhn: Karl R Popper, The logic of scientific discovery (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2002). For more discussion of new approaches in history of science, see: Steven Shapin, “Here and 
Everywhere: Sociology of Scientific Knowledge,” Annual review of sociology 21 (1995); Golinski, “Is It Time to 
Forget Science?”; Rachel Laudan, “The ‘New’ History of Science: Implications for Philosophy of Science,” PSA: 
Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 2 (1992): 476-81; Seymour Mauskopf 
and Alex Roland, “The Historiography of Science and Technology,” in Axel Schneider, The Oxford History of 
Historical Writing, Volume 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
 Foucault’s work on history of systems of thought is also noteworthy in this regard. See, for instance, Michel 5
Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971). 
Foucault recognizes advances made by his predecessors such as Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem in his 
introduction to the latter’s The Normal and the Pathological (New York: Zone Books, 1989). 
 Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge, ix.6
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scientific exceptionalism but also the very idea of “science” which has been shown as having a 
recent origin.  
Among the later generation of scholars, Peter Dear, Steven Shapin, Andrew Cunningham, 
Marwa Elshakry, and Pamela Smith have pointed out that the idea of science in its modern sense 
can be dated back to a recent history.  Shapin states that "there are words in our [Western] culture 7
whose referents are so highly prized that they have scarcely any stable reference at all.” He 
explains that "science," like other concepts such as "religion," and "art" is such a highly revered 
word, yet it is ambiguous. Shapin reveals this ambiguity by paying attention to the multiple uses 
of the term synchronically and diachronically. In Latin, Shapin writes, “scientia” just meant 
knowledge, acquired through a course of study,” however, in nineteenth century Europe, science 
denoted activities that were associated with observation and experiments. Today we talk about all 
kinds of sciences, yet even within natural sciences there is no consensus as to what constitutes 
science. This demonstrates heterogeneity of the concept.  Peter Dear also concurs that “science” 8
is amorphous and unstable. He demonstrates this by noting that even in modern times there are 
some scholars who view science as natural philosophy and others who define it through its 
concrete outcomes (instrumentality).  Depending on the context, the former or the latter 9
 Peter Dear, “What Is the History of Science the History of? Early Modern Roots of the Ideology of Modern 7
Science,” Isis 96, no. 3 (2005); Andrew Cunningham, “Getting the Game Right: Some Plain Words on the Identity 
and Invention of Science,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science Part A 19, no. 3 (1988): 365–389; Marwa Elshakry, “When Science Became Western: Historiographical 
Reflections,” Isis. 101, no. 1 (2010); Steven Shapin, "Science," in New Keywords  : a Revised Vocabulary of Culture 
and Society, ed., Tony Bennett et al., (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2005).; Pamela H. Smith, "Science," in Ulinka 
Rublack , ed., The Oxford Companion to History, (Oxford University Press, 2011), 268-97.
 Shapin, “Science,” pp. 314-317.8
 Dear, “What Is the History of Science the History Of?” p. 403. Peter Dear, “Science Is Dead; Long Live Science,” 9
Osiris 27, no. 1 (2012): 39–40.
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definition is employed. All of these reflections on “science” denote the historical origins of the 
concept and its multiple referents.  My study of the concept in the early modern and modern 10
Ottoman history will add to the heterogeneity of this idea by showing its various meanings. 
In a parallel fashion to the studies of science, contemporary scholars have reconsidered 
the meaning of religion. In this literature, the works of Talal Asad, Russel McCutcheon, Tomoko 
Masuzawa, Daniel Dubuisson, and Guy Stroumsa is useful for seeing the historical origins of 
“religion.”  In his Genealogies of Religion, and his review of William Cantwell Smith’s book 11
The Meaning and End of Religion, Asad criticizes the transhistorical approach to the term 
“religion.”  He points out that such an approach including that of Clifford Geertz assumes an 12
essence of the subject, and thus depoliticizes and dehistoricizes the concept.  McCutcheon as 13
well criticizes the essentialist approach of scholars such as Mircea Eliade,  and argues that their 14
approach to the study of religion is politically and ideologically charged. It ignores relations of 
 The change in the rhetoric used by advocates of scientific discourse was noted by Thomas Gieryn as well. In his 10
article on the boundary-work, Gieryn shows that scientists emphasize certain aspects of their practices (theoretical or 
instrumental) in order to convince varying audiences. Thomas F. Gieryn 1983. "Boundary-Work and the 
Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists". American 
Sociological Review. 48 (6): 781-795.
 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Johns Hopkins 11
University Press, 1993); Russell T. McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion 
and the Politics of Nostalgia (Oxford University Press, 1997); Daniel Dubuisson, The Western Construction of 
Religion: Myths, Knowledge, and Ideology (JHU Press, 2003); Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World 
Religions: Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (University of Chicago 
Press, 2005); Guy G Stroumsa, A New Science: The Discovery of Religion in the Age of Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2010).
 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991); Talal Asad, 12
“Reading a modern classic: W. C. Smith's The Meaning and End of Religion,” History of Religions 40 (2001): 205–
222.
 For Geertz’s definition of religion see his seminal work Interpretation of Cultures. For Asad’s criticism see the 13
Genealogies of Religion.
 For an example of the essentialist approach of Eliade, see Mircea Eliade, The sacred and the profane: the nature 14
of religion (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1959).
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power in establishing such categories.  McCutcheon insists on setting aside the assumption that 15
religion is sui-generis. Instead, he also proposes a more Foucauldian and Asadian approach to the 
study of religion which does not consider religion a thing to be discovered, but a constructed 
object of knowledge.  
Despite problems with the concept of religion, it is still useful for purposes of translation. 
In this work I focus on the idea of religious sciences, rather than religion per se. In this context 
either the adjectives “dīnī” or “shar‘ī” are used to signify religious sciences (‘ulūm al-dīnīya, 
‘ulūm al-shar‘iya). As I will discuss, the boundaries of religious sciences itself was contested, 
hence, it shows that its meaning was not stable in the early modern Ottoman context. Therefore, 
it is really difficult to find a stable meaning in translation. I suggest that we should not obsess 
with finding the exact equivalence of terms, but rather use possible words that make sense while 
always thinking of them in relation to the specific context in which they are used.  
 Stimulated by the theoretical debates this study not only reveals the history and 
historicity of our modern conceptions of science and religion, but also aims at rethinking the 
modern historiography of science, which has excluded study of disciplines that do not fit the 
modern category of science. Moreover, the modern history of science cannot be divorced from 
the modern form of political power, i.e. the nation-state. As I will show, modern idea of science 
came about under the influence of and in conversation with nationalist thought. In its critical 
analysis of the early modern and late Ottoman texts and contexts, this study aims at contributing 
 McCutcheon states “the discourse on sui generis religion deemphasizes difference, history, and sociopolitical 15
context in favor of abstract essences and homogeneity.” McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion, p. 13.
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to the underdeveloped literature on Ottoman intellectual history and history of science and 
religion. 
Nationalist and Orientalist Historiography of Science 
  
 Since the nineteenth century, sweeping generalizations have been made about Islamic and 
Ottoman intellectual history. The orientalist approach in Europe, and the nationalist approach in 
Turkey, took modern categories of science and religion for granted.  They both depicted a rise 16
and decline narrative of scientific and philosophical thinking and a negative role played by 
religion. Studies on Islamic intellectual history, which mostly ignored the Ottoman period, 
propagated the idea that sciences and philosophy enjoyed a golden age after the translation 
movement of the ninth century. However, it was asserted that there was a decline of sciences and 
philosophy after the twelfth century due to the attacks by al-Ghazālī on the philosophers 
(although the date and causes vary).  This approach, which has been labeled as the classical 17
narrative, is now debunked owing to scholarship in the last few decades including George 
Saliba’s research on astronomy, and Khaled El-Rouayheb’s studies on Arabic logic and 
dialectics.   18
 Although Orientalist and nationalist approaches emerged together and are not mutually exclusive, and in fact are 16
quite similar as the following discussion shows, I find this distinction useful for purposes of literature review.
 An article written in 1870, by Ali Suavi, entitled “al-Radd ‘ala man radda al-Ghazālī” (Refuting whoever refutes 17
al-Ghazālī) suggests the Orientalist origins for this idea of golden age and decline. See Ulûm, v. 7, pp. 321-328.
 For an overview of the Orientalist approach and its critique by Saliba, see Islamic Science and the Making of the 18
European Renaissance (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2007); Saliba, A History of Arabic Astronomy: Planetary 
Theories During the Golden Age of Islam (New York University Press, 1995); Khaled El-Rouayheb has also refuted 
the Orientalist and nationalist historiography with regard to the early modern Ottoman period. See Khaled El-
Rouayheb, Relational Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic, 900-1900 (Leiden  ; Boston: Brill, 2010), http://
www.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/cul/resolve?clio9173465; idem, Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: 
Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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A similar historiography was dominant in regard to Ottoman intellectual history. It was 
seen as a history of the rise and decline of the sciences with a similar golden age, this time falling 
roughly between the reigns of Mehmed II (d. 1481) and Süleyman I (d. 1566).  In fact, this 19
periodization reflects political history of the Ottoman Empire. The destruction of the Istanbul 
observatory in the last quarter of the sixteenth century was also seen as the turning point in 
Ottoman intellectual history.  Seventeenth and eighteenth-century Ottoman intellectual life has 20
been depicted as though it were in a period of stagnation and decline. According to this approach, 
a vibrant Ottoman intellectual life can be detected only after the Ottomans initiated reforms by 
imitating European institutions.  This approach has informed most writings on Ottoman and 21
Turkish intellectual history to this day. However, there are a number of significant studies that 
have challenged this dominant narrative.  In this regard, I should note studies by Rifa’at Abou-22
El-Haj, Karen Barkey, Giancarlo Casale, Khaled El-Rouayheb et al. who reconsider the early 
 For a brief summary of decline theory and its Ottoman origins see Douglas A. Howard, "Ottoman Historiography 19
and the Literature of "decline" of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" Journal of Asian History 22.1 (1988): 
52-77.
 The foremost historian on the Ottoman Empire, Halil İnalcık, presented this event as a “triumph of fanaticism.” 20
El-Rouayheb’s previously cited works shatter this depiction by showing that in fact it was a period of reinvigoration 
of rational sciences, and the ideal of verification. For more information on the Istanbul observatory see Aydın Sayılı, 
The Observatory in Islam (New York: Arno Press, 1981). 
 Examples of such historiography include: Bernard Lewis, “Some Reflections on the Decline of the Ottoman 21
Empire,” Studia Islamica no. 9 (1958): 111–127; Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford University 
Press, 2002); Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964).
 For a critique of the decline framework, see Jonathan Grant, “Rethinking the Ottoman ‘decline’: Military 22
technology diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, 15th to 18th centuries,” Journal of World History 10 (1999): 179–201. 
A good critique of the Orientalist and nationalist narratives is made by Rifa’at ‘Ali Abou-Al-Haj. His work will be 
discussed below. An important issue for following the decline paradigm is the place of rational sciences in the 
curriculum of the Ottoman medreses. Those who adhere to the decline paradigm claim that rational sciences were 
ignored after the sixteenth century. This resulted in stagnation and decline. Others contend that these sciences were 
taught in the later Ottoman Empire as well. Madeleine Zilfi’s work, The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the 
Postclassical Age (1600-1800), sheds some light on intellectual conflicts between Kadizadelis and sufis. However, 
Zilfi’s history of the period reflects the decline paradigm. For an example of a study that counters the decline of 
rational sciences thesis, see Cevad İzgi, Osmanlı Medreselerinde İlim I-II (Topkapı, Istanbul: İz, 1997); El-
Rouayheb, Seventeenth Century Islamic Intellectual History.
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modern period not as a period of stagnation and decline, but as a period of developments in 
political and scientific thought. I will come back to this literature after discussing the classical 
narrative in the Turkish historiography of science in the Ottoman Empire. 
Until recent decades, much of the literature on Turkish intellectual history as a whole, and 
more specifically the history of science, reflected the classical narrative on Islamic science.  We 23
can trace back secondary writings on intellectual history or the history of science  to the second 24
half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century by Ottoman scholars including Ali Suavi (d. 
1878),  Ahmed Midhat (d. 1912), Bursalı Mehmed Tahir (d. 1925),  Suphi Ethem (d. 1923?), 25 26
 This approach is also traced back to writings of Katip Çelebi who noted a rise and decline in rational sciences. See 23
Kâtip Çelebi, Mizanü'l-hakk fî Ihtiyari’l-Ehakk (Istanbul: Kitabhane-i Ebu'z-Ziya, 1888). For an English translation 
of this book see Kâtip Çelebi, and Geoffrey Lewis, The Balance of Truth (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957). Cf. 
Katip Çelebi’s on “‘ilm al-ḥikma” in Kashf al-Ẓunūn, v. 2 (Lebanon: Dar al-Kotob al-Ilmiya, 2008) pp. 38-44 
(especially p. 41).
 For a bibliographical article on Turkish history of science, see İhsan Fazlıoğlu, ed. Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür 24
Dergisi: Türk Bilim Tarihi, 2:4 (Istanbul 2004). For various articles on history of science and technology in the 
Ottoman Empire, see Yavuz Unat, Osmanlılarda Bilim ve Teknoloji   : Makaleler (Ankara: Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, 
2010). To these more comprehensive books I should add: Berna Kılınç, “Ottoman Science Studies: a Review,” 
Turkish Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. (2005): 251–263; Cemil Aydın, “Beyond Culturalism? An 
Overview of the Historiography on Ottoman Science in Turkey,” in Multicultural Science in the Ottoman Empire. 
(2003): 201–215.
 These writings on the history of science were clearly produced as replies to Orientalists in a period of existential 25
anxiety in the Ottoman Empire. Ali Suavi’s writings on the Turkish contribution to sciences were some of the most 
interesting writings as they were mostly defensive, and reflected an emergent nationalist approach. See Ali Suavi, 
“Türk,” in Ulûm Gazetesi, Volume 1, no 1. A modern Turkish transliteration is accessible at Recep Alpyağıl, 
Türkiye’de bir felsefe gelen-ek-i kurmaya çalışmak: feylesof simalardan seçme metinler II (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 
2010). Even prior to Ali Suavi, another Ottoman named Ali Haydar wrote a brief article on historical assessment, 
which, in a nutshell, attempted to demonstrate the Turks’ contributions to the sciences as well as their just and 
tolerant rule over their subjects, which was clearly produced in response to European representations and, in fact, 
accusations. See Ali Haydar, “Muhakeme-i Tarihiye” [Judging Historically], Mecmua-yı İber-i İntibah, v. 2, 
(1279/1863):33-39.
 Much like Ali Suavi, Mehmed Tahir stated in the introduction of his book Türklerin Ulûm ve Fünûna Hizmetleri 26
(Turks’ Service to Sciences and Arts) that he wished to correct the Orientalist depiction of Turks as vulgar, and 
frontier fighters by providing an index of Turkish scholars who have left some valuable works (p. 3). Mehmed Tahir 
also stated that Europeans who write about Islamic civilization do not recognize the Turkish contributions since they 
were also in Arabic or Persian. According to Mehmed Tahir, Turkish contribution to Islamic Civilization counted at 
least for a third of its output if not half of it (p. 4). See Mehmed Tahir, Türklerin Ulûm ve Fünuna Hizmetleri, 
(Dersaadet: İkdam Matbaası, 1898), electronically accessible at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=njp.
32101073252171;view=1up;seq=5 (last accessed, 04/17/2016) Tahir also wrote another widely known bibliographic 
encyclopedia entitled Osmanlı Müellifleri (Istanbul: Matbaa-ʼi Amire, 1914) showing his enthusiasm in pointing out 
Ottoman contributions to the sciences.
 11
and Salih Zeki (d. 1921).  Some of these Ottoman historians will figure in this study. However, 27
it was Abdülhak Adnan Adıvar who wrote both a general history of science entitled Tarih 
Boyunca İlim ve Din (Science and Religion Throughout History; the title itself is suggestive of 
the conflict thesis), and a more specific book on (positive) sciences in the Ottoman Empire, 
entitled La Science chez les Turcs Ottomans (Tr. Osmanlı Türklerinde İlim).  The latter book has 28
set the model for historiography in Turkey since the publication of its expanded Turkish-
language version.  In Kuhnian terms, we can think of Adıvar’s work as providing an exemplary 29
puzzle and solution, thus, embodying the “normal science,” which in this case being the 
historiography of science in the Ottoman Empire.  Adıvar’s work was also important as it 30
clearly reflected a historiography based on nationalist sentiments, hence the term “les Turcs” in 
the title of the book. His two books on the history of science evince that essentialist notions of 
science and religion were paralleled by the emergence of the homogenizing politics of 
nationalism. I will delve further into this relationship in chapter four.  
 After Adıvar, Aydın Sayılı was the foremost historian of science who played a significant 
role in shaping the discipline in Turkey. Sayılı wrote his dissertation at Harvard University under 
 Salih Zeki is also considered to be the first Turkish historian of science. Âsâr-ı Bâkiye (History of Mathematical 27
Sciences) is the most popular among his many works. Remzi Demir, “Salih Zeki Bey (1864-1921),” in 
Osmanlılarda Bilim ve Teknoloji, ed. Yavuz Unat, (Kızılay, Ankara: Nobel, 2010).
 Abdülhak Adnan Adıvar, Tarih Boyunca İlim ve Din: İptidadan XIX. Asra Kadar (Remzi Kitabevi, 1944); 28
Abdülhak Adnan Adıvar, Osmanlı Türklerinde İlim (Maârif Matbaası, 1943); Abdülhak Adnan Adıvar, La Science 
chez les Turcs Ottomans (G.-P. Maisonneuve, 1939).
 For an example, see Aykut Kazancıgil, Osmanlılarda Bilim ve Teknoloji (Harbiye, Istanbul: Gazeteciler ve 29
Yazarlar Vakfı Yayınları, 1999).
 Adıvar influenced H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen’s discussion of education in the Ottoman Empire in their 30
prominent book: H. A. R Gibb, Islamic Society and the West; a Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on 
Moslem Culture in the Near East (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1957). Adıvar also had a major 
impact on Bernard Lewis, who recognized this in his works.
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the supervision of George Sarton, a well-known science historian at the time. After Sayılı 
returned to Turkey he established a chair for the history of science at Ankara University, which 
later evolved into a department. He led many dissertations on science and philosophy in the 
Ottoman Empire (his students included Sevim Tekeli, Esin Kahya, and Mübahat Türker Küyel).  31
Despite Sayılı’s very significant study, Observatory in Islam, his writings on the late Ottoman 
Empire did not go beyond the much familiar teleology of modernization and Westernization, 
which culminated with the reforms of Atatürk.  32
 Criticizing the negative place of religion in Adıvar’s history of science in the Ottoman 
period, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu provides a counter-narrative of the development of science in the 
Ottoman Empire, adopting sociological interpretations in order to explain the cautious 
Westernization in the gap period (i.e. the seventeenth and eighteenth century). İhsanoğlu’s works 
are meant to correct Adnan Adıvar’s – as well as Bernard Lewis’ – judgments that Ottomans 
were not interested in contemporary scientific developments in Europe until the nineteenth 
century.  İhsanoğlu shows that there were translations from European languages in the early 33
modern period, and that these translations indicate a pragmatic approach to European 
developments. His approach to the history of science is more sociological, being informed by the 
 For information on Tekeli and Kahya, see Unat, Osmanlılarda bilim ve teknoloji.31
 See Aydın Sayılı, “Batılılaşma Hareketimizde Bilimin Yeri ve Atatürk,” Erdem, 1:1 (1985), pp. 11-24.; this article 32
is followed by an extended English version entitled, “The Place of Science in the Turkish Movement of 
Westernization, and Atatürk.” A further extended Turkish version of the article is printed in the second issue of 
Erdem; “Batılılaşma Hareketimizde Bilimin Yeri ve Atatürk,” Erdem 1:2 (1986) pp. 309-408. These are iterations of 
Adıvar’s writings in terms of both the conception of history of science and the process of Turkish Westernization.
 For a comparison between Adıvar and İhsanoğlu’s approaches, see Cemil Aydın, "Beyond Culturalism? An 33
Overview of the Historiography on Ottoman Science in Turkey,” in Multicultural Science in the Ottoman Empire, 
ed. (2003): pp. 201-215.
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social-constructionist turn, yet it also entails presentist and essentialist perspectives.  For 34
instance, his studies focus on natural and mathematical sciences, to the exclusion of religious 
sciences in the Ottoman Period. Like Sayılı, İhsanoğlu established another chair for the history of 
science (also later turned into a department) at Istanbul University. He also trained and 
collaborated with many scholars, producing much needed bibliographies.  Their work follows 35
another line of thinking that emphasizes Ottoman and Islamic contributions to science rather than 
denigrating or denying it. However, in both trajectories, the ideas of science and religion are 
quite modern, as they do not consider the Ottoman period in its own terms.  
Studies of Turkish intellectual history at large are not different. In this field, the works of 
Hilmi Ziya Ülken set the model for normal historiography. Ülken was a prolific writer, and 
published many works including Türk Tefekkür Tarihi (Turkish Intellectual History) and 
Türkiyede Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi (Contemporary Turkish Intellectual History). The former 
traces Turkish intellectual history from ancient Turkish tribes to the nineteenth century, while the 
latter recounts the history of contemporary Turkish thought starting with the pre-Tanzimat 
reforms and ending in the mid-twentieth century. Ülken’s approach was similar to that of Adıvar, 
as he complained about the lack of philosophical thinking among Turks. Thus, he thought it more 
 See, for instance, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, Science, Technology, and Learning in the Ottoman Empire: Western 34
Influence, Local Institutions, and the Transfer of Knowledge, Variorum Collected Studies Series 773 (Aldershot, 
Hants, England  ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003).
 These bibliographical works include the following: Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, Ramazan Şeşen, and Cevad İzgi, 35
Osmanli Matematik Literatürü Tarihi = History of Mathematical Literature during the Ottoman Period (Istanbul: 
İslâm Tarih, Sanat ve Kültür Araştırma Merkezi (IRCICA), 1999); Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, Osmanli Tabiî ve Tatbikî 
Bilimler Literatürü Tarihi = History of the Literature of Natural and Applied Sciences during the Ottoman Period 
Cilt 2 (Istanbul: Islam Tarih, Sanat ve Kültür Araştırma Merkezi (IRCICA)), 2006); Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, Osmanlı 
Astronomi Literatürü tarihi = History of Astronomy Literature during the Ottoman Period (Istanbul: Islam Tarih, 
Sanat ve Kültür Araştırma Merkezi, 1997); Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, Osmanlı Coğrafya Literatürü Tarihi = History of 
Geographical Literature during the Ottoman Period (Istanbul: İslâm Tarih, Sanat ve Kültür Araştırma Merkezi 
(IRCICA), 2000). 
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apt to write a Turkish intellectual history considering that this would enable him to discuss issues 
that would not fit the high task or category of philosophy. In addition to a shared nationalist 
perspective, he, like many other scholars including Adıvar, was heavily influenced by 
Orientalists, evidenced by his sources. This shows that in many ways Orientalist and nationalist 
approaches were interdependent, and that in fact they emerged simultaneously, as will be noted 
in the fourth chapter. 
Many Turkish intellectuals continued the nationalist approach by emulating such 
charismatic writers as Adıvar and Ülken. Scholars such as İbrahim Agah Çubukçu, Süleyman 
Hayri Bolay, and Remzi Demir, to name a few, simply reiterate solutions to the same puzzle.  36
For instance, İbrahim Agâh Çubukçu’s books Türk İslam Düşünürleri (Turkish-Muslim 
Thinkers) and Türk Düşünce Tarihinde Felsefe Hareketleri (Philosophical Movements in Turkish 
Intellectual History) can be seen as iterations of Ülken’s works.  Çubukçu continues to entertain 37
nationalist triumphalist sentiments as we can see from the following statements in the preface of 
the latter book: “Turkish intellectual history is richer than what the world public assumes. Just as 
once Turkish art was attributed to Byzantines and Persians, so Turkish thought is molten between 
Arabic and Persian. Nevertheless, it is a fact that there are ideas and thinkers belonging 
specifically to Turks.”   38
Çubukçu also notes that Turkish thought not only existed before Islam, but it also 
continued after Islam. His works obviously represent a nationalist historiography as he uses the 
 S. Hayri Bolay, Osmanlılarda Düşünce Hayatı ve Felsefe (Ankara: Akçağ, 2005); Remzi Demir, Philosophia 36
Ottomanica  : Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Döneminde Türk Felsefesi (Ankara: Lotus Yayınevi, 2005).
 İbrahim Agâh Çubukçu, Türk-İslâm düşünürleri (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989); İbrahim Agâh 37
Çubukçu, Türk Düşünce Tarihinde Felsefe Hareketleri (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi İlâhiyat Fakültesi, 1986). 
 Çubukçu, Türk Düşünce Tarihinde Felsefe Hareketleri, p. ix.38
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ethnicity of the scholars as a marker of inclusion and exclusion, although Persian or Arab 
nationalists would also claim many of the scholars he included. Much of this kind of scholarship 
plays a significant role in constructing and inventing Turkishness in the modern world. 
Frequently, almost all values that are attributed to modernity are backwardly projected on ancient 
Turkish people through Turkish intellectual historiography. Hence, it is concluded that modernity 
or modern values of rationality are not alien to Turks. Rather Turks were alienated from such 
values over time.   39
Critique of Nationalist Historiography 
 Nationalist and Orientalist approaches to Islamic and Ottoman intellectual history have 
rightly come under heavy criticism by contemporary scholars. George Saliba, Cemal Kafadar, 
and Christine Philliou, among others, have made powerful critiques of such essentialist and 
nationalist historiography. In his various writings on “Arabic” and “Islamic” science, Saliba 
reminds us of the problems with such labels and warns that in his own work he does not use 
these terms in order to refer to them as having distinct characteristics, rather, he uses them 
merely for labeling the language of scholarship (Arabic), or the larger civilizational context of 
scholarship (Islamic). Saliba specifically brings to our attention challenges confronting any 
nationalist intellectual historiography as exemplified in his review of the Encyclopedia Iranica.  40
In this article, Saliba shows the impossibility of writing a nationalist intellectual history due to 
how deeply intertwined various cultures and peoples were in the past. Recently, Saliba has 
 This resembles most of the writings by Muslim reformers who reinvent Islam with modern values, yet claim it to 39
be the pristine Islam that was distorted overtime. For an excellent article that analyzes Islamic reformist discourses, 
see Bruce B. Lawrence, "Ibn Khaldun & Islamic Reform,” African and Asian Studies 18.3 (1983): 221-240.
 See George Saliba, "Science and Medicine,” Iranian Studies 31:3/4 (1998): 681-690. 40
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further developed his criticism of the nationalist or linguistic approach to science. Saliba uses the 
phrase “blurred edges” in order to emphasize the relationship between Arabic, Persian, Greek, 
and Renaissance science. This metaphor is based on an analogy between sciences and arts, more 
specifically photography. Taken from a certain distance, photographs present an idea of clear-cut 
borders, and suggest a unity of the object. However, the more one zooms in, the looser the 
boundaries become. Looking in detail at science in European Renaissance or Islamic civilization, 
it becomes clear that scientific ideas, just like material objects, also do not have clear-cut 
boundaries that dovetail with a nation or language.  Saliba’s critique of the nationalist 41
historiography is equally applicable to the above-mentioned Turkish nationalist historiography.  
  
 Cemal Kafadar and Christine Philliou also point out problems of nationalism in relation 
to Ottoman history. Kafadar points out that depending on their religious and national affiliation, 
historians have explained the positive features of Ottoman history by noting the impact of 
elements affiliated with their current imaginaries, while attributing the negative aspects of 
Ottoman history to the empire’s other ethnicities.  Philliou particularly discusses the paradox of 42
perceptions in the post-Ottoman nation states. Philliou notes the visible legacy of the Ottoman 
Empire in nation states such as Turkey and Greece, and the lack of interest in that legacy as a 
 George Saliba, “Blurred Edges at the Intersection of Science, Culture, and Art,” Variantology 4: On Deep Time 41
Relations of Arts, Sciences and Technologies in the Arabic- Islamic World and Beyond, ed. Siegfried Zielinski et al., 
Kunstwissenschaftliche Bibliothek, v. 45, (Walther König, Köln, 2010): 345-361. 
 Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley, Calif: University of 42
California Press, 1996).
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result of nationalist perception. The nation state ignores that which does not serve its imaginary 
past, present, and future. Thus, Philliou states that nationalism functions as a blinder.  43
 Concurring with these critiques of nationalist historiography, I add that a nationalist 
approach to intellectual history and the history of science is misleading because past actors 
themselves were not producing works as representatives of a certain ethnicity. Of course, 
scholars were aware of their lineages and tribal origins, but ethnic markers were not the most 
common epithets for scholars. They were mostly known by their hometown such as ‘Āmidī, 
Baghdādī, Qunawī, Shīrāzī, Shirwānī, or religio-intellectual affiliations such as being Hanafī, 
Shāfi‘ī etc. Although we do occasionally come across titles such as al-Turkī or al-Kurdī, such 
titles did not mark their intellectual activities, but rather they signified their background be it clan 
or language. That is why in my genealogical study of science and religion I draw attention to the 
political and institutional context of knowledge production, rather than focusing on the 
nationality or ethnicity of intellectuals. However, in the late nineteenth century we do see an 
emergence of nationalism. In fact, I point out that this emergence of homogenizing politics came 
about together with the appearance of essentialist notions of science and religion. In that regard, 
nationalism played a significant role in the making of modern science. 
Rewriting the History of the Early Modern Period 
In line with the post-nationalist, and post-orientalist thought, scholars are rewriting 
Ottoman history in all of its variants. A significant step in this transition has been the rethinking 
of earlier periodizations. Scholars researching the middle period of the Ottoman Empire i.e. the 
 Christine Philliou, “The Paradox of Perceptions: Interpreting the Ottoman Past through the National Present,” 43
Middle Eastern Studies 44, no. 5 (2008): 661–675.
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far neglected period between the sixteenth and nineteenth century have labeled the early modern 
period since 1990s. In this regard, Ottomanists are following a trend that emerged with the 
history of other non-European polities in East Asia (especially Japan).  Ottomanists use this 44
periodization for various reasons, such as institutional change. I adopt this periodization of early 
modernity as I observe a change in the quality of scholarship, for instance increasing 
referentiality in the margins of manuscripts, use of dictionaries, and referring back to classical 
sources in the commentaries and glosses.  
New periodization and turns on history enabled alternative ways to rewrite Ottoman 
history that surpass the limits of previous scholarship.  There is a growing emphasis on 45
transnational historiography. Marshall Hodgson was among the pioneers in this new approach 
with his critique of arbitrary boundaries and mapping.  However, it was Edward Said’s 46
Orientalism that shattered the well-trodden paths of Orientalism, and the essentializing 
tendencies of colonialism. Following these pioneers, contemporary scholars think critically about 
the politics of knowledge as well as the frameworks that are adopted to analyze the subject 
matter. 
Rifa’at Abou-El-Haj carried the Saidian critique to the Ottoman studies as he challenged 
the decline paradigm. In his Formation of the Modern State, Abou-El-Haj pointed out major 
 Searching key words such as “early modern Ottoman,” in Google Scholar resource, we find a negligible result. 44
However the same search for “early modern Japan” gives hundreds, if not thousands, of items in which the phrase 
occurs. Therefore, the Ottomanists seem to have followed the trend in other regions which themselves claim this 
periodization of European history arguing that there were connected developments around the world. For a critique 
of this periodization, see Jack A. Goldstone, "The Problem of the "early Modern" World," Journal of the Economic 
and Social History of the Orient, 41.3 (1998): 249-284.
 For a review of the imperial turn in Ottoman studies, see Alan Mikhail and Christine Philliou, “The Ottoman 45
Empire and the Imperial Turn,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 2012; 54 (4): 721-745
 See Marshall G. S. Hodgson, and Edmund Burke, Rethinking World History: Essays on Europe, Islam, and World 46
History (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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methodological mistakes of modern historians of the Ottoman Empire: that the Ottoman Empire 
is peculiar and odd, and hence is not comparable to European Empires, that Ottoman early 
modern period is seen through the lens of the fully formed modern nation state, that Ottoman 
sources, especially the nasihatname (advice literature), are read uncritically, that nineteenth 
century reforms are studied as if there were no Ottoman precedents providing a historical 
background to them.  To remedy the major fallacies of Ottomanists, Abou-El-Haj pointed out 47
that early modern Ottoman developments were commensurable and comparable to European 
developments, that early modern Ottoman state had contradictory tendencies of centralization 
and decentralization, that the Ottoman sources are not objective in themselves since they were 
written by agents who had their own interests to pursue, and that nineteenth century reforms 
should be situated within a longer history of transformations in the Ottoman Empire.  In this 48
dissertation, I adopt Saidian (and by extension, Foucauldian) critique of the connection between 
knowledge and power, as well as Abou-El-Haj’s methodological approach to Ottoman history. 
Thus, I study both the early modern and modern period together. I also contextualize texts from 
the period and consider the institutional and social context of scholars and connections with the 
political power in order to make sense of them.  
 Abou-El-Haj’s preface to Formation of the Modern State, shows that he was situated in a history department in the 47
US, where conversations with other colleagues necessitate a comparative approach to Ottoman history.
 Karen Barkey also provides alternative ways to go beyond the decline paradigm. In the Empire of Difference, 48
Barkey presents an analytical history of the Ottoman Empire by pointing out the aspects and manner of governance 
that made the empire’s longevity possible. Barkey considers the Ottomans in the comparative studies of empires, 
and draws attention to flexibility and negotiations in Ottoman politics as keys for its longevity. See Karen Barkey, 
Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
Baki Tezcan’s recent book builds on the path opened up by Abou-El-Haj. See Baki Tezcan, The Second Ottoman 
Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010). By asking different and comparative questions, these scholars have opened up new avenues of research to go 
beyond the decline paradigm of Orientalists and nationalists.
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In addition to these critiques of historiography, parallel developments can be observed in 
the historiography of sciences and ideas in the Ottoman Empire. In fact, recent studies of science 
and technology in the Ottoman Empire have provided wonderful examples of the post-nationalist 
and post-orientalist approaches. Avner Ben-Zaken’s Cross-Cultural Scientific Exchange in the 
Eastern Mediterranean 1560-1660 studies the movement of objects and people between the 
Ottoman Empire and other Mediterranean powers.  Giancarlo Casale’s Ottoman Age of 49
Discovery, points out parallel developments in Ottoman and Portuguese explorations and conflict 
in the Indian Ocean.  Khaled El-Rouayheb has written a number of articles, and two excellent 50
books on Arabic logic and rational sciences in the early modern period, which demonstrate 
developments in these sciences in the period that was portrayed as the period of stagnation and 
decline in rational sciences.   51
Other studies reflecting the transformations in the historiography of science and religion 
include those of Bekir Harun Küçük, Tijana Krstic, and Derin Terzioğlu.  Bekir Harun Küçük, 52
in his recent dissertation, examines intellectual activity during the reign of Ahmed III (r. 
1703-1730, commonly known as the Tulip era). Küçük claims that there was a moderate and 
 Sonja Brentjes’ collection of articles entitled Travelers from Europe in the Ottoman and Safavid Empires, 16th-17th 49
centuries (Farnham: Ashgate/Variorum, 2010) provides another case for cross-cultural exchanges.
 Giancarlo Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration (Oxford: New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).50
 See the bibliography and previously cited works of El-Rouayheb. I discuss El-Rouayheb’s work further in the 51
following two chapters as the occasion presents itself.
 Among scholarship in Turkish on the early modern period, İhsan Fazlıoğlu’s contributions are noteworthy. Though 52
mostly Fazlıoğlu’s works deal with the transmission of intellectual and scientific ideas from pre-Ottoman Muslim 
polities to the Ottoman Empire, he has written some articles that shed light on the intellectual activity during the 
eighteenth century Ottoman Empire. See, for instance, İhsan Fazlıoğlu, "Türk Felsefe-Bilim Tarihi’nin Seyir Defteri 
(Bir Önsöz),” Dîvân İlmî Araştırmalar Dergisi, (2005) pp.1-57.; In another work, Fazlıoğlu provides an astute 
commentary on a couplet by Ottoman poet Fuzuli who stated: “Everything is love in the world/Science is nothing 
but “he said” “it is said.” See İhsan Fazlıoğlu, Fuzulî Ne Demek İstedi?: Işk İmiş Her Ne Var Âlem’de/İlim Bir Kîl û 
Kâl imiş Ancak (Istanbul: Klasik, 2011). Most of Fazlıoğlu’s writings on the later Ottoman period can be accessed at 
www.ihsanfazlioglu.net 
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short-lived enlightenment in the Ottoman Empire similar to the English enlightenment.  Krstic 53
and Terzioglu’s studies note similar developments in the Ottoman Empire and Europe with 
regard to religion. Considering religious transformations, Krstic has dubbed the period “the age 
of confessionalization.”  These and other scholars observe that the Ottomans increasingly 54
upheld Sunni beliefs and practices during the sixteenth century as a result of their conflicts with 
the nascent Safavid dynasty, which championed Shi’ite doctrines. Concurring with Krstic, 
Terzioğlu suggests that Ottoman sunnitization should be framed accordingly.  
As noted before, previous scholars have neglected the early modern period, thus 
affirming the bias of the classical orientalist as well as nationalist approaches, which did not 
perceive any intellectual dynamism in that period, except in certain instances where interactions 
with Europe could be noted.  Therefore, the recent studies just mentioned including those of 55
Ben-Zaken, Casale, El-Rouayheb, and Terzioğlu give the period its due. However, as Jane 
Hathaway notes, there are still lacunae in the scholarship on eighteenth-century Ottoman 
intellectual history.  Continuing this new line of thinking that approaches the post-Suleymanic 56
age as a vibrant period, I study texts from the period closely in the first two chapters, attending to 
their nuances while noting the dominant paradigm of thinking in regards to science.  
 Bekir H. Küc̦ük, “Early Enlightenment in Istanbul” (Ph.D. Diss. La Jolla: University of California, San Diego, 53
2012).
 Tijana Krstić, Contested Conversions to Islam: Narratives of Religious Change in the Early Modern Ottoman 54
Empire (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011).
 For instance, İhsanoğlu and Göçek’s studies of translations from European sources, and of Ottoman embassies to 55
Europe reflect this interest.
 See Jane Hathaway. "Rewriting Eighteenth-Century Ottoman History,” Mediterranean Historical Review. 19:1 56
(2004): 29-53. I should note that there are numerous texts and documents that have not been studied at all. Although 
there are many studies by Turkish students at the level of master thesis, these usually lack analytical and critical 
approach, thus limiting their contributions.
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Rethinking Ottoman Modernity 
Compared to the early modern period, nineteenth-century Ottoman intellectual history 
has received a large amount of attention from scholars. Perhaps the most striking evidence is the 
fact that there are hardly any books that survey the middle period (c. 1600-1800) of the Ottoman 
Empire by itself, while there are several well-known surveys of the late Ottoman period i.e. the 
long nineteenth century.  Some noteworthy authors of these surveys include Ahmed Hamdi 57
Tanpınar, Bernard Lewis, Niyazi Berkes, and Şerif Mardin.  All of these studies contain 58
valuable information that serves as a starting point for anybody who wants to work on late 
Ottoman history. Yet, in many ways, they suffer from the effects of the classical Eurocentric 
approach to modernization and secularization. Therefore, they mainly portray late Ottoman 
history as being an inevitable process of modernization instigated by and based primarily on 
European models. 
The Eurocentric approach has come under heavy criticism by scholars working on non-
European contexts, especially colonies of European empires. In this regard, Timothy Mitchell’s 
contributions are noteworthy. In his introduction to the edited volume Questions of Modernity, 
 Interestingly, one could easily find surveys of the early or formative period of the Empire, such as İnalcık’s The 57
Classical Age, Colin Imber The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650. Abou-El-Haj’s above-mentioned book is not really a 
survey, but rather a historiographic essay on how to study the period, and a call for studying the middle period in 
itself. El-Rouayheb’s recent work comes close to being a survey of the period with regard to intellectual works. 
However, it is limited to intellectual history, thus, not a general survey of the period with regard to politics, economy 
etc.
 Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey; Niyazi Berkes, Türkiyeʾde Çağdaşlaşma, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 58
1973); Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi (Istanbul: İbrahim Horoz Basımevi, 1956); Şerif 
Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas, 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1962); Şerif Mardin, Jön Türklerin siyasî fikirleri, 1895-1908 (Türkiye 
İş Bankası, 1964); Şerif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey the Case of Bediüzzaman Said 
Nursi, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989). To these, I should add Carter Findley’s Turkey, Islam, 
Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789-2007; Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922. Şükrü 
Hanioğlu’s recent survey of the period entitled A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, departs from these 
studies as he adopts a more critical approach to modernization and secularization.
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Mitchell challenges Eurocentric accounts of modernity, and the idea of singular time and space.  59
According to Mitchell, Eurocentric approaches assume a singular trajectory for all peoples of the 
world, that is, the trajectory of a capitalist modernity. Alternative approaches either point out 
multiple modernities, or they challenge the neat claim that modernity emerged in Europe and 
spread around the globe. The latter literature is more revisionist in that it reverses the usual story 
of modernization by showing that modern forms of power were developed first in the colonies 
and transferred to metropoles afterwards. Add to this the significant work of Huri Islamoglu-Inan 
and Peter Perdue, who also note the problems with an asymmetric approach to modernization in 
the West and the rest, and suggest that these should be connected.   60
There are a number of invaluable studies of the larger Ottoman domains and the Muslim 
world that critique Eurocentric approaches. In addition to Mitchell’s pioneering work on Egypt,  61
Khaled Fahmy, Brinkley Messick, and Marwa Elshakry have written monographs that emphasize 
the agency of locals in the emergence of new identities and ideas.  Although the late Ottoman 62
 Timothy Mitchell, Questions of Modernity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).59
 Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, and Peter C. Perdue, Shared Histories of Modernity: China, India, and the Ottoman Empire 60
(New Delhi: Routledge, 2009). For an article by which proposes an approach that goes beyond geographical and 
political boundaries in understanding the rise of modernity see Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Connected Histories: Notes 
Towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia,” Modern Asian Studies, 31.3 (1997): 735-762.
 Mitchell’s Colonising Egypt shows transformations in nineteenth-century Egypt by noting roles of both local and 61
imperial agents. See Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (CUP Archive, 1988); Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, 
Techno-Politics, Modernity (University of California Press, 2002). 
 Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt (Cairo: American 62
University in Cairo Press, 2003); Brinkley Morris Messick, The Calligraphic State Textual Domination and History 
in a Muslim Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Marwa Elshakry, Reading Darwin in Arabic, 
1860-1950 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013). See also, Marwa Elshakry, “Knowledge in Motion: 
The Cultural Politics of Modern Science Translations in Arabic,” Isis: International Review Devoted to the History 
of Science and Its Cultural Influences 99 (2008): 701–730. Studies on similar issues in the larger Muslim world 
make a comparative approach possible. For instance, studies on Muslims in Russia and Central Asia by Adeeb 
Khalid and Mustafa Tuna enable us to see parallels with the transformations going on in those regions. Adeeb 
Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia (Oxford  : Oxford University Press, 2000). 
Mustafa Özgür Tuna, “Madrasa Reform as a Secularizing Process: A View from the Late Russian Empire” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, (2011): 53(3): 540-70.
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Empire was not studied as a colonial power, the works of Said and Mitchell prompted recent 
studies by Usama Makdisi and Selim Deringil, which suggest a closer affinity between Ottoman 
ways of civilizing and those of European imperialism and colonialism.  This further complicates 63
the relationship between the West and the rest, since when looked at from a different angle, the 
victims of modernity turn out to be perpetrators of the mission civilisatrice. 
Studies on the core Ottoman lands also increasingly move away from the older 
historiography. For instance, Islamist or fundamentalist reactions to modernity were portrayed as 
a traditional pattern of thinking in the way of secularist modernity. However, studies by Ismail 
Kara and Kemal Karpat show that these religious ideologies are products of modernity and use 
modern forms of thinking. Karpat’s The Politicization of Islam demonstrates that Islamist politics 
came into being as a result of an interplay between imperial conflicts, new communication 
technologies, and the rise of middle class.  Studies on the late Ottoman thought and institutions 64
complement Kara and Karpat’s studies. In this regard, Brian Silverstein, Amit Bein and Brett 
Wilson and Benjamin Fortna’s studies are remarkable. Silverstein shows how state implemented 
modernization was exercised over Sufi brotherhoods, while Bein, in line with Kara’s studies, 
points out that late Ottoman ulema mediated between tradition and modernity.  Wilson, on the 65
other hand, explored the impact that printing had on the emergence of new understandings of 
 Usama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," American Historical Review 107 (2002): 768-796; Selim Deringil, 63
“"They live in a State of nomadism and savagery": the late Ottoman Empire and the post-colonial 
debate,” Comparative Studies in Society and History: an International Quarterly, 45.2 (2003).
 Kemal H Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late 64
Ottoman State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Selim Deringil, The Well-protected Domains: Ideology 
and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909 (I.B. Tauris, 1998).
 Brian Silverstein, Islam and Modernity in Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). Amit Bein, Ottoman 65
Ulema, Turkish Republic: Agents of Change and Guardians of Tradition (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2011).
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religion as manifested in discussions surrounding the printing, translation, and interpretation of 
the Qur’an in the late Ottoman Empire and early republican Turkey.  In his studies on education 66
in the nineteenth century Fortna also emphasizes Ottoman agency in modernizing educational 
institutions. Fortna points out the internal rivalry between non-Muslim and Muslim communities 
of the Empire, which stimulated building of schools. All of these studies offer a nuanced 
discussion of the period that goes beyond the dichotomy of tradition and modernity. 
The last two chapters of this dissertation which concern the modern Ottoman period, are 
informed by the theoretical critiques of Eurocentric approaches to modernization, and are meant 
to contribute to the rising studies of late Ottoman discussions on science, religion, and politics. In 
addition to the works mentioned earlier on religion and modernity, there are several studies on 
science, state and religion, which challenge the older teleological narratives of modernization 
and secularization. Among these studies, I should note Berrak Burçak’s dissertation, which 
focuses on the politics of science in the late Ottoman Empire. Burçak points out that the late 
Ottoman elite saw science as a cure for all the empire’s ills.  Serdar Poyraz’s dissertation also 67
concerns late Ottoman approaches to science and religion. Poyraz rightly attempts to critique the 
teleological studies of Lewis and Berkes, which I have mentioned earlier. However, he does not 
 Brett Wilson, Translating the Qur̓ an in an Age of Nationalism: Print Culture and Modern Islam in Turkey (London: Oxford University 66
Press, 2014). See also the works of M. Sait Özervarlı, Recep Şentürk, and Murteza Bedir, which point out secularization of Islamic disciplines 
in the late Ottoman Empire. M. S. Özervarlı, "Transferring Traditional Islamic Disciplines into Modern Social Sciences in Late Ottoman 
Thought: the Attempts of Ziya Gökalp and Mehmed Şerafeddin,” The Muslim World 97.2 (2007): 317-330; Recep Şentürk, "Intellectual 
Dependency: Late Ottoman Intellectuals between Fiqh and Social Science" Die Welt Des Islams 47 (2007): 283-318; Murteza Bedir, "Fıkıh to 
Law: Secularization Through Curriculum" Islamic Law and Society 11.3 (2004): 378-401.
 Berrak Burcak, “Science, a Remedy for All Ills Healing ‘The Sick Man of Europe’: a Case for Ottoman 67
Scientism” (Ph.D. diss. Princeton University, 2005).
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provide much of an alternative to the previous binary of modern versus traditional, as he only 
reproduces such binaries by depicting a conflict between secularists and conservatives.   68
In addition, a few recent publications by Justin Stearns, Alper Yalçınkaya and Miri 
Shefer-Mossensohn are particularly useful for my dissertation as they give me an opportunity to 
ground my research in the recent debates. Stearns, Yalçınkaya and Shefer-Mossensohn’s work, 
just as mine, are informed by the sociological and cultural approaches to the production and 
circulation of knowledge. While Stearns calls for a reconsideration of the historiography of 
Islamic science especially with regard to natural science in the pre-modern period,  Yalçınkaya’s 69
Learned Patriots provides a significant contribution to the field by surveying late Ottoman elite 
discourses on science in light of theoretical debates.  However, Yalçınkaya’s study, together 70
with the recent dissertations just mentioned, all focus on the late Ottoman period. My own study 
differs in that it looks at the early modern period as well as the late Ottoman transformations. To 
put it differently studies that focus on the nineteenth century alone tend to make claims about 
change in the idea of science that is not justified by primary sources from the earlier periods. 
Instead, I take the longue durée approach, and study both early modern and modern texts and 
documents in order to make substantiated assertions about transformations in the intellectual 
thought. This allows a better understanding of continuity and change in the categories of science 
 Serdar Poyraz, “Science Versus Religion the Influence of European Materialism on Turkish Thought, 68
1860-1960” (Ph.D. Diss. Ohio State University, 2010). Poyraz’s account is in line with his advisor Carter Findley’s 
book Turkey, Islam, Nationalism and Modernity. The title of this book is remarkably similar to Ziya Gökalp’s 
Türkleşmek İslamlaşmak Muasırlaşmak, (Turkifying, Islamizing, and Modernizing) showing that the major issues 
have not changed even after a century.
 Justin Stearns, “Writing the History of the Natural Sciences in the Pre-modern Muslim World: Historiography, 69
Religion, and the Importance of the Early Modern Period,” History Compass, v. 9 (2011): 923-51. 
 Yalçınkaya’s book Learned Patriots is based on his dissertation entitled "'Their Science, Our Values':  Science, 70
State, and Society in the 19th Century Ottoman Empire.” 
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and religion. Although Shefer-Mossensohn attempts at covering the whole history of the 
Ottoman Empire, unfortunately, her study suffers from lack of close reading of primary 
sources.  In that regard, my dissertation will further our understanding of “science” in the early 71
modern and modern Ottoman periods, filling the lacunae in the scholarship.  
Sources: Manuscripts, Archival Documents, and Printed Material 
 My dissertation is based on a number of sources, including Arabic and Turkish 
manuscripts, archival documents, and printed materials. The material used for chapters dealing 
with the early modern period differs from those used in the last two chapters. In the first two 
chapters I used texts on classifications of sciences, and commentaries and glosses on a 
prolegomenon in a logic textbook. As it is commonly known, the Ottomans did not use the 
printing press to a wide extent in the early modern period. Hence, the texts from the period are 
preserved in Arabic and Turkish manuscripts. Some of them have been published in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Though I made use of these editions, which are not critical in 
general, I have also made ample use of manuscript copies for various reasons. Manuscripts 
include a wealth of information that is invaluable for writing intellectual history. These include, 
information on the circulation of the text, its audience, commentaries by the author or the 
readers, much of which is not transferred to the printed version of these texts.  
 It is interesting that the texts studied in madrasas frequently had the namesake of the 
author, some of whom remain quite obscure. Unfortunately we have meager information on 
 Miri Shefer-Mossensohn, Science Among the Ottomans: The Cultural Creation and Exchange of Knowledge 71
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2015). Shefer-Mossensohn also does not differentiate Ottoman discourses on 
science as she takes the whole geography and time period as if constituting on single culture. Therefore, she insists 
on the existence of an “Ottoman science,” which is not demonstrated.
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biographies of figures who were not prominent when they published their works. The 
biographical dictionaries from the period usually include information on the prominent men. This 
also makes it important to seek bits and pieces of information in manuscripts for a better 
intellectual history. I should also add that my study is a humble effort at exploiting some of these 
manuscripts, and it does not exhaust the numerous copies, some of which I could not access.  
 As can be seen from my bibliography, I mostly made use of the manuscripts in Turkish 
libraries. I did research in various manuscript libraries in Istanbul, Ankara, and Konya. There is 
an important distinction to be made between the holdings of these libraries. Süleymaniye library 
in Istanbul, which has the largest holdings of manuscripts, includes collections of elite Ottomans, 
hence, purely relying on that library could give us a misleading picture of what Ottomans were 
reading or studying. The collections in the National Library (Milli Kütüphane) in Ankara, and the 
regional manuscript library in Konya give us an opportunity to see what provincial Ottomans 
were reading and studying, though this does not mean that they did not include collections of the 
elite. In fact some Ottoman administrators established libraries in Anatolian towns. But to a large 
extent we can see the difference between these collections. 
 For the last two chapters, I relied on both archival documents and printed publications 
from the nineteenth century. The archival material is based on the Prime Ministry Ottoman 
Archives in Istanbul. Searching keywords such as “ilm,” “ulûm,” “fünûn,” and “din” I came 
across correspondence regarding permissions for publishing periodicals and establishing 
scientific societies. That is why the first section of the fourth chapter is rather different as I 
develop an argument that separation of science, religion, and politics came about as a result of 
state regulations. For the second, and third sections of the that chapter I used a periodical from 
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the period, which has copies in ISAM and Atatürk library in Istanbul, and a correspondence that 
has been edited and published in Turkish. 
 I should also note a number of digital resources that have made this study possible. They 
enabled me to access some manuscripts and published books or journals online, among them I 
should note some university libraries in the US including, Princeton, and Harvard. Among 
European libraries, gallica (the website of Bibliotheque Nationale de France) also provides 
online access to documents and manuscripts. Some Turkish libraries as well, including Marmara 
University Rare Books collection (Nadir Eserler), and Atatürk Kitaplığı, as well as ISAM library 
provide access to digital copies of manuscripts and printed rare material. Ankara University 
Library, and the collection of Turkish National Assembly are also note worthy for the late 
Ottoman period. Last but not least, I should note the collection of hathitrust.org together with 
Google Books. As these sources show, this study is made possible by various revolutions 
including manuscript, printing, and digital revolutions. Also, I have consciously made use of 
different sources and media so that I could better capture ideas in their context, and thus provide 
a nuanced approach to the history of categories of science and religion in the Ottoman Empire.  
Outline of Chapters 
 Despite significant developments in the social and cultural study of science within the 
last several decades, historians of science continue to take the modern understanding of science 
for granted. In line with the conventional understanding of science, they have included in their 
histories disciplines that fit the contemporary criteria of science to the neglect of other areas. 
This is all the more so in histories of science in Islamic societies. There have been many works 
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on mathematical and physical sciences in the Ottoman Empire, as if these were completely 
different from other disciplines of the time. In my dissertation, I challenge this historiography by 
studying the concept of science(s) in later Ottoman history (c. 1600-1900). I argue that in the 
early modern period science was conceptualized in a manner that was not biased toward certain 
disciplines (as is the case in the modern period). Rather, Ottoman-Muslims conceptualized 
science in terms of its subject matter, purpose, and goal. Moreover, classifications of sciences 
were more egalitarian through this understanding of science. As a result, they did not alienate 
disciplines that did not share the same epistemic standards with others. Therefore, religious 
sciences were on an equal par with natural-philosophical sciences. This of course was to change 
dramatically in the nineteenth century when the idea of science increasingly referred to positive 
sciences to the exclusion of religious disciplines. I argue that in addition to the interactions with 
contemporary European discourses, certain Ottoman contingencies also brought about a 
separation between science, religion and politics, which resulted in a de facto alienation of 
religious disciplines as non-scientific. 
 Notwithstanding a shared paradigm in the early modern understanding of science, I also 
point out divergences among scholars of the time. Hence, I compare two classifications, or orders 
of sciences, from the period: one by Yahya Nev‘î, a scholar connected with the Ottoman court, 
and the other by Saçaklızâde Muhammed el-Maraşî, a provincial scholar with no ties to the court 
culture. I point out the differences between these orders of sciences, and argue that the context of 
their writing and their varying intellectual genealogies have brought about this diversion. 
 In the second chapter, I read a set of commentaries and glosses closely in order to study 
the idea of the aspect of unity (jihat al-waḥda) of science. I chart the pre-Ottoman genealogies of 
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this idea, and the ever-growing discussions on the concept during the early modern period, which 
also reveals that the commentary and glosses were not stagnant. Rather they included a vibrant 
intellectual conversation on philosophical matters, which the above-mentioned classical narrative 
assumed to be long dead by the Ottoman period. This concept also shows a shared paradigm of 
science among the early modern Ottomans. 
 By the first half of the nineteenth century there was a major shift in the notion of science 
owing to the encounter with European colonial-imperial discourses as well as to the changing 
conditions of knowledge production in the Ottoman Empire as reflected in new institutions such 
as schools, academic societies, print culture etc. In the third chapter, I look at the translation of 
Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah from Arabic into Ottoman Turkish. This translation, which includes 
commentaries by the translator, Cevdet Pasha, a leading Ottoman reformer, is helpful in seeing 
continuity and change in Islamic discursive tradition. Despite their shared conceptions of man 
and humanity, we can see that Cevdet revises much of Ibn Khaldun’s history in order to update 
it. This is an example of how tradition revives itself and continues despite changes in discourses 
and material culture.  
 In the fourth chapter, I point out that nineteenth-century social and institutional changes 
combined with the emergence of printing as a form of mass media brought about a 
reconfiguration of previously established conceptions of science(s) (ulûm and fünûn), religion, 
politics, literature etc. The process of change can be seen in a variety of print and archival 
documents, including official documents, newspapers and journal articles, translations, reform 
proposals, textbooks, and curricula. All of these show how new conceptions of science, together 
with other conceptual shifts, were negotiated, contested, and performed as they were being 
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reconstituted. I discuss Ottoman printing regulations and analyze documents from the archive 
that concern the formation of scientific societies or periodic publications. These, I argue, show 
how the Ottoman Empire was enforcing a separation of the science(s) (ulûm and fünûn) from 
religious and political matters (mezâhib or diyanet, and siyaset or politika). This separation 
indicates a homegrown model of secularity that was not based on European examples, but rather 
emerged out of the state’s efforts to control opposition and prevent religious conflicts. 
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CHAPTER I: Ordering Sciences in the Early Modern 
Ottoman Empire  




Many scholars have discussed the concept of ‘ilm (knowledge, discipline, science, etc.) in 
Islamic thought.  Some have discussed the institutional setting in which knowledge was 72
 The concept of ‘ilm is multivocal, and thus can be translated in a number of ways, depending on the context and 72
the use. It is mostly used to refer to “discipline,” “science” or “knowledge.” I will translate it as science or 
discipline, interchangeably, in places where it signifies an organized body of knowledge. Otherwise, if the word 
refers to anything that we know, then I will translate it as knowledge. Words such as fann, ma‘rifa, ma‘lūm, are also 
used as synonyms for ‘ilm. All of these words are used in both Arabic and Ottoman Turkish, with a similar web of 
meaning. For a brief discussion of this concept see “ʿIlm,” Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition, eds. P. Bearman 
e t a l . (Br i l l Onl ine , 2016) . Reference . Columbia Univers i ty. 08 January 2016 <ht tp : / /
referenceworks.brillonline.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/ilm-SIM_3537> First 
appeared online: 2012, First Print Edition: isbn: 9789004161214, 1960-2007 
For a study on the Islamic philosophical discussion of knowledge see İbrahim Kalın, Knowledge in Later Islamic 
Philosophy:Mulla Sadra on Existence, Intellect, and Intuition (Oxford University Press, 2010).
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produced and transmitted,  while others studied classifications of knowledge.  Among 73 74
scholarly treatments of ‘ilm, Franz Rosenthal’s Knowledge Triumphant provides the most 
comprehensive study of this concept in Islamic intellectual history.  Although Rosenthal 75
presents a wealth of information about the concept of knowledge in Islamic thought, 
demonstrating the diversity of thinking among Muslim scholars, his approach was essentialist. 
This is made clear in the following statement by which he introduces his book: “Civilizations 
tend to revolve around meaningful concepts of an abstract nature which more than anything else 
give them their distinctive character.”  ‘Ilm is one such concept in Islamic civilization, 76
according to Rosenthal. He further states that “‘ilm is Islam, even if theologians have been 
hesitant to accept the technical correctness of this equation.”  Actually, much of Rosenthal’s 77
book reflects diverging meanings of the concept of ‘ilm as it signified truth, religion, or light, 
 There are plenty of studies on madrasas that provide information about production and transmission of knowledge 73
in Muslim societies. George Makdisi’s The Rise of Colleges (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981) is still 
one of the most valuable contributions, although aspects of his work have been criticized by the more recent 
scholarship. There are many more studies including Jonathan Berkey, Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Francis Robinson, The Ulama of the Farangi Mahal (London: 
C. Hurst, 2001); İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye Teşkilâtı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 
Basımevi, 1965).
 For an overview of Arabic-Islamic classifications see Mahdi al-Muhaqqiq, “The Classification of the Sciences,” in 74
The Exact and Natural Sciences, Aḥmad Y. Hassan (Paris: Unesco Publ, 2001) pp. 111-131. Jean Jolivet’s chapter on 
“Classification of the Sciences” is biased toward those classifications which concern the word science in the sense 
used in the Encyclopedia of the History of Arabic Sciences 3 ed. Roshdi Rashed (London: Routledge, 2000) pp. 
1008-1025. For a more detailed study of some classifications, see Osman Bakar, Classification of Knowledge in 
Islam: a Study in Islamic Philosophies of Discipline (Suhail Academy, 2000); Gerhard Endress and Abdou Filali-
Ansary, Organizing Knowledge: Encyclopedic Activities in the Pre-eighteenth Century Islamic World (Brill, 2006); 
Paul L. Heck, The Construction of Knowledge in Islamic Civilization: Qudāma B. Jaʻfar and His Kitāb Al-Kharāj 
Wa-ṣināʻat Al-kitāba (Brill, 2002); Paul L. Heck, “The Hierarchy of Knowledge in Islamic Civilization,” Arabica 
49, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 27–54.
 Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam (Brill Archive, 1970). 75
 Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, p. 1.76
 Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, p. 2.77
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depending on the context in which it was used by various groups.  However, due to his 78
approach, despite the rich evidence to the contrary, Rosenthal objectified Islam in terms of ‘ilm.  79
Rather than equating Islam and ‘ilm, I focus on ‘ilm and its plural ‘ulūm (sciences), one of the 
more technical or terminological meanings of this word. Although, I discuss the concept of ‘ilm 
as an abstract term signifying a science in the following chapter, in this chapter I point out its 
plural use as manifested in classifications of sciences. In this context the concept of ‘ulūm is not 
equal, but inclusive of Islam as a textualized body of knowledge transmitted in various 
disciplinary or scientific discourses which were known as religious sciences.  
This chapter will challenge attempts at essentializing religion or science by providing a 
historical overview of the classification of sciences in the Ottoman Empire, and a comparative 
study of two texts from the early modern period. Orientalists frequently compared Islamic or 
Ottoman intellectuals’ conception of science or knowledge with those of Europeans, and 
exaggerated their differences by rendering the Western thought historical, and yet universal, 
while representing the Islamic thought as essentially religious and transhistorical but local, as if 
those who were Muslims were immunized against historical transformation. One example is 
Peter Burke’s claim that knowledge was fundamentally classified into religious and non-religious 
 Most of Rosenthal’s chapters are arranged according to the classification of disciplines as conceived by Muslim 78
scholars. In the first chapter, he looks at the pre-Islamic history of the word ‘ilm; in the second, he provides a 
discussion of knowledge in the Qur’an; in the third, Rosenthal presents a discussion of knowledge primarily in 
ḥadīth material; and in the fourth chapter he enumerates definitions of knowledge, which are provided in classical 
theological books. In the following four chapters, Rosenthal discusses the concept in terms of theology, Sufism, 
philosophy, and education (adab literature). Overall, Rosenthal relies on the Islamic analytical perspective.
 I think this is due to an overlap between his totalizing Orientalist approach and the essentialist perspective of the 79
history of ideas exemplified by Arthur Lovejoy’s The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1936).
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knowledge.  Relying on scholars such as Rosenthal and Halil İnalcık, Burke asserts that "there 80
was a fundamental distinction between the 'foreign sciences' (essentially arithmetic and natural 
philosophy) and the 'Islamic sciences', which included not only the study of the Qur'an and 
sayings of the prophet (ḥadīth), but also Muslim law (fiqh), theology, poetry and the Arabic 
language."  Burke further claims that Muslims distinguished between religious and secular 81
studies, calling the first ‘ilm, and the second ‘ulūm. The following comparative study of 
classifications of sciences in the early modern Ottoman-Islamic thought reveals that the division 
between religious and non-religious sciences was context specific, and only one among a variety 
of classifications. This renders Burke and his sources’ generalization inaccurate and invalid. 
As I pointed out in the introduction, Turkish scholars themselves have been under the 
influence of both orientalist scholarship and the nationalist rhetoric, which perceived Islamic and 
Ottoman history in terms of failures as they constantly compared these histories with the history 
of Europe or the West, which they represented as superior and as being a normal teleology not 
followed by non-Western people. Remzi Demir and Adem Akın’s study of Saçaklızâde’s Tartīb 
al-‘ulūm, (one of the texts discussed in detail below) reflects this asymmetric approach to 
Ottoman-Islamic intellectual history and the history of sciences. In that study Demir and Akın 
pose the following question: “why did the Turks not produce a philosopher?” They venture to put 
the blame on negative Islamic attitudes toward philosophy.  Moreover, they also contrast 82
 Peter Burke, A Social History of Knowledge: From Gutenberg to Diderot, Based on the First Series of Vonhoff 80
Lectures Given at the University of Groningen (Netherlands) (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000) p. 92. 
 Burke, ibid. p. 92.81
 Demir and Akın, “Saçaklızâde Muhammed ibn Ebi Bekr el-Mar’aşî ve Tertibu’l-Ulûm Adlı Eseri.” Remzi Demir 82
has a three-volume general work on Ottoman intellectual history in Turkish, interestingly entitled Philosophia 
Ottomanica. This work is modeled on Adıvar’s study, which was discussed in the introduction, as it also reports 
European developments after each section on the Ottoman scholars.
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Saçaklızâde’s treatise with writings of European scholars such as Newton’s Principia, and 
Locke’s treatise on human understanding, ignoring particular conditions (textual and contextual) 
that made them possible.   83
Khaled El-Rouayheb also discusses Saçaklızâde’s text, but with a focus on the emergence 
of private reading and “deep reading” during that period.  El-Rouayheb’s recent studies on the 84
history of logic, and intellectual history of the early modern Ottoman period in general, and his 
discussion of Saçaklızâde’s text, though brief, also demonstrates that Demir and Akın’s claim 
regarding the place of philosophy in the Ottoman context is inaccurate. Even though I study the 
same text as Demir and Akın, and El-Rouayheb, I approach it by comparing Saçaklızâde’s (d. 
1732?) work to Yahya Nev‘î’s (d. 1598) Netâyic el-Fünûn in order to understand the concept of 
‘ulūm or funūn (disciplines, sciences). Studying the two texts comparatively, and taking into 
consideration their slightly different genres within Islamic intellectual history, we can see the 
impact of different intellectual genealogies and their contexts on the classification and order of 
sciences. One might wonder whether the fact that they lived over a hundred years apart had 
anything to do with a difference of orders. As the discussions below will show, these two texts 
were produced within diverging intellectual and contextual genealogies, and thus, it is 
conceivable that the new developments in the history of Ottoman Empire was a factor in their 
different orders. Be that as it may, Saçaklızâde was writing in the provinces in rural Anatolia, 
while Nev‘î was writing in Edirne, in the vicinity of the court in Istanbul. These different social 
 A more relevant and reasonable comparison would be with Montaigne’s Of Education, and Locke’s treatise on 83
education, if we have to do a comparative approach. As my discussion will show, Saçaklızâde’s treatise can be read 
in a way that disproves Demir and Akın’s claims.
 El-Rouayheb, Seventeenth Century Islamic Intellectual History, Chapter 3.84
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(and intellectual) milieus had a much bigger role in their discourses, produced two diverging 
orders of sciences; the one by Saçaklızâde was geared toward a moral-salvational project, and 
Nev‘î’s was oriented toward a political-philosophical purpose. 
Classifications of Sciences in pre-Ottoman Islamic Thought 
 The early modern Ottomans were by no means the first to classify sciences. In fact, the 
genre of classifying sciences among Muslims, long precedes the Ottoman Empire. It began at 
least during the Abbasid period, when a number of Islamic religious disciplines were established, 
and a host of ancient or existing disciplines were being further pursued. Classifications appeared 
in a few forms, in encyclopedic works: such as al-Khwārazmī’s Mafātīḥ al-‘Ulūm, Ikhwān al-
Ṣafā’s Rasā’il, and al-Ghazālī’s Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn;  in treatises devoted to classifications, such 85
as al-Fārābī’s Ihṣā’ al-‘Ulūm, Ibn Sina’s Risāla fī Aqsām al-‘Ulūm al-‘Aqliya, and Ibn al-
Akfānī’s Irshād al-Qāṣid fī Asnā al-Maqāṣid;  and in the genre of unmūzaj al-‘ulūm (samples of 86
 Muḥammad A. Khwārazmī, Mafātīḥ al-ʻUlūm, (1970); al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn, (Matba’a al-Numudhajiya, 85
1982?). For further information and bibliographic reference on Ikhwān al-Safā’s Rasā’il see Y. Marquet, "Ik̲h̲wān al-
Ṣafāʾ" Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman, et al. (Brill Online, 2016). Reference. 
Columbia University. 10 May 2016 <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/
ikhwan-al-safa-COM_0356> First appeared online: 2012, First Print Edition: isbn: 9789004161214, 1960-2007.
 Abu Nasr al-Fārābī, Ihṣā’ al-‘Ulūm (al-Qahirah: Maktabat al-Anjlu al-Misriyah, 1968); Ibn Sina, Tis‘ Rasā’il fī al-86
ḥikma wa al-tabī‘iyyāt, (Matba’a Hindiye, 1908); Ibn al-Akfānī, Irshād al-Qaṣid ila Asnā al-Maqāṣid (Beirut, 
1904). 
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sciences),  which is somewhat different from treatises on classifications (taqsīm or tasnīf 87
al-‘ulūm).  Along with these classifications, there were also some hierarchies of sciences (Tartīb 88
al-‘Ulūm), the most famous being Ibn Ḥazm’s Marātib al-‘Ulūm.   89
 The pre-Ottoman classifications of sciences, of which I’ve mentioned only a small 
portion here, were inherited by the Ottomans who drew on a mixture of these sources and others 
in writing their treatises. The Ottoman dynasty, which emerged as a political power in Western 
Anatolia, inherited the existing Islamic corpus of learning. In fact, the Ottomans initially did not 
have strong centers of learning. Therefore, many students travelled from the Ottoman territories 
 More on this genre when I discuss Nev‘î’s Netâyic. To the texts on unmūzaj we could add treatises on various 87
issues of sciences in the form of question and answer (Q&A). Although these are not as systematic in covering 
various disciplines, they include a variety of issues that attest to their widespread learning and acumen in solving 
difficult problem. For some example see Kemal Çelebi, Ajwiba ‘alā masā’il min al-funūn al-muta‘addida, MS 
Bağdatlı Vehbi 02052-013. In this treatise Çelebi raises issues from authoritative books by scholars such as al-
Jurjānī and responds to them (fl. 183-190). Initial parts deal with issues including Qur’anic hermeneutics, 
metaphysics, logic, and knowledge. It is dedicated to Yakup Pasha. For another treatise see Abdurrahman ibn Seydī 
Ali al-‘Ajamī Saydī Alizāda, As’ila wa ajwiba min funūn mukhtalifa, MS Carullah 02113-006 (fl. 9-19). This is 
quite similar to Kemal Çelebi’s treatise. They both take issues from other scholars and respond, expressing their own 
views. There is a resemblance between Q&A and the samples of sciences (unmūzaj) literature. However, some of the 
former only treat questions in one or two disciplines. An example is Jamāl al-Dīn al-Aqsarāyī’s al-As’ila wa’l-
Ajwiba, which concerns issues in Qur’anic exegesis and hadīth. Al-Aqsarāyī’s treatise was written in Persian, with 
original Arabic quotations from the Qur’an and the hadīth. See al-Aqsarāyī, al-As’ila wa’l-Ajwiba, MS Fatih 
00099-001 fl. 1-46, dated 811AH. This manuscript includes another treatise in the same Q&A style authored by 
‘Abd al-Malik ibn Aḥmad al-Sarakhsī (MS Fatih 00099-002, fl. 46-47. This treatise is devoted to why questions (al-
ḥikma). There are a number of other treatises in Q&A style.
 The following can be cited among treatises that focus on the definition and classification of sciences (māhiyat 88
al-‘ulūm, ta‘rīf al-‘ulūm, taqsīm al-‘ulūm, and mawḍū‘āt al-‘ulūm etc.): Yusuf b. Hamza es-Surani, “Risala fī ḥudūd 
al-‘ilm wa taqsīmātih,” MS Nuruosmaniye 4892-009, fl.138-147; Nakibzâde Ebu Bekir b. Ahmed, “Risāla fī 
māhiyat al-‘ulūm,” MS Nuruosmaniye 03907. This treatise begins with discussion of tafsīr (Qur’anic exegesis). 
There were scholars who continued writing in these genres in the nineteenth century. See, for instance, Muhammed 
b. Necmuddin Erzenetu’l-Rum (a.k.a. Resul Hocazâde), “Tarifat ve taksimatu’l-ulûm” (Hülasatu’l-ulûm), MS Özel 
525, (dated 1275AH). This treatise includes an Arabic introduction followed by description of disciplines in 
Ottoman Turkish. It is quite interesting as it incorporates the new understanding of science in the nineteenth century, 
and uses the phrase ‘ulūm al-saḥīḥa, meaning positive sciences. It also appropriates some modern classifications 
such as fine arts. It provides a nice contrast in regards to how the notion of science was changing, and how the 
religious sciences were almost being sidelined as an Arab matter.
 Ibn Ḥazm, and Iḥsān ʻAbbās, Rasāʼil Ibn Ḥazm al-Andalūsī (Bayrūt: al-Muʼassasah al-ʻArabīyah li’l-Dirāsāt wa 89
al-Nashr, 1983).
 40
to Mamluk Cairo or to lands under the control of the Ilkhanids to complete their education.  90
Later generations of Ottoman scholars continued studying texts that were produced by scholars 
under Mongol or Timurid rule during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, including Nasīr al-
Dīn al-Tūsī, Qāḍī Bayḍāwī, Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī, and Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī. Moreover, 
scholars from neighboring dynastic territories travelled to the Ottoman Empire and vice-versa. In 
short, as my discussion of the Saçaklızâde and Nev‘î's texts will show, they both crossed the 
political boundaries of the Ottoman Empire in terms of their intellectual genealogies, and are 
therefore products of a connected Islamic history.  
 By pursuing previously well-trodden paths, Saçaklızâde and Nev‘î made use of slightly 
different genres when writing about the sciences. While Saçaklızâde’s writing could be situated 
in the genre of pedagogical texts (ta‘līm al-muta‘allim or tartīb al-‘ulūm), Nev‘î’s work is in the 
genre of unmūzaj al-‘ulūm (representing sciences). However, they both provide various orders of 
sciences, which make this comparative study of the two texts and figures possible. I will begin 
by discussing Saçaklızâde’s text first, although chronologically it was written over a century after 
Nev‘î’s book. It is common to consider a chronological connection between events when given 
in that order. However, since my argument is based on the context and intellectual genealogies of 
the two texts, and there is no immediate connection between the texts, I reverse the chronological 
order so that it does not inadvertently lead to making an argument about decline or progress 
based solely on the chronological order of these two texts. 
 For a study of the scholarly movements or exchanges during early Ottoman history see the following dissertation: 90
Abdurrahman Atçıl, “The Formation of the Ottoman Learned Class and Legal Scholarship (1300-1600)” (Ph.D. 
Diss. Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago, 2010).
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Saçaklızâde’s Tartīb al-‘Ulūm as a Pedagogic Intervention 
Saçaklızâde’s Tartīb al-‘ulūm was written around 1715. The treatise consists of an 
introduction, two objectives, an addendum, and a conclusion. Saçaklızâde’s text conveys at least 
three different classifications of the sciences. In the introduction, Saçaklızâde began by 
enumerating useful disciplines (funūn nāfi‘a). He then restated the age-old division of knowledge 
into religious (shar‘ī ) and non-religious (ghayr-shar‘ī) sciences dating at least to the ninth 
century.  Finally, Saçaklızâde provided another classification of the sciences based on the legal 91
or normative verdicts on studying sciences. Actually, all of these classifications reflect his own 
propensities and allude to his intellectual genealogy, as the comparison with Yahya Nev‘î’s text 
will demonstrate below. In the first chapter (maqṣad, literally goal, purpose), Saçaklızâde 
described useful disciplines. In addition, he pointed out harmful disciplines i.e. those sciences 
which contain knowledge that should be avoided. In the second chapter Saçaklızâde presented a 
proper order (tartīb) of studying sciences for beginners. In line with earlier Islamic and Ottoman 
writings, Saçaklızâde pointed out three levels (marātib, elementary, intermediate, and advanced) 
 Classifying knowledge or sciences into religious and non-religious sciences dates back at least to al-Khwārazmī’s 91
Mafātīḥ al-‘Ulūm. In its preface, al-Khwārazmī stated: "I have divided it into two treatises. The first is of religious 
sciences (‘ulūm al-shar‘iya), and that which comes close to them among Arabic disciplines. The second is foreign 
sciences from the Greeks and other nations” (Mafātīḥ al-‘Ulūm, p. 15). Prior to this classification, Jābir ibn Ḥayyān 
had an ostensibly similar classification, dividing knowledge into that which is of this world, and that which is of 
religion (dīn) in his treatise entitled Kitāb al-Hudūd, published in Mukhtār Rasāʼil Jābir Ibn Ḥayyān (al-Qāhirah: 
al-Khānjī, 1935) pp. 97-114. However, this is quite a different sense of religion as philosophical knowledge is also 
regarded within religious knowledge. Perhaps we should see it as overlapping with a classification of sciences into 
theoretical and practical sciences. Later on, Ibn Ḥazm and al-Ghazālī divided knowledge along similar lines to those 
of al-Khwārazmī. For a discussion of al-Khwārazmī, see Paul Heck’s previously cited article. For more information 
on al-Ghazālī’s classification of sciences see chapters eight and nine of Osman Bakar’s Classification of Knowledge 
in Islam, and Alexander Treiger, “Al-Ghazālī’s Classification of the Sciences and Description of the Highest 
Theoretical Science,” Dîvân Disiplinlerarası Çalışmalar Dergisi, 16:30 (2011/1).
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of learning in each discipline.  In the addendum (tazyīl) Saçaklızâde praised the Qur’an, and in 92
the conclusion he discussed philosophy, condemning in particular the study of metaphysics.  93
Saçaklızâde’s book was intended as an intervention into the prevailing pedagogy. 
He lamented the lack of valuable books, and argued that this was due to the contemporary style 
of education. Saçaklızâde stated, “O community of students …in times past, there used to be a 
group of authors and verifiers among the ulema, however there are not such writers in any place 
[now].”  As we can see, Saçaklızâde perceived a decline in the quality of scholarship in his 94
time. However, we should not take this at face value; rather it shows that Saçaklızâde’s particular 
expectations regarding learning were not being met. He was addressing certain defects that he 
saw in the state of education.  
Saçaklızâde certainly was not the first to complain about the lack of rigorous scholarship; 
Katip Çelebi also complained about this matter in the previous century. However, Katip Çelebi 
lamented about the neglect of rational sciences in the medreses controlled by the state,  while 95
Saçaklızâde complained about the prevailing interest in philosophy and complex glosses. 
Nevertheless, we can assume that many were happy with the status quo, as the amount of such 
criticism is rather limited. These criticisms have drawn undue attention in the modern period 
since they corresponded with the decline paradigm. In fact, Ali Suavi used Saçaklızâde’s 
complaints during the nineteenth century in order to criticize the education system and call for 
 In line with the three levels of study, there were three levels of texts, short, medium, and long, as pointed out by 92
many scholars, including Nev’î, and Ibn al-Akfānī (Irshād al-Qāsid, p. 19).
 Muḥammed ibn Ebi Bekr Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm (Bayrūt, Lubnān: Dār al-Bashāʼir al-Islāmīyah, 1988) p. 93
83.
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb Al-ʻulūm, p. 79.94
 Katip Çelebi, Kashf, v. 2, p. 41.95
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reform.  Overall, I agree with El-Rouayheb’s assessment that such criticisms in favor or against 96
philosophy, from the early modern period itself, cancel each other out as reliable historical facts. 
Therefore, evidence needs to be sought based on the deeds, not the words of scholars of early 
modern period.  97
Saçaklızâde pointed out that the problem was due to the methods of education. He noted 
that in the past scholars had taught students using introductory books that were clear. But in his 
time, Saçaklızâde complained, students were introduced to the most complex issues of a 
discipline without first studying introductory texts.  Apparently, they were delving into glosses 98
on glosses of commentaries of a text. Saçaklızâde believed that since students would not 
comprehend glosses, their intelligence would wither away by engaging in such complex texts. 
Saçaklızâde quoted al-Zarnūjī’s (d. 1223) Ta‘līm al-Muta‘allim  to the effect that their pious 99
ancestors taught from simple and brief texts, and reiterated the latter’s warning against students 
taking notes on issues they did not understand.  Saçaklızâde suggested that this warning 100
applied just as much to those who audited classes, i.e. that if they did not understand a speech 
 See the first issue of Muhbir, a late Ottoman periodical. For more information on Ali Suavi, see chapter four, 96
where I provide a brief biography and discuss his journal Ulûm.
 El-Rouayheb, Seventeenth Century, p. 26.97
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, pp. 80-81.98
 Al-Zarnūjī’s Ta‘līm al-Muta‘allim was one of the most popular texts on manners of learning. Katip Çelebi pointed 99
out that Ibn Ismā‘īl wrote a commentary on it during the reign of Murad III, for the sultan’s use. Çelebi also notes 
that it is said that the work was commented on for use in the harem, as the commentator was a teacher there. In fact, 
in the introduction the commentator points out that al-Zarnūjī’s text drew interest from residents of the palace, 
perhaps meaning students and bureaucrats at the royal court. What is more interesting is that this commentary was 
attributed to Nev‘î, the author of Netâyic, (see title page of MS Hacı Mahmud Efendi 01869, dated 1074AH). Çelebi 
also notes that the Ta‘līm al-Muta‘allim was translated into Turkish as Irshād al-Tālibīn fī Ta‘līm al-Muta‘allimīn 
(see Kashf al-Ẓunūn, v. 1, pp. 439-440). It is also translated into English by G. E. Grunebaum and Abel, Taʻlīm Al-
Mutaʻallim: Ṭarīq At-Taʻallum = Instruction of the Student (New York: King's Crown Press, 1947).
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, p. 81; cf. Burhān al-Dīn al-Zarnūjī, Kitāb Taʻlīm Al-Mutaʻallim Ṭarīq Al-Taʻallum 100
(Bayrūt: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1981) p. 101.
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they should not continue listening. Basically, he discouraged students from studying complicated 
glosses before they grasped the essential issues of a science.  I should note that Ibn Khaldun, 101
writing about a century and a half after al-Zarnūjī, already complained about the harm that 
summas were causing, in that brief texts were too difficult for students to comprehend, and did 
not lend themselves to acquiring the scholarly habitus. According to Ibn Khaldun, it was more 
likely to gain the scholarly habitus by studying larger elaborations of subject matters (mawḍū‘āt 
al-basīṭa al-muṭawwala) rather than the handbooks.  These diverging views on what was 102
worthy of studying shows that Saçaklızâde’s was calling for a return to teaching students from 
brief handbooks rather than glosses. Ibn Khaldun would have disagreed as he thought scholarly 
habitus was present in the expansive texts rather than the handbooks. 
Although Saçaklızâde introduced his Tartīb as an intervention into the prevailing 
pedagogy of the time, the reform envisioned by Saçaklızâde was itself based on the 
classifications and hierarchical ordering of sciences. It was by ordering sciences and instructing 
them accordingly that Saçaklızâde sought to revitalize learning among the madrasa students.  
A Pragmatic Classification of Sciences 
Among his few classifications of sciences, Saçaklızâde first presented a pragmatic or 
utilitarian division of sciences. He enumerated useful sciences (‘ulūm nāfi‘a), and subsequently 
noted harmful sciences as well as useless sciences (meaning neither useful nor harmful sciences). 
The following is a full list of the sciences categorized by Saçaklızâde as useful or not. 
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, pp. 81-82.101
 Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddima, v. 3, ed. Cheddadi, pp. 211-212.102
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1. Useful sciences (al-funūn al-nāfi‘a):  
a. Arabic sciences: lexicography, morphology, Arabic writing, syntax, poetry, 
exposition or discourse, and oratory (muhāḍarāt) 
b. Some rational sciences (ba‘ḍ al-’ulūm al-‘aqliyya) : logic and argumentation, 103
principles of theology (mabādī ‘ilm al-kalām),  mathematical sciences such as 104
geometry, arithmetic, and astronomy. 
c. Sciences that are derived from the book (Qur’an) and the tradition of the Prophet 
(sunna) such as creed, morality, preaching, jurisprudence (fiqh) and legal theory. 
d. Esoteric knowledge 
e. Qur’anic sciences, including its arrangement (naẓm), guidelines for its recitation, 
and its origins, writing, and its recitation and exegesis. 
f. Sciences of tradition (ḥadīth); knowledge of the text (matn), and its meaning 
(ma‘ānī) and its condition with regard to weakness and strength stemming from its 
transmission (i.e. whether it truly originated from the Prophet and was not forged), 
hence it is called knowledge of the condition of tradition (‘ilmu ahwālihi), and the 
science of the methodology of ḥadīth. 
g. Anatomy (tashrīḥ) 
h. Medicine (ṭibb) 
i. Physiognomy (‘ilm al-firāsa), 
j. Interpretation of dreams 
k. Persian language and grammar  105
2. Harmful sciences: 
a. Philosophy (falsafa, i.e. metaphysics)  
b. Magic (siḥr) 
c. Astrology (‘ilm aḥkām al-nujūm) 
3. Neither harmful nor useful (i.e. useless) sciences 
a. Poetry (shi‘r) 
b. Genealogies (ansāb) 
This classification, like much of Saçaklızâde’s discourse, is dependent on earlier 
articulations. For much of the treatise’s content, we are able to be more precise about 
Saçaklızâde’s textual sources (intellectual context) thanks to his references. However, 
Saçaklızâde did not refer to the preceding authorities that presented a similar classification. 
 In a marginal note of MS Marmara YZ 0739 (p. 4) of Tartīb, it is explained that the word “some” is used because 103
some of the rational sciences such as natural philosophy and metaphysics were considered harmful. 
 Theology is divided into two sections: principles (mabādi), and intent of theology (maqāsid). The former deals 104
with issues of epistemology, ontology, and natural philosophy, the latter presents articles of faith with their proofs.
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, p. 85.105
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Nevertheless, Saçaklızâde does refer now and again to one particular text in other parts of the 
Tartīb, namely al-Ghazālī’s Revival of Religious Sciences, which contains a remarkably similar 
classification of non-religious knowledge. Hence, it seems that Saçaklızâde was reformulating 
al-Ghazālī’s classification.  
In his magnum opus, al-Ghazālī re-conceptualized religious sciences, doing away with 
the ossified disciplinary discourses such as fiqh, kalām, and taṣawwuf, providing a rather 
interdisciplinary approach to Islam, to use our current parlance. Al-Ghazālī classified all of 
knowledge into practical (‘ilm al-mu‘āmala) and revealed [theoretical] knowledge (‘ilm al-
mukāshafa).  In addition to this overarching conception of the whole book, al-Ghazālī divided 106
sciences into religious and non-religious sciences.  Then, he divided non-religious sciences into 107
praiseworthy, blameworthy, and permissible sciences, which I assert is the basis of the above 
classification by Saçaklızâde, who basically integrates religious sciences into al-Ghazālī’s 
category of praiseworthy or beneficial sciences.  I do not mean to say that al-Ghazālī did not 108
have a conception of useful and non-useful sciences. He definitely had such a conception, as he 
stated that he distinguishes useful knowledge (al-ilm al-nāfi‘) from harmful knowledge (al-ilm 
al-dārr). This idea itself was inspired by a prophetic ḥadīth, quoted by al-Ghazālī, which stated 
 The word “mukāshafa” indicates al-Ghazālī’s propensity for Sufi knowledge. In other words, instead of using the 106
word “naẓar” which indicates a more theological or philosophical approach, al-Ghazālī prefers “kashf” which is 
claimed by Sufis as the most reliable source of knowledge. For a discussion of the Avicennian origins of this 
classification, see Avner Giladi "On the Origin of Two Key-Terms in Al-Ġazzālī's Iḥyāʼ ʻUlūm Al-Dīn" Arabica 
(1989); cf. Treiger, “Al-Ghazālī’s Classification of the Sciences.” 
 By religious (shar‘ī), al-Ghazālī means sciences that are derived from the prophets as opposed to those that are 107
arrived at by reason, or those arrived at by experience such as medicine. They are also different from sciences that 
are learned by hearing, such as language. See Iḥyā’, (1927) p. 27.
 He further divides praiseworthy worldly sciences into those that are recommended, and those that are obligatory 108
for some. Saçaklızâde’s reappropriation of this classification will be discussed below.
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“O God, indeed, I seek refuge in you from knowledge that does not benefit.”  However, al-109
Ghazālī did not enumerate “useful sciences” in the manner and scope used by Saçaklızâde. 
Another source for Saçaklızâde’s classification of useful sciences could be 
Taşköprüzâde’s treatise entitled Risāla al-Jāmi‘a li-Wasf al-‘Ulūm al-Nāfi‘a (A Treatise 
Concerning Useful Sciences).  This treatise covers issues discussed in Saçaklızâde’s Tartīb. So 110
first I would like to provide an overview of Taşköprüzâde’s treatise on this very issue in order to 
reveal the similarities, before going on to discuss the enumeration of useful sciences by 
Saçaklızâde. Taşköprüzâde, a widely learned and prolific sixteenth-century Ottoman author, was 
best known for his bio-bibliographic work on Ottoman scholars entitled Shaqā’iq al-Nu’māniya 
fī ‘Ulamā al-Dawla al-‘Uthmāniya, and his encyclopedic work on the subject matter of the 
sciences named Miftāḥ al-Sa‘āda wa Miṣbāḥ al-Siyāda fī Mawḍū‘āt al-‘Ulūm.  His treatise on 111
useful sciences is quite short compared to the Miftāh al-Sa‘āda, and is written for those who seek 
perfection through the knowledge of the next world (‘ulūm al-’ākhira). It is divided into three 
sections and a conclusion. In the first section, Taşköprüzâde defines useful sciences (sing. al-‘ilm 
al-nāfi‘) as those that are derived from the Qur’an and the Prophet’s sunna (al-‘ulūm al-wārida fī 
al-kitāb wa’l-sunna), concern either actions of those who bear responsibility, relate conditions of 
beginning and end (afterworld), or deal with ethics or morality such as abstinence, patience, 
 The Prophet’s ḥadīth states “Allahumma innī a‘ūdhu bi-ka min ‘ilm lā yanfa‘.” Saçaklızâde quotes another 109
prophetic saying from al-Ghazālī’s Iḥyā’ which describes poetry and genealogy as knowledge that is neither useful 
nor harmful. This further indicates that he was relying on al-Ghazālī’s discussion. See Al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’’ ‘Ulūm al-
Dīn, p. 11, cf. Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, p. 85.
 For bibliographic reference on Taşköprüzâde’s Risāla al-Jāmi‘a li-Wasf al-‘ulūm al-Nāfi’a see Katip Çelebi, 110
Kashf, v. 2 p. 180. Taşköprüzâde’s Miftāḥ al-Sa‘āda is also noteworthy as an encyclopedic work on classification 
and description of the sciences, which also was known by Saçaklızâde. For a descriptive article on the content of 
Miftāḥ al-Sa‘āda, see Francesca Bellino, “The Classification of Sciences in an Ottoman Arabic Encyclopaedia: 
Taşköprüzâde’s Miftāh al-Sa‘āda,” Quaderni di Studi Arabi 9:9 (2014): 161-181. 
 See bibliography for printed edition of these books.111
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contentment, peace of the heart in praying etc. These are made possible by the science of 
preaching, positive law, principles of jurisprudence and theology, and taṣawwuf. These six 
sciences are called religious sciences, and knowledge of them to a certain extent is obligatory 
upon all Muslims.   112
Similar to al-Ghazālī’s bias toward taṣawwuf, Taşköprüzâde also considered taṣawwuf to 
be the ultimate knowledge that is acquired by studying other sciences and practicing them. 
Arabic disciplines and logic (‘ilm al-dirāsa) are considered principles (mabādi’) of useful 
sciences. Taṣawwuf is also referred to as ‘ilm al-wirātha, based upon a prophetic statement. The 
rest of the sciences either belong to the order of earning a living (nizam al-ma‘āsh) or they are 
instrumental in perfecting the sciences of the other world (‘ulūm al-ukhrawiya).  All of these 113
are considered to be among the useful sciences, be they of making a living (ma‘āsh), or the end 
(ma‘ād, the afterworld).  
According to Taşköprüzâde philosophical sciences and geometry, on the other hand, were 
far from the sciences of the other world. Taşköprüzâde asserted that these sciences were 
produced by those who preferred this world to the next world. The case of poetry and genealogy 
was similar due to a prophetic ḥadīth that considered these as neither useful nor harmful.  After 114
all, Taşköprüzâde stated, knowledge (‘ilm) is firm verses (of the Qur’an), established practice (of 
 Taşköprüzâde, Risāla al-Jāmi‘a li-Wasf al-‘ulūm al-Nāfi’a, MS Reisulküttab 944, folios 83b-84a. For another 112
copy see MS Aşir Efendi 00436-005, fl. 65-81.
 Taşköprüzâde, Risāla al-Jāmi’a, MS Reisulküttab 944, fl. 85b-86a.113
 Taşköprüzâde, Risāla al-Jāmi‘a, MS Reisulküttab 944, fl. 86a. The second chapter of Taşköprüzâde’s treatise 114
concerns the obligatory sciences. The third focuses on explaining the need for argumentation in sciences. A bulk of 
this section consists of a history of religious sciences, and especially views on kalām (theology). The last section 
also explains disagreements among the early Muslims on theological issues. In short, the main bulk of the text 
consists of discussion on the need for theology and its emergence, ending with a prophetic ḥadīth on sects. This 
makes it yet another treatise that deals with classifications of sciences in order to propagate a certain theology.
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the Prophet), and just obligation (farīḍa adila?), as stated in Tatarkhāniya (a Hanafī manual of 
Islamic law).   115
It is not clear whether Saçaklızâde had access to Taşköprüzâde’s Risāla. However, they 
share similar issues. They both begin by enumerating the useful sciences, and then determine the 
obligatory knowledge as well as providing a lengthy discussion on the merits of studying 
theology. They also share some of the same references such as Tatarkhāniya. But Saçaklızâde’s 
treatise differs in that it also provides a curriculum of study.  
Saçaklızâde’s choice of prioritizing the pragmatic classification of sciences might seem 
arbitrary, considering the number of classifications in his text and elsewhere. However, a 
marginal note in the Tartīb indicates otherwise. According to this note, the category of “useful” is 
more comprehensive than categories of religious knowledge, or worldly knowledge such as 
medicine.  Therefore, it is implied that Saçaklızâde preferred this category of sciences to begin 116
with in order to be as comprehensive as possible. 
As we can see, authors such as Saçaklızâde put a great deal of emphasis on “naf‘,” 
meaning utility, pragma, benefit, or whatever we may call ‘the good that comes out of an action.’ 
This concern with naf‘ is central for acquiring knowledge in general, and in ordering sciences in 
particular. Thus, we cannot make sense of tensions revolving around the study of certain 
disciplines such as astrology, magic, alchemy, philosophy and theology without looking at what 
pragma, utility, benefit, and good means for scholars such as Saçaklızâde. 
 For bibliographic information and description of Tatarkhāniya, see Ferhat Koca “el-Fetava’t-Tatarhaniyye,” DİA, 115
v. 12, pp. 446-447; Katip Çelebi, Kashf, v. 1, p. 322. Katip Çelebi described it as a huge book, in many volumes, 
which collected issues of al-Muhīt, al-Dhakhīra, al-Khāniya, and al-Zahīriya, which are all Hanafī legal texts. He 
also noted that it begins with a chapter on knowledge (‘ilm), which again shows the importance of the chapter for 
Hanafī scholars.
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, footnote d, p. 82, cf. MS Marmara YZ 0739, p. 3.116
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Due to the aforementioned prophetic ḥadīth, in which God’s refuge is sought from 
knowledge that does not benefit, we might be inclined to assume that this was the sole reason for 
such keen interest in the pragmatic aspect of knowledge. Be that as it may, as the following 
discussion shows, there was also a philosophical consideration of the issue in line with the 
teleological thinking of Aristotelian tradition. Hence, we have a situation where Islamic precepts 
and Aristotelian philosophy are enmeshed in this discussion (and many others). Saçaklızâde 
distinguished benefit (fā’ida) from goal (ghāya), and telos (gharaḍ), all of which are related to 
an action. All of the benefits (manfa‘a) that result from an action are called fā’ida (benefit). In 
other words, an action can produce multiple benefits. If an agent acts in order to acquire the 
benefit, then it is called gharaḍ (telos). And it is called ghāya (goal) if it comes at the end of an 
action. The ghāya occurs because somebody acts to bring it about.  Let me give an example 117
that I hope captures the nuances of this discussion. Building a house as an action can bring about 
the benefit of having a shelter, this benefit is in regards to the subject. The act of building results 
in a house, and hence, considering the relationship between the object and action, the resulting 
object is called the aim or goal (of the action). The fact that somebody acted in order to build a 
house, can be considered the teleological cause (gharaḍ) of the action. All of these are 
interconnected, and as these scholars would say, they are the same in essence, different in 
regards.  
 Saçaklızâde also stated he wrote a long treatise on fā’ida but was afraid to publish it due to its tediousness (imlāl/117
malal). Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, p. 86. For a similar articulation of this issue, cf. Katip Çelebi, Kashf, v.1, p. 33. 
Çelebi stated that fā’ida and ghāya are the same in essence, but differ in regard (i‘tibār). Similarly, gharaḍ (or 
maqsūd) and ‘illa al-ghā’iya are the same in essence and different in regard. Katip Çelebi cited Sayyid Sharīf al-
Jurjāni as the source of the discussion.
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Though Saçaklızâde did not mention any earlier authorities writing on “fā’ida,” it seems 
that he relied on al-Jurjānī’s articulation of the issue.  Al-Jurjānī himself was well grounded in 118
Islamic philosophy (ḥikma) as well as in philosophical theology (kalām), and thus his discussion 
was probably influenced by Avicennian tradition,  which was itself indebted to the Aristotelian 119
tradition.  120
In addition to the concept of “naf‘” and “fā’ida” (benefit) it is also important to note the 
idea of “‘abath” (nugatory, futile, useless), which was invoked with regard to the study of some 
disciplines. Students were shunned from spending efforts on things in vain. A marginal note on 
MS Marmara YZ 0739 explains that benefit (fā’ida) is that which is worth the effort. If an action 
does not result in a benefit that is larger than the effort spent, then that action is not worthy of 
being pursued. In that regard, study of disciplines that did not produce greater benefit than the 
effort spent were considered ‘abath (useless). Poetry and genealogies of people were considered 
among such sciences.   121
Following the philosophical explanation of actions and their outcomes in order to 
delineate benefit, goal, and ultimate goal, Saçaklızâde then stated that for every knowledge there 
 Apparently al-Jurjānī is the source of these ideas. See Ṣiddīq ibn Ḥassan al-Qannūjī, and ʻAbd -J. Zakkār. Abjad 118
Al-ʻulūm (Dimashq: Wizārat al-Thaqāfah wa-al-Irshād al-Qawmī, 1978) pp. 49-50, see also p. 85. There are many 
copies of al-Jurjānī’s small essay on this issue. See, for example, MS 01 Hk 181/3, folio 128a, accessible from the 
National Library in Ankara. Süleymaniye manuscript library of Istanbul has other manuscript copies including MS 
Servili 209-002, fl. 113-114; Yazma Bağışlar 00735-008; Darülmesnevi 00512-017, fl. 159-161. 
 For a discussion on causes (including final cause) in Arabic and Islamic philosophy, see Kara Richardson, 119
“Causation in Arabic and Islamic Thought,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2015 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/arabic-islamic-causation/>.
 For book length discussion of Aristotle’s teleology, and his distinction between two types of “for the sake of 120
which” i.e. aim and benefit of actions, see, especially chapter 3 of, Monte R. Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005). 
 MS Marmara YZ 0739, marginal note “k,” p. 4.121
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is a benefit, and for every benefit there is another benefit ultimately leading to success in 
achieving happiness in two worlds (lit. homes, this world and the next, al-fawz bi-sa‘āda al-
dārayn). As this statement shows, utility, goal, and purpose in performing certain acts is based on 
happiness (eudaemonia, to use an Aristotelian terminology). However, the question is how to 
ascertain that happiness, which was central for many Muslim scholarly discussions on the issue 
in the post-classical period.  For instance, both Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064) and al-Ghazālī’s conception 122
of knowledge and practice was based on happiness. In his Marātib al-‘Ulūm, Ibn Ḥazm 
explained that religious knowledge is superior to worldly knowledge as it provides eternal 
happiness. It was thought that worldly knowledge only brings about temporary happiness.  A 123
similar emphasis on obtaining happiness in the eternal world is also expressed in al-Ghazālī’s 
oeuvre. For example, in his Mizān al-‘Amal (The Balance of Action), al-Ghazālī presented the 
kind of knowledge and practice that leads to eternal happiness in the world to come.  Ottoman 124
scholars such as Birgivi and Taşköprüzâde also noted that happiness in the afterworld was more 
worthy of the effort. Birgivi introduced his magnum opus, al-Tarīqa al-Muhammadiya 
 In fact, Aristotle himself was aware of multiple means of bringing about happiness, depending on one’s 122
condition. See the introduction of Nicomachean Ethics, available online at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/
nicomachaen.1.i.html last accessed April 1, 2016.
 Ibn Ḥazm stated “human beings have two abodes; this world and the world after this world. It is clear that human 123
beings live for a little while in this world. Hence it is not of any good for human beings to struggle/study hard for 
sciences that would benefit one for a little while in this world. Because what one learns from this world is either for 
having more property/wealth or keeping one’s health... and there is not a third benefit of studying sciences of this 
world…” Ibn Ḥazm argued that one could earn a better living by doing other things such as befriending a sultan, or 
cultivating land, rather than studying. If the purpose is to make a good living, then, he argued, there was no point in 
wasting time by studying the sciences of this world. That could be achieved in a much faster and easier way by the 
means mentioned. In short, Ibn Ḥazm suggests that it is just not worth studying something that is both frustrating, 
and has such little return (perhaps these assessments are applicable to the life of an academic today). If that is the 
case, then, he argued for investing in religious sciences, which promise the everlasting happiness. See Ibn Ḥazm, 
ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad, and Iḥsān ʻAbbās, Rasāʼil Ibn Ḥazm al-Andalusi (Bayrūt: al-Muʼassasah al-ʻArabīyah lil-Dirāsāt 
wa-al-Nashr, 1983) p. 63.
 Ghazzālī, and Sulaymān Dunyā, Mīzān Al-ʻamal (Miṣr: Dār al-Maʻārif, 1964).124
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[Muhmammadan Path] by stating that the reason and revelation (naql) concur that the world is 
temporary and will disappear fast, and that the next world is eternal and it includes things that are 
better, and greater happiness which is only possible by following the Prophet in creed, words, 
ethics (character), and action.  In his treatise, Taşköprüzâde also presented knowledge of the 125
next world as being superior and more worthy of study compared to instrumental sciences, and 
the sciences of living in this world. Yet, this should not lead us to conclude that knowledge of 
this world was not valued. In fact, we can see in all three scholars’ works, as well as that of 
Saçaklızâde, an encouragement to study such worldly sciences as medicine, mathematical 
sciences etc. as instruments of happiness. So although these scholars viewed the next world as 
superior to this world, this did not lead them to negate this world totally nor to denigrate the 
study of worldly sciences. Rather, they suggest a balance that would give due importance to each 
one of them in their shared ontology. 
Although the scholars such as Saçaklızâde and Taşköprüzâde believed that studying 
religious sciences was important for gaining happiness, there was still some disagreement as to 
which religious discipline could provide that goal. Taşköprüzâde pointed out that experts on each 
religious discipline believed that the knowledge referred to in the Prophetic ḥadīth, which 
enjoined all Muslim men and women to seek knowledge, was the knowledge of their own 
specialty be it tafsīr, ḥadīth, fiqh, kalām, or taṣawwuf. Agreeing with Abu Ṭālib al-Makkī (d. 
996), Taşköprüzâde believed it was the knowledge of the pillars of Islam that was obligatory for 
 Birgivi, al-Tarīqa al-Muhammadiya wa al-Sīra al-Ahmadiya (Dimashq: Dār al-Qalam, 2011) pp. 29-30. Birgivi 125
was one of the most prominent scholars of the sixteenth century. He authored many books in the fields of Arabic 
language (Izhār and ‘Awāmil) and religious sciences that became handbooks for students. For a detailed analysis of 
this text of Birgivi see Katharina A. Ivanyi, “Virtue, Piety and the Law: a Study of Birgivi Mehmed Efendi's “al-
Tarīqa Al-Muhammadiyya”,” (Ph.D. Diss. Princeton University, 2012).
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all Muslims. Aware of this ambiguity, Saçaklızâde quoted al-Jurjānī to the effect that the ultimate 
goal or utility of theology (kalām) was to obtain happiness in both worlds (sa‘āda al-dārayn), 
which was the ultimate objective and goal.  Saçaklızâde countered or complemented al-126
Jurjānī’s assertion by stating that he considered practical religious disciplines (sharī‘a) as being 
closer to accomplishing that objective than instrumental disciplines such as linguistic sciences. 
This statement also raises a question of whether Saçaklızâde considered theology (kalām) among 
the instrumental sciences.  Another possibility is that Saçaklızâde was ranking the remaining 127
sciences in terms of their utility in leading people to the ultimate goal (happiness in two worlds). 
In that regard, his ranking would be theology (usūl al-dīn), practical religious duties (sharī‘a), 
and instrumental sciences, from highest to lowest. Here again, we see that Saçaklızâde preferred 
sharī‘a based sciences over rational sciences, although this is a matter of degree rather than 
rejection.  
Saçaklızâde’s engagement with al-Jurjānī is quite significant, as the latter was a leading 
Ash’arite theologian (a major Sunni theological school), and wrote many books, commentaries, 
and glosses on theology. Al-Jurjānī’s Sharḥ al-Mawāqif (commentary on al-‘Ījī’s theology) was 
very popular throughout the Muslim world.  Saçaklızâde referred to this book several times in 128
his Tartīb al-‘ulūm, and frequently supplemented his book Nashr al-Ṭawāli‘, a commentary on 
al-Bayḍāwī’s summa in philosophical theology, with al-Jurjānī’s texts.  Yet Saçaklızâde’s 129
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, pp. 85-86. 126
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, p. 86.127
 Al-Jurjānī, ʻAlī M, ʻAbd -H. Siyālkūtī, Ḥasan M. S. Fanārī, and ʻAḍud -D. A.-R. A. Ījī, Sharḥ Al-Mawāqif Lil-128
Qāḍī ʻaḍud Al-Dīn ʻabd Al-Raḥmān Ibn Aḥmad Al-Ījī (Madīnat Naṣr, al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Baṣāʼir, 2008).
 Saçaklızâde Muhammed ibn Ebi Bekr, and Muḥammad Y. Idrīs, Nashr Al-Ṭawāliʻ (ʻAmmān: Dār al-Nūr al-129
Mubīn, 2011).
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attitude toward kalām changed as he aged. It is significant that Saçaklızâde cited al-Jurjānī, an 
important authority in post-classical Islamic thought, and asserted his own view. Rhetorical 
impact of this dialogical format is that Saçaklızâde is an equal authority on these matters, if not 
more authoritative. This shows that other scholars’ works were instrumental for asserting ones 
own arguments or views and establishing themselves on a par with previous authorities. To put it 
another way, earlier authorities were not always called on to confirm ones views, but also to be 
criticized and contrasted with the position held by later generations. This exemplifies what Talal 
Asad has called discursive tradition,  i.e. that there were central texts in the Islamic traditions 130
that constituted a proper setting for making Islamic arguments.  
Sharī‘a as a multivocal term: the boundaries of religious and non-
religious knowledge 
As I noted above, Saçaklızâde presented another classification of disciplines borrowed 
from previous authors such as al-Ghazālī, by dividing knowledge into religious and non-religious 
knowledge. In this classification, the word “sharī‘a” or “dīn” are used interchangeably despite 
the fact that the former signifies practical issues of religion whereas the latter is used for its 
theoretical framework. In order to eliminate potential confusion, Saçaklızâde noted that sharī‘a 
and dīn (practical and theoretical knowledge of religion) are essentially the same thing.  This 131
 Asad, Talal. “The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam” (Washington, D.C: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 130
Georgetown University, 1986).
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, p. 86. The main difference between sharī‘a and dīn is that the former refers to 131
practical aspects of religion and the latter refers to its theoretical aspects. To put it roughly, sharī‘a signifies ritual 
and transactional aspects of Islam, while dīn signifies creedal aspects of Islam. There were also discussions about 
the meaning of dīn as compared to milla. It was again considered that milla referred to following a prophet, and dīn 
belonged to God. Cf. MS Marmara YZ 0739, marginal note “k-i,” p. 4. This marginal note and many others in this 
manuscript do not appear in the printed edition I use in general. 
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also indicates that they are different in terms of their accidents. However, Saçaklızâde 
acknowledged that the word sharī‘a is ambiguous, as the phrase ‘ulūm al-shar‘ī (religious 
sciences) encompasses three meanings. First, as asserted by al-Ghazālī, religious (shar‘ī) 
knowledge signifies knowledge that is transmitted from prophets. This knowledge was 
contrasted with knowledge arrived at by reason (such as mathematical knowledge), or 
knowledge arrived at by experience, such as medicine. Religious knowledge was also 
differentiated from disciplines that were acquired by hearing (transmitted knowledge), such as 
language.   132
The second meaning of religious sciences was conveyed by the Ottoman scholar (Molla) 
Hüsrev (d. 1480) who defined disciplines of sharī‘a as those which were taken (yustafādu) from 
the lawgiver (al-Shāri‘), and those which were derived from them (yustamaddu minhu).  This 133
definition of religious sciences, Saçaklızâde explained, allows disciplines such as legal theory 
(usūl al-fiqh) to be considered religious knowledge, which would not be possible under the first 
definition. 
The third meaning of sharī’a is the one stated by Ibn al-Ḥajar al-Haytamī (d. 1567) in his 
commentary on al-Arba‘īn (the book of forty ḥadīth) by al-Nawawī (d. 1277). In this 
commentary, al-Haytamī asserted that logic is considered a religious (shar‘ī ) science because it 
emanated or emerged from the law giver (shāri‘, God and the prophet). Here we can see that a 
discipline such as logic, though it does not have any immediate relation to religious knowledge 
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, pp. 86-87; Iḥyā’' (1927) p.27.132
 Molla Hüsrev is one of the most prominent Ottoman ‘ālim (scholar) who held significant posts during the reign 133
of Mehmed II. He also is prominent for authoring texts on jurisprudence and theology, which were taught in 
medreses. For more information see “Molla Hüsrev,” DİA, pp. 252-253.
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per se, can still be counted as such since it can be derived from religious material.  This idea 134
itself brings to mind al-Ghazālī’s al-Qusṭās al-Mustaqīm, where he argued that logic was built 
into the Qur’anic verses, proving that one does not need to rely on ancient Greek authorities in 
order to discover this science.  To put it differently, embedded in God’s speech were logical 135
arguments, which not only legitimized but also universalized the science of logic. 
These different conceptions of “religious sciences” highlight the ambiguity in the word 
sharī‘a. For some scholars, religious sciences consist of knowledge that was transmitted from the 
law giver(s), and for others, they include, in addition to transmitted knowledge, matters that can 
be derived from the utterances of the law giver. And for others still, religious sciences encompass 
what is assumed or implied in divine revelation, extending into logic, astronomy, etc. All of these 
variations clearly show that Saçaklızâde was well aware of the diverging conceptions of religion 
(sharī‘a) and did not really state his preference for one meaning of ‘religious’ (shar‘ī) over 
others. Moreover, this discussion demonstrates that the idea of “religious sciences” (‘ulūm al-
shar‘iyya or al-dīniyya) is not fixed, and that it can actually be inclusive of disciplines that we do 
not ordinarily associate with religion, such as logic and linguistics. Hence, this calls for a careful 
approach to the classifications of religious and non-religious sciences, and any generalizations 
made on such a classification. To put it differently, we need to look at what was actually included 
in such classifications rather than immediately conclude that religious sciences necessarily 
exclude rational or natural sciences. 
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, pp. 87-88.134
 For an English translation of Al-Ghazālī Qustas see Ghazzālī, and Richard J. McCarthy, Deliverance from Error: 135
An Annotated Translation of Al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl and Other Relevant Works of al-Ghazālī (Louisville, KY: 
Fons Vitae, 1999).
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Defining ‘ilm as science: what do all sciences have in common? 
It is interesting that many of the authors who wrote treatises on the classification of 
sciences took for granted the term ‘ilm (science), as they did not explain what constituted an ‘ilm. 
Sometimes, the term sciences (‘ulūm) is only modified with the word “mudawwan” (written 
down, inscribed, collected, composed, compiled, from the Arabic root “d-w-n,” related to the 
word dīwān)—even this is sufficient for them to be recognized as an ‘ilm. Actually, the above-
discussed marginal note (on the reason for prioritizing useful sciences) provided a similar 
conception of ‘ilm. The note was in response to a skeptic that questioned why agriculture or 
archery were not enumerated among the worldly disciplines even though they were written down 
or collected in books (mudawwan). The note states that it would be a luxury to include these 
disciplines since there was no need to compose books on agriculture or archery, whereas for 
medicine there was a necessity.  It was made clear that the term “sciences” does not include 136
crafts (sinā‘a) such as farming and archery, yet it was also acknowledged that medicine, which 
was recognized as a science, was more like a craft than other discursive disciplines. Indeed, in 
another part of the text, Saçaklızâde pointed out that by sciences (funūn) he referred to the 
knowledge that needed to be written down or collected (tadwīn, we could say textualized).  137
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, p. 82, footnote c, cf. MS Marmara YZ 0739, p. 3. I should add that this marginal 136
note probably belongs to Saçaklızâde himself, though there are some marginal notes that definitely do not belong to 
him. However, these are notes that are shared across various manuscripts, indicating that they are based on the same 
source. It was Saçaklızâde’s habit to write a treatise and then write glosses on the same treatise, first in the manner 
of writing marginal notes, and then composing them in a separate text. This can be observed in Saçaklızâde’s 
writings on dialectic (ādāb al-bahth wa’l-munāzara), and his treatise on knowledge.
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, p. 82, footnote c., cf. MS Marmara YZ 0739, p. 3. “wa al-murād al-funūn al-lati 137
uḥtīja ila tadwīniha”
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In addition to reiterating the connection between sciences and writing, Saçaklızâde 
discussed the idea of sciences in terms of methodology as well. In this more methodological 
sense of the word, ‘ilm referred to knowledge that was acquired through certain methods. Below 
is a brief engagement with this issue that explains this sense of ‘ilm (science). Since it is not a 
very long discussion, I provide a full translation of this significant passage: 
Names of sciences such as syntax, morphology, semantics (ma‘ānī), jurisprudence etc. share three 
meanings: these are issues (masā’il), comprehension (idrākāt) of, and the habit (malaka) that is 
acquired from repeated perceptions [of these issues]. This habit (malaka) is the ability (qudra) to 
evoke or call to mind (istiḥḍār) every [or the whole] universal topic (kull mas’ala kullīya) from 
among scientific issues when faced with any one of its particular issues (juz’īyāt tilka al-
mas’ala). The benefit (fā’ida) of this evocation [calling to mind] (istiḥḍār) is to derive and 
deduce (isṭinbāṭ) the condition or situation of that particular from that universal. [For instance,] 
when you are asked about “Zayd” in [the sentence] “ḍaraba Zaydun (Zayd beat)” you evoke that 
‘all subjects are marfū‘ [in the nominative], and you think in your mind that Zayd is the subject 
here, and since all subjects are marfu‘, you recognize that Zayd is marfu‘. This habit is called “the 
habit of evoking.” By repeating this deduction you will gain the “habit of deducing” (malakat al-
isṭinbaṭ). This is the ability to derive judgments about particulars from the universal issues, as you 
saw in the example.  
The second habit is the habit of discovery (malaka al-muṭāla‘a). In order to gain malaka 
al-muṭāla’a it is necessary to learn the universal (general) principles (qawa’id kulliya), to repeat 
this knowledge i.e. repeatedly remembering them, then to derive judgments about particulars of 
their topics, and to repeat these derivations. People rank differently with regard to this ability 
(malaka). 
Attributing the word ‘ilm (knowledge/discipline) to syntax, morphology, jurisprudence 
and the remaining names of disciplines is like the tree of Arāk. And names of disciplines are 
added to it.   138
 This passage reveals various meanings of the word ‘ilm as attributed to sciences. Before 
reiterating those meanings, let me first consider the metaphor of the tree of Arāk, which is also 
known as the Salvadora persica. It is described as “an evergreen shrub or small tree, reaching up 
to 7 m tall, with many drooping branches.”  This tree is the source of miswak, a twig used like 139
a toothbrush to clean teeth because of its fiber-like branches. It is a tree that was probably 
common and well known in the region where Saçaklızâde was living, i.e. Southeastern Anatolia 
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, pp. 88-89.138
 See http://www.kew.org/science-conservation/plants-fungi/salvadora-persica-toothbrush-tree 139
Last accessed: January 9, 2016.
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and Syria. Perhaps that is the reason why this particular tree is mentioned, in addition to the fact 
that it has many branches. Other scholars also used trees as a metaphor in the classification of 
sciences, but they did not mention a specific tree, as did Saçaklızâde. The similarity between the 
tree and science, I believe, is that they both have numerous branches. The resemblance can be 
seen at two levels. First, that the idea of science is universal, and hence encompasses various 
branches of science. Second resemblance can be established at the level of each science. Just as 
the tree has a root, disciplines have universal principles, which the passage also mentions. In that 
regard, the resemblance could be between a discipline and its particular issues. As the quoted 
passage shows, ‘ilm in this regard was thought of as a habit of conceptualizing or making 
assertions about a particular aspect of a subject matter based on its universal principles. In order 
to make a certain assertion about a particular issue, one needs to learn the universal principles, 
and recall what those universal principles enable one to say about that issue. This is a logic-
centered – and we could say a deductive – approach, to disciplines, similar to how a tree has 
roots, which produce many branches.  
 Given the centrality of the relationship between universals and particulars in a science, 
this gave rise to the question of how disciplines that did not have universal principles, such as 
ḥadīth, would be considered a science. In this regard, it seems that among religious sciences, 
only theoretical disciplines such as principles of religion (usūl al-dīn), principles of 
jurisprudence (usūl al-fiqh), and other disciplines that rely on theoretical considerations, 
deserved the attribution of ‘ilm. This issue of whether some religious disciplines deserved to be 
called ‘ilm (science) was raised in another treatise. The author of the treatise asked if such 
disciplines as tafsīr (Qur’anic exegesis), ḥadīth (Prophetic tradition), and lexicography (lugha) 
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could be considered a science (‘ilm), since they were commonly called ‘ilm al-tafsīr, ‘ilm al-
ḥadīth, or ‘ilm al-lugha.  The author claimed that everything discussed in exegesis was based 140
on other issues, hence, it was justified to be called a science.  
The connection between science and intellectual habits is also noteworthy. Saçaklızâde 
did not invoke previous authorities on the issue of intellectual habits. Here it is worth invoking 
Ibn Khaldun’s conception of ‘ilm in terms of habitus, which I will discuss in the third chapter. 
However, the above criteria for a more exclusive conception of ‘ilm can be seen in the writings 
of other Ottoman scholars as well. For instance, Katip Çelebi discussed the idea of ‘ilm along 
similar terms in the introduction of his major work Kashf al-Ẓunūn.  Müneccimbaşı Ahmed 141
Dede (d. 1702), in his treatise on manners of critically and analytically studying texts, also 
discussed these intellectual habits, which one should acquire in order to have the mastery over 
sciences.   142
These discussions concerning the idea of ‘ilm demonstrate that there were different 
grades of knowledge in terms of methodology or epistemology. They also indicate that in 
 This scholar is not named, however, from his treatise we know that he was a student of Muṣliḥ al-Dīn al-Lārī (d. 140
1572) and lived in eastern Anatolia. In the treatise, he raised the issue of whether Qur’anic exegesis can be called a 
science (‘ilm) stating that: 
 إإذذ االعلم ووإإسم االعلم اانما يیطلقانن على االمسائل أأوو االى االتصديیقاتت بهھا أأوو على االملكة االحاصلة من االتمرنن عليیهھا. ...فإنن قيیل موضوعع االعلم ما يیبحث فيیهھ عنهھ
 وواالبحث إإثباتت محمولل لموضوعع بدليیل أأوو تنبيیهھ ففي أأيي موضوعع من االتفسيیر أأثبت االمحمولل للموضوعع بب االدليیل أأوو االتنبيیهھ قلنا كل ما يیذكر في االتفسيیر
  ررااجع إإلى مسألة يیستدلل أأوو يینبهھ عليیهھا.....ووكذلك االكالمم في علم االحديیث ووعلم االمحاضرةة ووعلم االلغة حيیث اليیثبت فيیهھا االمحموالتت بالدليیل أأوو االتنبيیهھ
See “Risale fī fünûn-i müte’addide,” MS 06 Hk 2823/1, fl. 6a, located in the National Library in Ankara.
 Çelebi’s introduction to Kashf al-Ẓunūn deals with some of the theoretical and philosophical issues concerning 141
the idea of ‘ilm including its definition, classifications, hierarchies, relation between science, writing, and 
civilization (tamaddun), history of science, authors and their books. For the specific discussion on ‘ilm as written 
science (‘ilm al-mudawwan), and the habitus, see Çelebi, Kashf, v.1, p. 29.
 For Müneccimbaşı’s text, see MS al-Azhar 321741. I have accessed this copy online at http://142
www.ahlalhdeeth.com/vb/showthread.php?t=68647 (last accessed March 10, 2016) For a discussion of this text by 
Khaled El-Rouayheb, see Seventeenth Century Islamic Intellectual History, pp. 109-115.This discussion is followed 
by an analysis of Saçaklızâde’s text (pp. 115-120). El-Rouayheb considers these treatises in terms of the emergence 
of “deep reading.” 
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addition to its looser meaning, as referring to any branch of knowledge compiled in texts, the 
term ‘ilm was also strictly used as a name for sciences that were not just merely a collection of 
random data but rather included the systematic derivation of knowledge based on logical criteria 
using premises and conclusions.  In the following chapter, I will discuss yet another concept, 143
the unity of science, which entailed rigorous criteria for constituting a discipline as a science. 
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly Knowledge (or The Moral Economy of 
Knowledge) 
In addition to providing a comprehensive cluster of sciences under the category of useful 
sciences, and reiterating the widespread classification of sciences into religious and non-religious 
sciences, Saçaklızâde discussed a third classification of sciences in terms of the normative 
categorization of the object of knowledge.  With regard to judgments on disciplines, 144
Saçaklızâde stated that the verdict regarding whether one should study a body of knowledge 
depends on the verdict on the object of knowledge. This is derived from the commonly reiterated 
premise that knowledge is dependent on its object.  This classification actually reflects Islamic 145
 For a discussion along similar lines see Siddiq ibn Ḥassan al-Qannuji, Abjad al-‘Ulūm, p. 43. Qannuji states that 143
the word science, when used in relation to disciplines such as syntax, law, etc., can refer to three things including 
issues (masā’il) of the science, or propositions of the science (tasdīqāt), or the habit (malaka) that is acquired from 
repeating those propositions.
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, p. 89.144
 “Anna al-‘ilma tābi‘un li’l-ma‘lūmi”: a discipline is derivative from its object of study. A similar idea is 145
expressed by Francis Ellingwood Abbot, who stated “in knowledge the object determines the subject” (The 
Syllogistic Philosophy or Prolegomena to Science, p. ix). This in fact is a realist or objectivist position, which 
entertains that human knowledge is based on the object of knowledge. In other words, our knowledge of x depends 
on x, so if there is a change in the condition of x, then our knowledge also changes. This was the dominant position 
in Western philosophy as well, as pointed out in Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. This position is 
problematic as attested to by twentieth century studies on the history of science and technology. Just as the 
humanities and social sciences are not devoid of a set of influences that shape their inquiries, neither are the natural 
sciences, showing that “objective knowledge” is not as objective as it is claimed to be. Thus, the idea that human 
knowledge or sciences are dependent on the object of knowledge only reflects one side of the interplay between the 
subject and the object, which influences the production of knowledge.
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legal categories such as “obligatory for everybody,” “obligatory for some,” “permissible,” 
“forbidden,” and “reprehensible,” as based on Ibn Nujaym’s (d. 1563) exposition in al-Ashbāh 
wa al-Nazā’ir.   146
 If the verdict on learning a science depends on the object of knowledge, then it follows 
that learning about forbidden things should be forbidden. Actually, in another marginal note of 
the MS Marmara, it is pointed out with surprise that Birgivi (d. 1573) held such an opinion in his 
al-Tarīqa al-Muhammadiya.  Although Birgivi does repeat the above mentioned premise that 147
knowledge is dependent on its object, his position on forbidden knowledge is quite similar to that 
of Saçaklızâde.  Holding on to the general premise is criticized on the basis that one might be 148
falling into misdeeds without knowing them. Saçaklızâde went further, asserting that if there was 
suspicion that one may be involved in misdeeds then it was not only permissible but in fact 
necessary to learn about such forbidden matters. This is especially emphasized with regard to 
situations where misdeeds are quite common among people. In such places it becomes obligatory 
for some scholars in the community to learn about them, even if they themselves are not in 
danger of committing such misbehaviors.  For instance, if magicians and philosophers 149
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, p. 89. It is interesting to pay attention to the texts Saçaklızâde uses in different 146
contexts. Of course, here Saçaklızâde utilizes Ibn Nujaym’s articulation for various reasons: for one, to criticize Ibn 
Nujaym for neglecting a category (or mode of behavior) that exists in Hanafī jurisprudence even though he was also 
a Hanafī. Al-Ghazālī also articulated this idea, and one can find it in al-Zarnūjī’s Ta‘līm al-Muta‘allim. As noted 
earlier, Saçaklızâde used both of these sources on other occasions. Thus, it seems that Saçaklızâde intentionally 
preferred certain authorities to insert his criticism, rather than merely transmitting what a predecessor had said. 
Paying attention to these discursive strategies will enhance our knowledge of how religious discourses are 
transformed by later generations as opposed to being merely reproduced.
 MS Marmara YZ 0739, p. 7, marginal note K. For Birgivi’s discussion of normative categories of science, 147
including “obligatory,” “forbidden,” and “encouraged” knowledge, see al-Tarīqa al-Muhammadiya, pp. 108-126. 
For more information on Birgivi see Ivanyi, “Virtue, Piety, and the Law.”
 Birgivi, al-Tarīqa al-Muhammadiya, p. 111 (for his reiteration anna al-‘ilma tābi‘un li al-ma’lūmi). A few pages 148
later, it is stated that one could learn magic and similarly forbidden matters in order to avoid them (p. 119). 
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, pp. 91-93.149
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proliferate in a town, then it is necessary for the person in danger of participating in such groups 
to learn about philosophy and magic in order to avoid them. Another salient example is the case 
of charging interest in commercial activities. Saçaklızâde stated that one should learn about the 
nature of interest in order to refrain from participating in an interest economy.   150
After remarking that legal verdicts on learning depend on the object of knowledge, 
Saçaklızâde provided more detail on the knowledge of things that were obligatory for all 
Muslims. On this issue, Saçaklızâde invoked the authority of Tatarkhāniya, which pointed out 
that obligatory knowledge is knowledge of ‘ilm al-ḥāl (Tr. ilmihal) i.e. the condition in which 
one might find themselves.  ‘Ilm al-ḥāl includes knowledge of creed, actions and morality, and 151
abstinence from forbidden things. These are conditions that Muslims should know about in order 
to conduct themselves according to a proper Islamic lifestyle should they encounter them.  
Relying on the Iḥyā’ of al-Ghazālī, Saçaklızâde enumerated the following disciplines 
among the sciences that were obligatory to study (for every Muslim): disciplines of [the 
different] recitations of the Qur’an and its exegesis, rules of recitation, ḥadīth (tradition) and 
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, p. 92.150
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, p. 95. He could have invoked al-Ghazālī or al-Zarnūjī’s previously cited texts, 151
which more or less state the same thing. Birgivi also relies on al-Zarnūjī in this matter. However, Tatarkhāniya is a 
Hanafī manual of legal or religious conduct, and thus may exert more authority on behaviors than a book written in 
the manner of advice for students.
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their meaning and their methodology, morals, also known as taṣawwuf (Sufism),  jurisprudence 152
and its principles, and theology.   153
Saçaklızâde added that only the intermediate level of each discipline was obligatory to 
master. Saçaklızâde stated that according to al-Ghazālī, medicine was obligatory, but the 
majority of scholars only recommended its study. He clarified his own view, that in towns where 
illnesses were abundant, it was obligatory for some Muslims to study medicine. However, for 
other places it was merely recommended. This view also shows that authors such as Saçaklızâde 
were aware of the conditions for learning and transmitting knowledge.  Saçaklızâde also 154
experienced the difference between rural and urban settlements, just as Ibn Khaldun did, and thus 
he did not see any necessity for studying medicine in sparsely populated areas. This further 
indicates a pragmatic approach to studying and transmitting knowledge.  
After pointing out obligatory knowledge, Saçaklızâde provided information on sciences 
that were recommended for studying, followed by forbidden knowledge. Recommended 
disciplines included taṣawwuf. In addition, gaining an advanced level in the study of disciplines, 
which were obligatory for some (farḍ kifāya), except in theology, was recommended. Sciences 
that were forbidden to study included those subjects concerning matters that were forbidden in 
any condition, especially in milieus where there was no danger for many among the people to 
 There is a tendency to emphasize the ethical and moral aspects of fiqh in the secondary literature, to contrast it 152
with Western law. Be that as it may, scholars such as Saçaklızâde clearly considered taṣawwuf or akhlāq as the 
domain of morality and character. In my view, this separation is getting lost as modern scholars are rightly arguing 
against Western approaches to Islamic law.
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, pp. 102-103. Saçaklızâde explains that in this context theology refers to the creed 153
with its brief proofs/explications, which are produced by theologians. This creed includes whatever Sunnis agree on 
(by consensus) which are not from the necessity of religion/essentials of religion.
 This idea with regard to medicine is clearly articulated in Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah, where he states that 154
medicine emerged in the cities, and in rural areas there is no need for doctors. See Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, ed. 
N.J. Dawood, pp.324-327.
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fall prey to them. Forbidden sciences included magic, and philosophy in a place where they had 
not yet prevailed (ifshā). Delving too much in theological proofs was also forbidden, particularly 
in locales where heretical sects of Islam and philosophers were not prevalent and so did not 
require any theological disputation. Similarly, astrology was counted among forbidden 
sciences.    155
Saçaklızâde proposed a hierarchy of instruction based on this normative classification. 
The most important duties should be studied first. Hence, learning about God’s unity and 
properties (‘aqīda) was given first priority. This was followed by learning about matters that 
were obligatory at all times, such as the knowledge of morally commanded and forbidden things. 
Incidentally, I should note that this emphasis on morality has been lost in modern times where 
religion has been considered first and foremost a matter of rituals and rites. In fact, it was only 
after knowing about God’s existence and learning about morals that Muslims were enjoined to 
learn about which rituals were obligatory at certain times, such as daily prayers, and fasting.  It 156
is clear that creed is the most important object of knowledge, followed by morality, which is then 
followed by other religious duties such as worship and fasting, which are obligatory for all 
Muslims. These are followed by knowledge of duties that were obligatory for some in the 
community. Finally one had to learn the recommended (mustaḥibbāt pl. of mustaḥab) behaviors.  
The utilitarian or practical approach of scholars such as Saçaklızâde and his predecessors 
is best manifested in their attitude toward acquiring knowledge of religious obligations. They 
 Saçaklızâde notes that astrology is a science that derives from the formation of heavenly circles their influence on 155
events of the sublunary world. This science is forbidden if one believes that the influence emanates from the essence 
of stars rather than the habit of God creating it [the influence] as they move. Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, p. 111.
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, pp. 89-90.156
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asserted that a Muslim does not have to learn about obligatory practices until the time when the 
obligation starts, be it even the knowledge of the most important acts of worship. It is made clear 
that knowledge of worship is necessary only when one arrives at puberty and the proper time of 
praying begins.  They reasoned that if one dies before being responsible for praying, one is 157
excused for not knowing about such rituals. This approach verges on the border of legalism. 
Overall, Saçaklızâde’s discussion reflects a well-developed economy of knowledge that indicates 
particularly lucrative investments, and warns against risky ones.  
As we have seen from the foregoing, Saçaklızâde’s Tartīb al-‘Ulūm included a variety of 
classifications that reflect his utilitarian and moral-salvational approach to sciences. This specific 
orientation or approach is owed to both Saçaklızâde’s textual genealogy and immediate context. 
I’ve pointed out the textual lineages, such as al-Ghazālī’s Iḥyā’', al-Zarnūjī’s Ta’līm al-
Muta‘allim, and Hanafī legal texts such as Tatarkhāniya and Ibn Nujaym’s al-Ashbāh wa’l-
Nazā’ir. I will provide biographical information on Saçaklızâde that will indicate the immediate 
context of his writing. Before that, lets look at Yahya Nev‘î’s Netâyic for comparative purposes. 
Yahya Nev‘î’s Netâyicü’l-Fünûn ve Mehâsinü’l-Mütûn 
 Yahya Nev‘î’s work, commonly known as Netâyicü’l-fünûn, is markedly different from 
Saçaklızâde’s Tartīb despite significant similarities. Beginning with shared concerns, Nev‘î also 
approaches disciplines in terms of utility and happiness. Like Saçaklızâde, Nev‘î emphasized the 
study of sciences that were more likely to bring about happiness. Despite these overarching 
similarities, their orders of sciences differed sharply. Moreover, Saçaklızâde and Nev‘î’s texts 
 Saçaklızâde, Tartīb al-ʻUlūm, pp. 95-98.157
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diverged on their treatment of several sciences including history, philosophy, theology, astrology, 
and fortune telling. They also differed with regard to the language in which they were written. 
While Saçaklızâde wrote in Arabic, Nev‘î wrote in Ottoman Turkish. I will discuss this issue 
further below. Before explaining various factors for these different orders of sciences articulated 
by Nev‘î and Saçaklızâde, I provide a brief overview of Netâyic, a best selling manuscript, as 
evidenced by the number of copies in Turkish libraries.  158
 Like Saçaklızâde, Nev‘î began with the usual prayers, and presented the book as a 
collection (mecmua) that includes discussions on only a few issues related to some respectable 
disciplines. He excused himself by noting that this limitation was due to the impossibility of 
gaining expertise in all sciences. Whoever reads the book, Nev‘î proclaimed, would enjoy some 
of the benefits of various sciences.  Netâyic was written in the genre of unmūzaj al-‘ulūm 159
(sample of sciences), thus the sciences discussed are represented by selected issues. As noted 
previously, this was a genre of writing on sciences that was already established prior to the 
Ottoman period, and which had gained some popularity around the time Nev‘î wrote his work.  
 Nev‘î’s Netâyic has been studied by some Turkish scholars, including Ömer Tolgay, who has transliterated it into 158
the Latin alphabet and published the text under the title İlimlerin Özü: Netâyic-i Fünûn (Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 
1995). I’ve relied on this version in this study. In English, Didar Ayşe Akbulut has written a master’s thesis entitled 
“The Classification of Sciences in Nev'î Efendi’s Netâyicü’l-Fünûn: An Attempt at Contextualization” (M.A. Thesis, 
Bosphorus University, 2014). This study emphasizes Nev’î’s intellectual genealogy, and provides the most expansive 
treatment of his career in English. Though Akbulut is also interested in contextualizing the text, she does not exploit 
the connection between the courtly culture and the making of Netâyic. Even after pointing out that Nev’î added a 
summary of history while dedicating the book to Sultan Murad III, Akbulut only comments in passing that 
“speculatively, when Nevʽī wished to present his work to a grandee, he preferred to add some history” (Akbulut, p. 
9). In contrast, I argue that not only the section on history, but the whole text is enmeshed and produced in the 
courtly culture of Istanbul. Even though Nev’î wrote the text during his brief stint in Edirne, the former capital of the 
Ottoman dynasty but still an alternative venue for the Sultan’s court, he was educated in Istanbul and as an emerging 
poet and scholar knew very well the kind of knowledge that was marketable in the court as attested to by the kind of 
work he undertook. 
 Nev‘î, Netâyic El-Fünûn, p. 72.159
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 One reason for the popularity of this genre of ‘unmūzaj is the fact that it was particularly 
apt for seeking patronage, as it allowed the authors to demonstrate their breadth of knowledge 
within the limits of one text. The texts that I came across in this genre were mostly dedicated to 
the rulers, though this could be because most of them are from the collection of the Ottoman 
elite. In this regard we can mention Yawāqīt al-‘Ulūm, or Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Jāmi’ al-‘Ulūm 
al-Arba‘īn, which were written in Persian. The existing copies of these texts at the Süleymaniye 
library are illustrated, showing that they were originally prepared for pre-Ottoman sultans. In 
fact, the endowment note indicates that they later came under the possession of the Ottoman 
sultans.  Other texts in this genre include ‘Izz al-Dīn Muhammad ibn Mahmūd al-Āmūlī’s 160
Nafā'is al-Funūn fī ‘Arā'is al-‘Uyūn,  Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī’s (d. 1502-03) text entitled 161
Unmūzaj al-‘Ulūm, and Muṣliḥ al-Dīn al-Lārī’s (d. 1572) identically titled treatise.  Al-Dawānī 162
presented his Unmūzaj to the Ottoman Sultan, whereas Lārī dedicated his book to Rüstem Pasha 
(d. 1561), an Ottoman vizier. This shows that they were seeking patronage. Sipahizâde Mehmed 
b. Ali’s (of Bursa, d. 1589) Unmūzaj al-‘Ulūm was written in the same period as Nev‘î’s 
Netâyic.  One difference is that Sipahizâde began his text with the religious sciences such as 163
Tafsīr, Ḥadīth etc. while Nev‘î began with history and philosophy. Another text in the same 
genre as Netâyic from more or less the same period is entitled al-Manhaj al-Ma‘lūm fī Unmūzaj 
 See Yawāqīt, MS Ayasofya 4352 (dated 22? Sha‘bān, 771AH); al-Rāzī, Jāmi‘ al-‘Ulūm, Ayasofya 2205 (dated 160
Jamādiya’l-Akhar 21, 738AH).
 Al-Āmūlī, Nafā'is al-funūn fī ‘arā'is al-‘uyūn, MS Esad Efendi 2935. This treatise starts with linguistic sciences, 161
continues with religious sciences, ends with various sciences such as medicine, anatomy, metrics in poetry, and 
logic. It was published in Iran in 1317 AH.
 For an overview of Lārī’s Unmūzaj, see Reza Pourjavady, "Muṣliḥ Al-Dīn al-Lārī and His Samples of the 162
Sciences,” Oriens, 42 (2014): 292-322. Pourjavady only mentions al-Rāzī and al-Dawānī’s texts as two precedents 
in this genre. However, as the above mentioned titles show, there were in fact many more. 
 Sipahizâde, Unmūzaj, MS Ayasofya 390.163
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al-‘Ulūm, dedicated to an unspecified Sultan.  Many more books were written in this style after 164
Netâyic.   165
 Yahya Nev‘î’s book was organized in a way that had implications for pedagogy as well. 
The customary preface is followed by a story preceding the twelve chapters. It is a story of a 
perfect youth (civan-ı fazıl), a Muslim, discussing with representatives of several religions 
including Judaism, Christianity, and Manicheism. This story is taken from Yawāqīt al-‘Ulūm, a 
Persian text on various sciences, wrongly attributed to al-Ghazālī.  However, it is considerably 166
expanded. In fact, this was a quite common practice, i.e. scholars wrote in the introduction or 
conclusion of their books on such theological issues as if implying that sciences attest to the 
accuracy of the author’s position.  In other words, classifications or samples of sciences are 167
frequently presented with theological issues complicating their purposes. Hence, I contend that 
these texts were not merely classifications, rather they were arguments about the superiority of 
one ideology over others, using the sciences as a legitimizing basis.   168
 Al-Manhaj al-Ma‘lūm fī Unmūzaj al-‘Ulūm, MS Kasidecizâde 434. Al-Manhaj is wrongly attributed to Burhān 164
al-Dīn al-Zarnūjī, as the biographical information in the beginning of the text shows that the author was educated in 
the Syrian region.
 Among the texts that succeeded Nev‘î’s Netâyic in the genre, I should mention Muhammed Emin Şirvânî’s 165
Fawā’id al-Hāqānīya, dedicated to Sultan Ahmed I, and Mehmed Akkirmânî’s Ta‘rīfāt al-Funūn, which is also 
noteworthy. Mehmed b. Ahmed Tarsusi also contributed to the genre by his Unmūzaj al-‘Ulūm.
 For copies of Yawāqīt al-‘Ulūm, see MS Ayasofya 04351 (copied in 861AH), and MS Ayasofya 04352 (copied in 166
771AH). This text apparently belonged to Shahāb al-Dīn Ebū Muhammad al-Qazwīnī (d. 575/1179). See Akbulut, 
“The Classification of Sciences in Nev’î Efendi’s Netâyicü’l-Fünûn,” p. 5.
 Examples include Kawākib-i Sab’a, anonymous eighteenth-century text written for the French embassy. For a 167
recent Turkish transliteration of this book see Nasuhi U. Karaarslan, Kevâkib-i Sebʻa Risâlesi: Xviii. Asrın 
Ortalarına Kadar Türkiye'de İlim Ve İlmiyeye Dâir Bir Eser, (Istanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2015).
 Ömer Türker has also argued that classifications of sciences stemmed from the question of the relationship 168
between reason and revelation or philosophy and religion. See Ömer Türker, “İslam Düşüncesinde İlimler Tasnifi,” 
Sosyoloji Dergisi, 3:22 (2011), cf. Selime Çınar, “Farabiden Taşköprüzâde’ye: İslam Medeniyetinde İlimler 
Tasnifinin Gelişimi” (M.A. Thesis, İstanbul: Fatih Sultan Mehmet Vakıf Üniversitesi, 2014).
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 The main bulk of Netâyic consists of twelve sciences (fen) so that it would resemble the 
zodiac (felek-i burûc). These are the following disciplines in order: History, Philosophy, 
Astronomy, Theology, Principles of Jurisprudence, (Qur’anic) Exegesis, Sufism, Interpretation of 
Dreams, Medicine, Agriculture, Astrology, and Fortune Telling (fal ve zecr).  The parallels 169
between cosmology and disciplines reflect an application of the relationship between 
macrocosmos and microcosmos. Just as human beings were viewed as a mini replica of the 
cosmos, the sciences are considered as occupying places that are equivalent to the zodiac. After 
giving some brief information about each discipline’s definition, subject-matter, and benefit, 
Nev‘î pointed out prominent books in each discipline, noting their levels, either as expansive, 
medium, and short, or as advanced, intermediate, and elementary. The lengthiest part of each 
section consists of discussions on a few representative issues (usually three) of the relevant 
science, which were also among that science’s most important topics.  The book ends with 170
another dialogue between Beşir and Şadan on various sciences, some of which were not included 
among the twelve disciplines in the main body of the work, notably linguistic disciplines. This 
section is more in the form of an oral exam, perhaps preparing students for such situations.  
Although Nev‘î’s text was written in the model of unmūzaj al-‘ulūm (samples of 
sciences), the discussion of disciplines was based on a preferred order. Nev‘î made the following 
remarks to explain the particular order of sciences (tertib-i fünûn) that he presented in the 
Netâyic:  
 Here is a full list in Turkish: “ilm-i tarih, ilm-i hikmet, ilm-i hey’et, ilm-i kelâm, ilm-i usûl, ilm-i hilâf, ilm-i tefsir, 169
ilm-i tasavvuf, ilm-i ta’bir-i rüya, ilm-i ruky ve efsûn ve tıbb, ilm-i felâhat, ilm-i nücûm, ilm-i fal u zecr.”
 Nev‘î, Netâyic El-Fünûn, p. 73. Nev‘î added that effects are demonstrative of agents or causes (wal āthār ‘alā al-170
mu’athir burhānun).
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[As a] mirror of happiness (kitab-ı behcet-nümâ) this book begins with the history of prophets, 
kings, and the mention of leading philosophers [for the following reason]. Since the most 
precious knowledge is knowledge of God's essence, and the pillar of disciplines is knowledge of 
God's attributes, and it is possible to have a perfect grasp of this mystery [of god's essence and 
attributes] by reasoning (deriving) an eternal agent (müessir-i kadîm) from created effects (âsâr-ı 
bedî’a, beautiful or artful deeds) [which] depend on, first of all, knowing the history (ilm-i tarih) 
of the beginning of the world and the appearance of human beings, secondly, it depends on 
knowing the natures of three kingdoms (mevâlid-i selase), principles (ümmehât, mothers), and 
order of genia and species of higher or lower (realms). Thirdly, it [knowledge of God] depends on 
the knowledge of the configuration of the heavens, the heavenly bodies, and the spheres (tabaka) 
of fire, water, and earth. This is why history is followed by philosophy and astronomy, and only 
then is the discipline of principles of religion, which is the pillar of sciences discussed.   171
 This is a theological as well as ontological explanation for the order of sciences. In other 
words, there is an order of creation, and through the study of that order, God’s essence and 
attributes can be known. In this manner, Nev‘î not only legitimizes natural-philosophical 
sciences by religious discourse, he even prioritizes them over religious sciences. However, I 
doubt that the reason given for learning these disciplines is satisfying, considering what someone 
like Taşköprüzâde or Saçaklızâde might ask: Given that the ultimate goal is eternal happiness in 
the next world, and God has sent prophets informing human beings about His will and 
orientation for them in order to ease their path toward the next world, why should people first 
study history, natural philosophy, and astronomy in order to know God’s essence and attributes? 
It is not just a mere chance that Nev‘î is interested in natural theology. There is a context for the 
emergence of natural theology, and it has more to do with the exploitation of nature and reasons 
of state, rather than an innocent belief that by studying contingent matters, one would learn about 
the necessary being, to use Avicennian language.  Below are some of the factors that informed 172
 Nev’î, Netâyic El-Fünûn, p. 76.171
 I should note that Ibn Sina himself served in the courts of different dynasties in the capacity of a physician and a 172
vizier. Hence, his theological philosophy should be viewed in that context.
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diverging articulations of sciences by Nev‘î and Saçaklızâde despite their shared values and 
ideas.  
Context, Genealogies and the Production of Knowledge: Nev‘î Efendi 
and Saçaklızâde 
Nev‘î Efendi and Saçaklızâde composed these texts in quite different contexts, in terms 
of intellectual genealogy as well as their immediate social, political, and institutional 
environments. To begin with, Nev‘î wrote in Ottoman Turkish, and dedicated Netâyic to Sultan 
Murad III. In fact, a recent study based on some of the earlier copies of the text has shown that 
the earliest manuscript copy of Netâyic lacked the section on history, and that it was not 
dedicated to anybody.  This finding corroborates my below argument that Nev’î prioritized 173
history as a discipline due to its relevance and utility for the rulers and the court. However, the 
lack of a dedicatee, in my view, does not eliminate the possibility that Nev’î was aware of the 
possible audience at the court at the time he was writing. Clearly this text was not written for 
madrasa-trained students, due to both the language and style of the book. Netâyic was also 
dedicated to unnamed viziers,  so perhaps the fact that the earlier version was not dedicated to 174
a potential patron was due to an indecision on the part of Nev‘î. Saçaklızâde did not dedicate his 
book to any authority, as his intended audience was students and colleagues. Nevertheless, he 
 Akbulut, “The Classification of Sciences in Nev’i Efendi’s Netâyicü’l-Fünûn,” pp. 7-9. Akbulut points out that a 173
copy of Netâyic, i.e. MS Atatürk Library 0728 (dated May 1, 1587), was dedicated to Sultan Murad III. To this 
information we should add another copy of Netâyic namely MS AETRH 597, dating from January 30, 1588 
(Rabī’u’l-Awwal 1, 996) which preceded those dedicated to the unnamed vizier. This shows that there was at least 
another attempt at dedicating the text to Sultan Murad III before Nev‘î sought another patron. 
 Akbulut, ibid. p. 9.174
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still wanted to draw the attention of the ruler in the end, as a marginal note makes a call to the 
sultan to suppress teaching philosophy in the Muslim lands.  
Nev‘î’s himself was well-versed in Arabic and Persian, as the text itself includes 
piecemeal passages in these languages. Moreover, Nev‘î was one of the leading poets of the era. 
His interest in literature and his mastery of poetry is reflected in Netâyic as well, as he included 
many Persian and Turkish poems and stories. All of these attest to his courtly affiliations. 
Saçaklızâde, on the other hand, was not immersed in a courtly culture. He wrote his works 
mainly in Arabic, and did not use any stories to buttress his arguments.  In fact, as Cornell 175
Fleischer’s excellent study of the period based on the career of a contemporary and fellow poet 
of Nev’î, namely Mustafa Âli, demonstrates, poetry and literature were patronized by the courts 
of Sultans and princes as well as leading administrators. At this time there was an emerging 
group of bureaucrats who lacked madrasa education but were literate.  Fleischer identified this 176
budding bureaucracy as a third branch of the Ottoman governing elite (the other two being 
military and scholarly branches, which were long established by that time). There was also a 
surge in the study of history during the reign of Selim II and Murad III, exactly the time when 
Yahya Nev’î was active. In that regard we can see that Nev’î’s interest in poetry, his prioritization 
of history as a discipline, and his choice of writing in Ottoman Turkish were all stimulated by the 
context of his writing.  
 I would like to note that I have only come across two small treatises that Saçaklızâde wrote in Turkish. They are 175
both among the manuscript collection of Milli Kütüphane: 06 Mil Yz A 4962/3, “Nasihatname”; 06 Mil Yz A 
7236/4. The former imparts general advice for Muslims, and the latter suggests that students differentiate different 
types of knowledge and esteem them according to their religio-legal value. 
 Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541-1600), 176
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). For Fleischer’s discussion on the rise of Ottoman bureaucracy 
and historiography in the latter part of the sixteenth century, see chapters eight and nine respectively. 
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 Orientalist and nationalist writings focus on commonalities between Ottoman or Islamic 
intellectuals in order to fix or objectify the subjects of their studies. In such generalizing 
approaches, it is not hard to lump Nev‘î’s and Saçaklızâde’s texts together as representative of a 
shared and dominant Islamic discourse, as both Nev‘î and Saçaklızâde were following the same 
legal and theological schools in Islam (Hanafī and Maturīdī), were very much interested in Sufi 
learning, came from families of mosque imams, and taught as professors themselves. Being a 
Muslim, living under the same polity, and sharing legal and theological schools, as it seems, does 
not entail propagating the same order or discourse of sciences. As the following discussion will 
further show, both their immediate contexts and intellectual genealogies informed Saçaklızâde 
and Nev‘î’s differing production of knowledge. 
Nev‘î lived during the sixteenth century (born in 1533 and died in 1598). His father Pîr 
Ali was an imam and a sort of Sufi sheikh, following a branch of Halvetiye (one of the 
prominent Sufi brotherhoods at that time).  Nev‘î received his early education in his hometown 177
(Malkara), and travelled to Istanbul for advanced studies. After a career in teaching in medreses, 
he was appointed a preceptor for Ottoman princes (Şehzâdes) during the reign of Murad III.  178
Netâyic was written prior to his appointment, it was a product of this immediate institutional and 
social context, i.e. the state regulated medrese circle, Sufi learning, and court milieu. To begin 
with the last, I assert that Nev‘î’s writing very much reflects the concerns and interests of the 
court environment as he prioritized disciplines such as history, philosophy, and astronomy, which 
 For information on Halvetiye brotherhood and its Ottomanization, see Hasan Karataş, “The Ottomanization of 177
the Halveti Sufi Order: A Political Story Revisited,” Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association 1:1-2 
(2014): 71-89. 
 Nev‘î was a renowned poet, a peer of Baki, and Gelibolulu Mustafa Âli. See Fleischer, Bureaucrat and 178
Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire, pp. 137, 149, 153.
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were crucial for governance. As a cursory look at the literature on Islamic political thought will 
show, most of the literature on politics was in the form of advice for kings (naṣīḥat al-mulūk), 
and this advice literature utilizes stories to their fullest capacity in order to teach sultans about 
past experiences of rulers as well as proper conduct for an immediate or prospective situation. 
This kind of literature and history (adab, etiquette) developed in the midst of the court culture.  179
Hence, history as a source of useful knowledge was of prime importance for rulers and would-
be-rulers. Knowledge of astronomy and natural philosophy were also useful, as they enabled 
rulers to confront the challenges of navigation, directing military excursions, and managing the 
production of wealth.  
We also see the impact of the particular institutional and intellectual context that Nev‘î 
was writing in. This is best revealed in the sources of Netâyic. Nev‘î stated that he drew mostly 
on Yawāqīt al-‘Ulūm,  which was attributed to al-Ghazālī, and he made use of Abd al-Raḥmān 180
al-Bistāmī's Fawā’iḥ al-Miskiya.  Another book that Nev’î acknowledged as a source was 181
entitled Mawdu‘āt al-‘Ulūm (Molla Lutfi’s book Matālib al-Ilāhiyya fī Mawdū‘āt al-‘Ulūm 
 In fact, Fleischer points out in the chapter on historiography that histories of the time were also aiming at being 179
literary masterpieces, thus the difficulty of separating the two (see Bureaucrat and Intellectual).
 This was wrongly attributed to al-Ghazālī. There are two copies of such a Persian text among the holdings of 180
Süleymaniye Manuscripts Library. These are MS Ayasofya 04351 (copied in 861AH), and MS Ayasofya 04352 
(copied in 771AH). Yawāqīt consists of thirty disciplines, beginning with the religious disciplines, followed by 
linguistic disciplines, and ending with natural disciplines. Nev‘î seems to have taken some stories such as the first 
one and the last one from this book. However, he completely disregards the order of knowledge in Yawāqīt. 
 The full title of al-Bistāmī’s book is al-Fawā’iḥ al-Miskiyya fi’l-Fawātih al-Makkiya. For some manuscripts of 181
this book in Süleymaniye Library see MSS Ayasofya 04160, Esad Efendi 01612, and Hamidiye 00688. Al-Bistāmī 
has some interesting views on knowledge, and has a tree of knowledge in the manuscripts. For Katip Çelebi’s 
description of the book, see Kasfh al-Ẓunūn, v.2, p. 527. Al-Fawā’ih was translated into Turkish as Terceme-i Kitab-ı 
Fevaihü’l-Miskiyye fi’l-Fevatihi’l-Mekkiyye during the reign of Selim II. See Ömer Yağmur, “Abdurrahman Bistami 
ve 16. Yüzyılda Yapılmış Bir İlimler Ansiklopedisi Tercümesi: Terceme-i Kitab-ı Fevaihü’l-Miskiyye fi’l-Fevatihi’l-
Mekkiyye,” Turkish Studies 4/3 (Spring 2009). 
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al-‘Arabiya or Taşköprüzâde’s Miftāḥ al-Sa‘āda (Mawḍū‘āt al-‘Ulūm).  He also referred to 182
other treatises of elite and highly regarded books throughout the rest of the work. As we can see, 
the main sources of the book were texts that were not mentioned by Saçaklızâde. Al-Bistāmī had 
a strong Sufi tendency, and combined together, for instance, knowledge of the various traditions, 
such as prophetic, philosophical, and Sufi discourses. Yawāqīt is a quite interesting text that 
includes thirty disciplines, in which twelve issues are discussed in each discipline, demonstrating 
that Nev‘î was inspired by its order. Moreover, Nev‘î relied on this text in regards to the sciences 
of astrology, fortune telling, and sorcery, which were issues that were not looked upon favorably 
by many scholars, including al-Ghazālī himself. This further suggests that he could not have 
written it. As I show below, it is clear that Nev‘î studied texts that looked favorably at philosophy 
and other non-religious disciplines that were frowned upon by the intellectual tradition within 
which we can situate Saçaklızâde. However, Nev‘î presented these sciences in religious terms, 
by either quoting prophets or citing Qur’anic verses to show that they were legitimate and 
respectable disciplines. Thus, we can see the impact of a different intellectual genealogy on the 
organization of knowledge, despite some shared sources such as al-Jurjānī, al-Taftāzānī, and a 
few other legal texts. 
Saçaklızâde Mehmed Efendi was born in Maraş, a town in Eastern Anatolia, sometime in 
the 1660s and died circa 1732. His father was also an imam. Saçaklızâde received a madrasa 
 Since Nev’î did not provide the name of the author it is not clear whether this Mawḍū’āt al-Ulūm is the one 182
composed by Molla Lütfi, or the one composed by Taşköprüzâde, commonly known as Miftaḥ al-Sa’āda. Molla 
Lutfi was a philosopher as well as a medrese professor, and was actually killed for his sarcastic approach to 
theological issues. Perhaps the reason he was considered as the source might be due to Nev‘î’s interest in 
philosophy. See Akbulut, “Nev’î Efendi’s Netâyic,” p. 5. 
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education, studying with many scholars including Darendeli Hamza Efendi, Ayıntabi Mehmed 
Efendi, and the famous Abd al-Ghani al-Nābulsī (with whom he studied traditional texts and 
mysticism in Damascus). He also acquired licenses in two tariqas (Sufi networks), 
Naqshibandiya and Qadiriya from al-Nābulsī, and became an imam and teacher.  The major 183
differences between Saçaklızâde and Nev‘î’s immediate context is that while Nev‘î worked as an 
appointed professor in the medreses and produced his work in the vicinity of the court, 
Saçaklızâde was quite isolated from the court setting and lacked any official posts or 
assignments.  
Tartīb and Netâyic represent different intellectual genealogies as well. These texts were 
outcomes of overlapping and diverging discursive traditions. In terms of intellectual genealogy, 
the main texts that Saçaklızâde relied on were not central to Nev‘î’s Netâyic, though the latter 
would not contest them. These included, as we have seen, al-Ghazālī’s Iḥyā’' and al-Munqidh, al-
Zarnūjī’s Ta‘līm al-Muta‘allim, al-Subkī’s Mu‘īd al-Ni‘am,  al-Jurjānī’s Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, and 184
Hanafī legal texts such as Tatarkhāniya, Ibn Nujaym’s al-Ashbāh wa’l-Naẓā’ir, as well as Ali al-
Qārī’s books. Some of these texts were very critical of certain disciplines such as philosophical 
metaphysics. As noted earlier, these differences are reflected in the placement of disciplines, 
including history and philosophy, in the order of learning. 
History and Philosophy as arts of ruling 
 See Fındıklı İsmet Efendi, Tekmiletü’l-Şakaik fi Hakkı Ehl-i Hakaik, ed. Abdulkadir Özcan (İstanbul: Çağrı 183
Yayınlar, 1989) pp. 50-52. 
 Subkī, Tāj al-Dīn, and David W. Myhrman, Kitāb Muʻīd An-Niʻam Wa-Mubīd An-Niqam =: The Restorer of 184
Favours and the Restrainer of Chastisements (New York: AMS Press, 1978).
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 It is worth recapitulating Nev‘î’s and Saçaklızâde’s discussion of history and philosophy 
in order to contrast their exposition. Nev‘î began the section on history by stating that it was a 
repository of lessons for the whole world and a mirror of insights (basiret-nüma) for human 
beings. Moreover, Nev‘î continued, by revealing events of various epochs, history makes its 
students experienced in affairs (mücerrib-i umur) and in governing public interest or wellbeing 
(müdebbir-i mesalih-i cumhur). The first point, that is, the idea of history as a repository for 
taking lessons, is an idea that was very prevalent at the time, and is expressed by Saçaklızâde as 
well. However, it is the second point, i.e. its value for managing people’s interests, that reflects 
the utility of history for governors.  
 After his general discussion on history, Nev‘î presented a formal definition of the 
discipline, in Arabic, as “knowing conditions (ahwāl) of communities (tawā’if), their manners 
(rusūm) and customs, and the crafts, genealogies, and births of individuals, etc.” The subject 
matter (mawḍū‘) of history, according to Nev‘î, is “the conditions of past figures including 
prophets, philosophers, kings etc.” And “its telos (gharaḍ) is to comprehend the quality of those 
conditions. Its benefit is the learning of lessons, and advice.”  Among the compositions on 185
history, Nev‘î enumerated the following: History by Ibn Kathīr, as well as works of the same title 
by Ṭabarī, Ibn Athīr, Ibn al-Jawzi, Ibn Khallikān, Ibn Ḥajar, Ṣafadī, and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyutī; a 
biography of companions and ascetics, Ḥilyat al-Abrār; history of Ḥākim Nīsābūrī, Tarih-i 
Baghdadi, that of Ḥukamā (Philosophers), Kashf al-Ghamm fī Tārīkh al-Umam. 
 There are some points of agreement as well as disagreement in Saçaklızâde’s and Nev‘î’s 
description of history as a discipline. They both agree that history provides knowledge that is 
 Nev’î, Netâyic El-Fünûn, p. 85.185
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useful for taking lessons from. However, there are differences in presentation. To begin with, 
Saçaklızâde emphasized the literal meaning of the word history (i.e. dating). Another point of 
divergence is with regard to its place in the classification of knowledge. As stated before, 
Saçaklızâde considered history to be a part of Arabic linguistics or literary sciences, as he 
classified it with the branch of muhāḍara (oratory or elocution?). Nev‘î, on the other hand, 
classified history as a literary discipline (‘ulūm al-adabiyya).  What is at issue here is well 186
articulated by a marginal note to Saçaklızâde’s text, which shares Nev‘î’s view. It states that 
history should not be counted among Arabic disciplines, but rather it is more likely one of the 
literary disciplines ('ulūm al-adabiyya), which are more expansive than Arabic disciplines. This 
is because neither muhāḍarāt nor ta’rīkh are specific to Arabic (alfāz al-‘arabiyya).  It seems 187
that the commentator is familiar with the intellectual output in other languages, perhaps Turkish 
and Persian. It is worth remembering that Saçaklızâde overwhelmingly wrote in Arabic, 
composing only a few treatises in Turkish. He definitely was familiar with some of the 
intellectual output in Turkish as well, such as Birgivi’s Risale, and the Turkish translation of 
Kalila and Dimna. Saçaklızâde did recommend the study of Persian, yet most of his books were 
in Arabic, which was the lingua franca of sciences.  
As noted before, Saçaklızâde’s writing does not show the same kind of keen approach to 
history as a discipline. This is not because there was any Islamic injunction against studying 
history; to the contrary it was actually encouraged as the Qur’an commands people to travel and 
 Nev’î, Netâyic El-Fünûn, p. 85.186
 MS Marmara YZ 0739, p. 23, marginal note H. Marginal note adds that the writing and qarḍ (recitation?) of 187
poetry are doubtfully Arabic disciplines, since they are not specific to Arabic poetry. If they are not specific to 
Arabic, then they should be part of the literary disciplines ('ulūm al-adab).
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see the ruins of other nations in order to take lessons. Nor is it because of a decline of learning, 
as claimed by Mustafa Âli (a contemporary of Nev‘î), and by Katip Çelebi a couple generations 
later, or by any other scholars in the twentieth century. I venture to say that history did not have 
the same kind of utility in Saçaklızâde’s context, and therefore it was not prioritized over other 
disciplines. The reverse, I argue, is the case for Nev‘î since he was writing in a context that had a 
much greater use for history. 
Another major contrast between Saçaklızâde and Yahya Nev‘î is manifested in the place 
of philosophy in their imaginaries. As I have discussed above, Saçaklızâde had a negative 
attitude toward a specific domain of philosophy, namely metaphysics. Yahya Nev‘î did not divide 
philosophical sciences into those which were good, and those which were not. Instead he adopted 
an approach that embraced all philosophical sciences, echoing the sentiment embodied in Plato’s 
statement, as reported by al-Bistāmī, which said one should seek all kinds of knowledge, as there 
is noting in knowledge that is ugly, rather being ignorant of it is uglier.  I should also note that 188
Nev‘î used the word “ḥikma” for philosophy and “hukema” for philosophers, while Saçaklızâde 
used “falsafa” for philosophy, and “falāsifa” for philosophers. Even the choice of words 
indicates that Nev‘î viewed philosophy as a legitimate field of inquiry by using a word for it that 
has Islamic connotations, as it is used in the Qur’an and ḥadīth. Saçaklızâde, on the other hand, 
discouraged the study of some philosophical sciences, hence, he referred to it accordingly as 
falsafa, the Arabized version of the Greek word philosophia.  
 Al-Bistāmī, Fawā’iḥ al-Miskiya, MS Esad Efendi 01612, fl. 10b. For a study on the relationship between 188
knowledge and virtue in Plato’s dialogues see Lorraine S. Pangle, Virtue Is Knowledge: The Moral Foundations of 
Socratic Political Philosophy. (Chicago: London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014).
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Conclusion 
Saçaklızâde and Yahya Nev‘î shared many ideas regarding ‘ilm. They both emphasized 
useful knowledge, and they both discussed disciplines in terms of subject matter, goals, and 
utility in line with the shared paradigm of science. Also as I noted, they had common religious 
affiliations. Yet, we have seen that Nev‘î’s and Saçaklızâde’s organization of disciplines differed. 
The order in which Saçaklızâde discussed different disciplines reflected his hierarchical 
classification of knowledge. We can see a similar overlap in Nev‘î’s text. Nev‘î stated that he 
included twelve disciplines (Tr. fen, Ar. fann) so that it would resemble zodiac (felek-i burûc). 
This correspondence between constellations and disciplines reflects an overlap between ontology 
and epistemology. In contrast, we can see in Saçaklızâde’s case a correspondence between 
morality and epistemology i.e. what is commanded should be learned, and what is forbidden 
should be avoided, as a general rule. Although, there may not always be such correspondence 
because sometimes what is forbidden can be a subject of knowledge in order to avoid 
wrongdoing by mistake. 
Considering conditions of possibility for the production of knowledge, neither 
Saçaklızâde’s Tartīb al-‘Ulūm nor Nev‘î’s Netâyic can be seen as the Islamic or the Ottoman 
conception of knowledge. Comparisons with other scholars writing more or less in the same 
period show that Saçaklızâde could only represent a certain discursive tradition. We can also note 
that diverging approaches to disciplines such as history, metaphysics, theology, and natural 
philosophy demonstrate that compared to Nev‘î, Saçaklızâde’s relative disinterest in these 
disciplines reflects the lack of an official post, and an involvement with governance. To put it 
differently, Saçaklızâde was not making a living based on the knowledge of natural philosophy 
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or medicine. Neither was he working as a state official. Nev‘î, on the other hand, was involved 
with the ruling elite, and was himself a graduate of the centralized medrese system. Moreover, 
his readings indicate a quite different intellectual genealogy. All of these explain the priority 
given to history, astronomy, natural philosophy, and philosophy over religious disciplines.  
 I provided in this chapter a comparative analysis of two texts from the early modern 
Ottoman era showing that we have, due to diverging conditions of possibilities for production of 
knowledge, two contrasting classifications of sciences, in two different languages, literally 
(Ottoman Turkish and Arabic) and metaphorically (philosophical-mystical and legal-moral). 
Nevertheless, both Saçaklızâde and Nev‘î adhered to a concept of sciences that was more 
inclusive of religious and rational sciences, unlike the modern period where science and religion 
are considered separate, and religious sciences are no longer considered science proper.  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CHAPTER II: Out of Many, One: Unity of Science in the 
Early Modern Ottoman Empire  
Introduction  
 In the first chapter I discussed classifications of sciences in the early modern Ottoman 
Empire with a comparative and detailed study of two texts and their authors. I showed that their 
diverging intellectual lineages as well as the immediate context of their writings influenced the 
classifications of sciences by Yahya Nev‘î and Saçaklızâde. Even though these two scholars 
entertained divergent values and put varying degrees of emphasis on the study of particular 
disciplines, they both provide a more pluralistic approach to sciences, which includes religious 
and natural-philosophical disciplines side by side. I have also briefly discussed the idea of ‘ilm as 
“science” while discussing Saçaklızâde’s text. In this chapter, I further investigate the idea of 
‘ilm as science, as opposed to knowledge in general. To that end, I study the prolegomena to 
sciences in post-classical Islamic thought, especially during the long Ottoman history. However, 
the central figures of discussion will be from the early modern period.  
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 There were many treatises that dealt with the prolegomena to sciences (muqaddimat 
al-‘ulūm). However, this chapter specifically follows the discussion as it took place in the genre 
of logic. More specifically I study commentaries and glosses on Fenârî's (d. 1431) prolegomenon 
to his commentary on a popular handbook of logic, namely Īsāghūjī (Isagoge) by Athīr al-Dīn al-
Abharī (d. 1264).  I focus on both the manner of scholarship and the conception of science as 189
reflected in these texts by first analyzing the prefaces to commentaries and glosses, and then 
exploring the content of Fenârî’s prolegomena. Based on the study of prefaces, I argue that 
commentaries and glosses were discursive and dialogical, and prove that there was no final 
explication of a main text, as all explications introduced new complications.  In other words, 190
this genre of writing shows that the study of shared texts in madrasas across the Islamic world 
contributed to intellectual interconnections as well as to cosmopolitanism as they provided a 
common theme for discussion, despite varying interpretations. To put it differently, the madrasas 
with their shared core curriculum, not unlike the core curriculum of many universities in the US, 
made it possible for Muslim scholars to read and respond to each others works as they 
commented on the core texts.  Moreover, commentaries and glosses were dialogical, showing 191
 Many commentaries and glosses on al-Abharī’s Isagoge append this text. Fenârî ve Kul Ahmed, (Istanbul: 189
Kırımlı Abdullah Efendi, 1312AH): 158-160. For a translation of al-Abharī’s Isagoge into English, see Edwin 
Calverley, “Al-Abharī's Īsāghūjī fi'l-Mantiq," in MacDonald Presentation Volume (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1933), pp. 75-85.
 I am not the first to exploit the prefaces of Arabic commentaries. In fact, in his study of philosophical 190
commentaries on Avicenna’s Ishārāt, Robert Wisnovsky provides a good model for studying the nuances in the 
prefaces. See Wisnovsky, "Avicennism and Exegetical Practice in the Early Commentaries on the Ishārāt,” Oriens 
41 (2013): 349-378.
 Considering the shared textual communications across Muslim societies during that period, Muhsin al-Musawi 191
called it the Islamic republic of letters. Al-Musawi rightly points out the vast network of scholarship that contributed 
to a flourishing Arabic literary tradition. Muḥsin J. al-Mūsawī, The Medieval Islamic Republic of Letters: Arabic 
Knowledge Construction (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2015). 
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that scholars built on each other’s interpretations and responded or critiqued other commentaries 
rather than simply focusing on the original text.  
 With regard to the content, I will show that the conception of science reflected in these 
texts mainly consisted of certain shared principles across disciplines. Fulfilling those principles 
was theoretically sufficient to establish a subject matter as a scientific discipline. I argue that this 
conception of science does not lend itself to our modern notion of the conflict between science 
and religion, which is based on a radically different reconfiguration of these two categories. 
 Finally, I look at the genealogy of Fenârî’s discussion in order to point out the legacy of 
scholars living prior to the Ottomans or under other contemporary polities. In fact, we have 
already seen in the previous chapter that early modern scholars such as Nev‘î and Saçaklızâde 
utilized texts from previous and contemporary Islamic polities. This chapter will further note 
connections between Muslim scholars across political divisions using Fenârî’s intellectual 
genealogy. Among others, I assert that Timurid scholar al-Taftāzānī's (d. 1390) works were 
particularly influential on Fenârî’s discussion regarding the aspect of the unity of sciences. 
 Today, reflections on the nature of science occur in various contexts, including the 
community that is professionally defined as scientists; by the historians and philosophers of 
science; and most recently by scholars interested in science and technology studies, or social and 
cultural studies of science. The latter literature emphasizes a shift from modern to the post-
modern conceptions of science. Whereas formerly science was presented as singular and 
universal, nowadays it is imagined as plural and local. The classical perception of science as 
having a unified method is no longer viable. Rather, the cacophony of scientific practices shows 
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that there is not a singular universal notion that has particular appearances in various fields. Yet, 
there are still contestations regarding what constitutes science, and how to study its history.  192
In the pre-modern Islamic world, reflections on the concept of 'ilm (a multifaceted idea) 
appeared in almost every disciplinary book. We need to differentiate two major meanings of 'ilm, 
as knowledge (Fr. connaisance), and 'ilm as science (Fr. savoir) in the pre-modern Islamic 
thought.  However, analogous discussions on the nature of science as a disciplinary practice 193
occurred primarily in logic books, especially in the chapters on demonstration. For instance, both 
Aristotle and Ibn Sina discussed the nature of scientific knowledge in Posterior Analytics, and 
Kitab al-Burhān of al-Shifā, respectively.  However, later scholars gave precedence to this 194
issue by introducing their books with the prevalent scientific paradigm, by discussing matters 
that united and held together a multitude of issues as a science (jihat al-waḥda, which will be 
discussed further below). Thus, they introduced a discipline with the discussion of shared issues 
across disciplines, such as the subject matter, definition, and the aim of the science, which I 
would like to call the "metaphysics of science."  Later on, commentators and glossators 195
normalized books that did not fit this standard. Among the books lacking that format was Athīr 
 For more information on the ambiguous concept of science, see Steven Shapin, "Science," in New Keywords: A 192
Revised Vocabulary of Culture and Society (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2005), and Steve Woolgar, Science: the 
Very Idea (London UK: Routledge, 1993). For contesting views on how to study science, see also the sociology-of-
knowledge-oriented approach of David Bloor et al., and anthropological studies by Bruno Latour. David Bloor, 
Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1976); Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to 
Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987).
 As the following discussion will make it clear, most books began with the discussion on the definition of the 193
discipline or science. Commentaries and glosses further elaborated on the notion of science in the original text. 
Suffice it to mention the introduction of Katip Çelebi’s Kashf al-Ẓunūn which discussed both the idea of ‘ilm as 
science, and ‘ilm as knowledge.
 Aristotle, William D. Ross et al. The Works of Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926); Ibn Sina, al-Shifa al-194
Mantiq: al-Burhān, eds. İbrahim Madkour and Abu al-‘Alā ‘Afīfī.
 Perhaps it is better to call it meta-metaphysics of science, since science itself is metaphysical in the sense that it is 195
a discourse on things.
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al-Dīn al-Abharī’s, Īsāghūjī (from now on Isagoge) a very short introduction to logic, also 
commonly known as al-Risāla al-Athīrīya.  Commenting on this text, the Ottoman scholar, 196
Molla Fenârî, rectified the lack of the standard prolegomenon by inserting a new one and thus 
“normalized” the Isagoge of al-Abharī. He concurrently provided a brief argument for doing so. 
This prolegomenon drew considerable interest from later scholars and students who studied 
Fenârî’s text to the extent that it stimulated stand-alone commentaries focusing on just the 
prolegomenon. The main theme of this prolegomenon was the jihat al-waḥda (the unifying 
aspect or the aspect of unity) of a science, which was crucial for constituting and defining a 
science. This issue provided a venue for late medieval and early modern Ottoman scholars to 
reflect on the nature of science as they conceived it, which they believed was the key to studying 
any discipline.  
Before delving into the study of these texts, I should note at this point that there has been 
a recent surge in the studies of commentaries and glosses from later Islamic history. Asad 
Ahmed, George Saliba, and Robert Wisnovsky have all challenged the previous bias against this 
style of writing as being unoriginal and barren. They have shown that commentaries and glosses 
were in fact sites of productive engagement with previous scholarship.  An exception in this 197
 The title of al-Abharī’s treatise does allude to its connection with the Greek tradition. It reminds us especially of 196
Porphyry's Isagoge. However, we should be aware of the fact that the title of Porphyry's text only signifies one 
section of al-Abharī’s treatise, which included the gist of all the topics of logic in a catharsis. These include a brief 
discussion of verbal signification, the five universals, propositions, contradictions, reversions, syllogism, and 
demonstration. Porphyry, however, only discussed the five universals in his Isagoge, as an introduction to the 
Aristotelian corpus of logic. An English translation of Porphyry’s Isagoge can be accessed at http://
www.tertullian.org/fathers/porphyry_isagogue_02_translation.htm last accessed May 10, 2016.
 See Asad Q. Ahmed, "Post-classical Philosophical Commentaries/glosses: Innovation in the Margins" Oriens 41 197
(2013): 317-348; George Saliba, Late Arabic Scientific Commentaries: Their Role and Their Originality (London: 
al-Furqan Islamic Heritage Foundation, Centre for the Study of Islamic Manuscripts, 2014); Robert Wisnovsky "The 
Nature and Scope of Arabic Philosophical Commentary in Post-Classical (ca. 1100-1900 AD) Islamic Intellectual 
History: Some Preliminary Observations" Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 47 (S83PART2): 149-191; 
Wisnovsky, "Avicennism and Exegetical Practice in the Early Commentaries on the Ishārāt,” Oriens 41 (2013). 
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recent scholarship is Ahmed El Shamsy, who based on a study of the genre of glosses in the 
Shāfi‘ī school of law, claims that the genre limited the number of texts that informed later jurists’ 
contribution, and was not propitious for elaborating on issues.   198
Notwithstanding the recent reconsideration of genres of writing in manuscript culture, 
there is still a major gap in the secondary scholarship on the intellectual history of the early 
modern Ottoman period in general. With a few exceptions, the subject matter of this chapter in 
particular has not been investigated by contemporary scholars. Among the exceptions one must 
include Abdurrahman Atçıl's recent article on jurisprudence in the formative period of the 
Ottoman Empire,  and Khaled El-Rouayheb's studies on logic, which shed light on the general 199
history of logic during that period.  El-Rouayheb’s article on the subject of logic is most 200
pertinent to this issue, although he does not discuss the material I analyze here.  Therefore, 201
considering that most of the texts I am studying are unfamiliar, I would like to introduce these 
texts by way of their prefaces. Then I will go on to analyze the commentaries on the jihat al-
waḥda (unifying aspect of scientific issues).  
 Ahmed El Shamsy, “The Ḥāshiya in Islamic Law: A Sketch of the Shāfiʿī Literature,” Oriens 41 (2013): 289-315.198
 Atçıl mainly argues that Ottoman legal scholars adopted Greek and Islamic philosophers' conception of science, 199
and defined the subject matter of law accordingly. Abdurrahman Atçıl, “Greco-Islamic Philosophy and Islamic 
Jurisprudence in the Ottoman Empire (1300–1600): Aristotle’s Theory of Sciences in Works on Usul al-Fiqh,” 
Osmanlı Araştırmaları Dergisi 41 (2013). 
 See Khaled El-Rouayheb, "The Myth of the Triumph of Fanaticism in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire" 200
Die Welt Des Islams 48.2 (2008): 196-221.; El-Rouayheb, Relational Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic, 
900-1900 (Leiden: Brill, 2010).
 El-Rouayheb, "Post-avicennan Logicians on the Subject Matter of Logic: Some Thirteenth-and Fourteenth-201
Century Discussions,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 22.1 (2012): 69-90. For another noteworthy discussion on 
the subject matter of logic, see A. I. Sabra, “Avicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic,” The Journal of Philosophy 
77.11 (1980): 746–764. Sabra points out that Avicenna thought highly of the role of language in logic.
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Fenârî and his Useful Notes on al-Abharī’s Isagoge 
 Despite significant changes in the conception of science over the last few centuries, there 
is a quite surprising resemblance between the structures of modern and pre-modern texts, 
especially with regard to modern scholarly studies. The books written in later Islamic history 
(a.k.a. post-classical period) had a very well structured form, beginning invariably with an 
invocation or customary prayer (khutba), followed by a preface (dībāja) noting the 
circumstances of writing, as well as including dedicatory remarks. Subsequently, there is a 
proper introduction or prolegomenon (muqaddima) to the subject matter, followed by actual 
inquiries or issues relating to the science, which are usually divided into chapters and sections. 
These texts also include a conclusion (khātima). Modern forms of scholarship also contain these 
parts more or less, with the significant absence of customary prayer in secularized academia. Of 
course there are some changes in the form of writing as well due to the printing technology, 
which has moved the colophon from the end to the beginning. Furthermore, westernization had 
also brought about significant changes, following the end of colonialism.  However, the main 202
structure of texts have remained intact up to the present moment, showing that despite ruptures in 
the ideas, the form of thinking, i.e. analytical writing, has continued up to the present time.  
 Now as then, prefaces are particularly valuable to intellectual history. They present 
fragments of intellectual life, as scholars point out the circumstances of their writings that may 
be missing from the relevant literature such as chronicles or biographical dictionaries. Many 
 For an excellent study on the significance of writing in a Muslim polity, see Messick, Calligraphic State. Messick 202
provides a comparative analysis of printing and manuscript tradition in Yemen.
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scholars briefly mentioned in the preface of their works the reason for their writing. Although 
such writings are often formulaic, due to the fact that they were modeled on previous prefaces in 
the same genre, they are still informative in showing how past scholars viewed and presented 
their contributions to scholarly discourse. By looking at the prefaces, we can see that 
commentators and glossators mostly considered their works as contributions to the understanding 
of texts and issues, rather than being a mere repetition of previously existing knowledge. 
Fenârî, like other scholars provided a brief note about the occasion for writing his 
commentary on al-Abharī's Isagoge. He stated that a brother (colleague) had repeatedly asked 
him to write useful notes (Fawā'id) on the gems or artful expressions (farā'id) in al-Abharī’s 
Isagoge on logic (mīzān, lit. balance),  which would be useful for colleagues. He stated that he 203
could no longer put off the frequent requests with "maybes and perhapses." To that end, Fenârî 
claimed, he wrote the text in one of the shortest days (maybe sometime around the winter 
solstice), from dawn to dusk, adding, "by God’s help, He is the governor of all success.”  Two 204
issues are noteworthy in this preface: first, the social setting for writing, and secondly the 
duration of writing. 
 Emphasis on the social setting was quite prevalent. Scholars throughout have prided 
themselves in expressing the encouragement they received from students, colleagues, or patrons 
to write. This also indicates that other scholars or seekers of knowledge recognized their 
authority. Thus, Fenârî's remarks in this regard can be seen as a manifestation of his expertise or 
authority, acknowledged by the unknown colleague. Recognition of one's skills in this field 
 Fenârî, Fawā’id, (Istanbul, Rajab, 1253AH) p. 2; cf. Fenârî ve Kul Ahmed, (Istanbul: Kırımlı Abdullah Efendi, 203
1312AH)
 Fenârî, Fawā’id, p. 2.204
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proves especially useful in acquiring scientific authority when considering that the subject matter 
of the treatise concerns logic, the paradigmatic science of the later Islamic period. To put it 
differently, logic was a must for studying both rational and transmitted sciences after al-Ghazālī's 
period.   205
  Fenârî's remarks regarding the duration of writing were clearly meant to astonish the 
reader. That remark did not go unnoticed by later commentators as well.  Although I do not 206
contest Fenârî's assertion that he may have indeed written the commentary in a day, I would like 
to briefly demystify this claim by pondering about the process of writing a commentary. First of 
all, considering the nature of education at that time, it was possible to write commentaries with 
relative ease. In fact, the whole education system was geared toward producing competent text 
readers and interpreters. As mentioned in the first chapter, there were three levels of texts and 
three levels of study.  Beginners usually studied abstract or brief texts such as al-Abharī's 207
Isagoge, which were to be memorized. After completing the elementary level, they would study 
intermediate texts. These intermediate texts themselves could be either independent treatises, or 
in many cases, mid-level commentaries of brief texts. In the latter case, they would be introduced 
to another scholar's exposition on the brief texts, and their teacher's explanation of both. Hence 
overtime, these studies would furnish students with the skills to read and interpret various texts, 
ultimately reaching a level in which they would compose their own interpretations of textbooks. 
 For integration of logic into the study of Islamic legal theory, see Wael B. Hallaq, “Logic, Formal Arguments and 205
Formalization of Arguments in Sunnī Jurisprudence,” Arabica 37.3 (1990): 315–358. 
 Kul Ahmed, for instance, noted that Fenârî's claim on the duration of writing could be interpreted as praising the 206
book, but he disagreed with this interpretation, claiming that perhaps Fenârî wanted to be thankful to God for his 
beneficence. See Kul Ahmed, (Istanbul, 1243AH) p. 41. 
 For more information, see Taşköprüzâde’s Miftāh al-Sa‘āda and Katip Çelebi’s Kashf al-Ẓunūn (volume 1, see 207
the section on division and classes of writing, p. 57), cf. Ibn al-Akfānī, Irshād al-Qāṣid.
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Thus, all graduates of madrasas were potentially able to write commentaries for texts they 
studied with their teachers. In Fenârî's case, we know that he received a formidable education, 
making it all the more easier for him to write commentaries.  
 Biographical dictionaries provide ample information about Fenârî (full name Şemseddin 
Muhammed b. Hamza), as he was one of the foremost scholars of the Ottoman Empire’s 
formative period (1300-1453), and well connected to the political elite. According to 
Taşköprüzâde’s account,  he was born in 1350, and received his early education in Anatolia, 208
first studying with Alaeddin el-Esved (d. 1397) in İznik, with whom he did not get along. 
Consequently he left and studied with Jamāl al-Dīn al-Aqsārāyī (d. 1388?), a well-known scholar 
of the period.  Fenârî then traveled to Cairo to further his studies with Akmal al-Dīn al-Bābartī 209
(d. 1384).  From these biographical notes, we can see that Fenârî studied with some of the most 210
prominent scholars of his time such as al-Aqsārāyī and al-Bābartī. Taşköprüzâde reports that 
Ahmedî (d. 1413) and Hacı Pasha (Ar. al-Hāj Pasha, d. 1413) were Fenârî’s fellow students, 
studying under al-Bābartī.  We also know that al-Jurjānī (d. 1413) was another peer of Fenârî, 211
 Taşköprüzâde reports from al-Suyutī, who reported from his teacher, Muhyiddin al-Kafiyajī, that Muhammed's 208
(Tr. Mehmed) nisba “al-Fanāri” refers to the craft of fanār. Taşköprüzâde also notes that he heard from his father 
who heard from his grandfather that this nisba refers to the village of Fenar. See Taşköprüzâde, al-Shaqā’iq al-
Nu‘māniyya fī ‘Ulamā’ al-Dawla al-‘Uthmāniya, ed. Ahmed Subhi Fırat, (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 
1985), p. 22.
 See Taşköprüzâde, Shaqā’iq, pp. 9, 22. For a biography of Alaeddin el-Esved, see ibid, p. 9, and for that of al-209
Aqsārāyī, see Taşköprüzâde, Shaqā’iq, pp. 17-19. cf. Bursali Mehmed Tahir, Osmanlı Müellifleri, p. 291.
 Taşköprüzâde provides further information about Fenârî's career and works, all of which amount to the fact that 210
he was learned in a variety of scientific disciplines, to which his oeuvre also testifies. For more information on 
Fenârî's life and his successors see Madeline C. Zilfi, "Fenârîzâde." Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE. Edited by: 
Kate Fleet et al. Brill Online, 2014. Reference. Columbia University. 29 December 2014 <http://
referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-3/Fenârîzâde-COM_27091> Last online update: 
November 2014, First appeared online: 2011, First Print Edition: issn: 1873-9830
 Taşköprüzâde, Shaqā’iq, pp. 28-29. Besides al-Bābartī, there were other famous scholars teaching in Cairo, 211
including Shams al-Dīn al-Isfahānī, and Ibn Mubarak Shah, and slightly later, Ibn Khaldun. For more information on 
Hacı Pasha and al-Bābartī, see Sara Nur Yildiz, “From Cairo to Ayasuluk: Haci Pasa and the Transmission of Islamic 
Learning to Western Anatolia in the late Fourteenth Century,” Journal of Islamic Studies, 25:3 (2014), pp. 263-297.
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studying in Cairo, and that actually Fenârî wrote a commentary on al-Jurjānī's prominent book 
Sharḥ al-Mawāqif.  Fenârî also studied with other scholars in Cairo.  Although we don’t 212 213
know the specific texts Fenârî studied during his education with regard to logic, we can assume 
that he must have studied either al-Abharī’s text, or other similar introductions to Logic, such as 
the more advanced Shamsīya  of al-Katibī al-Qazwīnī and its commentary by al-Taftāzānī, as 214
these were well-known logic texts during that period.  215
 Considering that al-Abharī’s Isagoge (Īsāghūjī) was one of the most popular logic texts in 
the Islamic world at that time, both in Arabic speaking lands and in Anatolia, it is likely that 
Fenârî himself studied it during his early education. In addition, Fenârî might have taught the 
text for some time before undertaking the commentary. This can be deduced from the colleague’s 
request, since one would not insist on commissioning a work unless one believes that the person 
undertaking the task is capable and has already demonstrated his capability. In short, Fenârî 
received a formidable education, in both Anatolia and Cairo, and also taught in madrasas. 
Therefore, Fenârî's skill must not come as a surprise or as unique, but rather he went through an 
educational system shared by other fellows. Hence, considering his previous studies as a student 
and his teaching experience, I assert that writing the commentary must have been easier than it 
 For a copy of the al-Jurjānī’s commentary as published together with others, see al-Jurjānī et. al., Sharḥ ̣ Al-212
Mawāqif Lil-Qāḍī ʻaḍud Al-Dīn ʻabd Al-Raḥmān Ibn Aḥmad Al-Ījī (Madīnat Naṣr, al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Baṣāʼir, 2008).
 See Taşköprüzâde, Shaqā’iq, p.22. cf. İbrahim Hakkı Aydın, “Molla Fenârî,” in DİA.213
 For information on al- Risāla al-Shamsiya fī al-Qawāʿid al-Manṭiḳīya see Ali Durusoy, “eş-Şemsiyye,” DİA. For 214
a translation of this text into English by Aloys Sprenger, see First Appendix to the Dictionary of Technical Terms 
used in the Sciences of the Mussalmans, containing the Logic of the Arabians (Bengal Military Orphan Press, 
Calcutta 1854). 
 Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī also wrote a summary of logic entitled Qawā'id al-Mantiqīya. In fact, that is part of a 215
book of universal principles in various disciplines entitled al-Qawā‘id al-Kulliya fī Jumlatin min al-Funūn 
al-‘Ilmiya. For what seems to be a contemporary manuscript copy of a student of Isfahānī who studied it with the 
author see MS Aşirefendi 471 (fl. 1b-9a concern logic).
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sounds for a modern reader. He may have been exaggerating the challenge, though, in order to 
further establish his authority. 
Burhâneddin and Kul Ahmed’s Glosses on Fenârî's Fawā’id 
 There were many supercommentaries, glosses, and superglosses written on Fenârî's 
Fawā’id throughout the later Ottoman period, including Burhâneddin Bulgari and Kul Ahmed's 
glosses.  As suggested before, the strong motivation behind writing so many commentaries and 216
glosses on a text demonstrates that there was a high demand for it among madrasa students. 
Therefore, it is arguable that Fenârî's Fawā’id stimulated glosses after it was studied at 
madrasas, perhaps as a result of his networks.  As we will see, many commentators and 217
glossators asserted that their interpretations would clarify the difficulties in the original text, thus, 
helping students comprehend it better. Before I discuss the prefaces of these glosses, it is worth 
noting our limited knowledge about the lives of these figures and the context of their writing. In 
many cases we do not know anything at all about the commentator or glossator, possibly because 
their texts became well known only in posteriority. This impels us to extract clues about the 
context of these writings from the prefaces, and to gather relevant marginal notes, which can 
provide invaluable information about the author and the text. Manuscript copies can also help us 
to speculate about the period in which the author lived. For instance, based on manuscript copies 
 For Robert Wisnovsky’s online rendering of an incomplete list of commentaries and glosses on al-Abharī’s 216
Isagoge which includes commentaries and glosses on Fenârî’s Fawā’id as well, based on Brockelman's 
bibliography, see http://islamsci.mcgill.ca/RASI/docs/pipdi.htm#dd2 last accessed March 12, 2016.
 Eighteenth century treatises on madrasa curriculum such as Kevakib-i Seb'a, indicate that Fenârî's Fawā’id was 217
one of the logic texts studied in the madrasas. Taşköprüzâde's description of the book as "latifan hasanan" shows 
that it was recognized as a pleasant text on logic. Due to a lack of earlier curriculums, further studies of Fawā'id's 
manuscripts might help us to pin down when the text gained recognition from madrasa students. 
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of Burhâneddin’s commentary, El-Rouayheb points out that he probably lived in the latter half of 
the fifteenth century.  The dialogical form of commentaries also confirms that Burhâneddin 218
wrote prior to Kul Ahmed. We know that the latter was active in the first half of the sixteenth 
century. 
 In his preface, Burhâneddin echoed Fenârî in providing a similar raison d'être for his 
work. According to Burhâneddin, Fenârî's Fawā’id was a tight and strong text composed of 
veiled truths and subtle statements.  Therefore, it was worthy of being explicated.  219 220
Burhâneddin further asserted that, by his gloss, he removed the burden from those who studied 
the gems of Fenârî, and thus helped them in comprehending the secrets of the science of logic. 
Burhâneddin entitled his gloss Burhâneddin's Precious Verifications on Fenârî's Useful 
Explanations (al-Farā'id al-Burhāniya fī Tahqīq al-Fawā’id al-Fanāriya).   221
 Burhâneddin's gloss is one of the earliest well-known interpretations of Fenârî's Fawā’id. 
However, it was most likely not the first commentary, as the dialogical nature of Burhâneddin's 
gloss indicates his engagement with previous interpretations of the same text. Though 
Burhâneddin's gloss superseded previous glosses, it was overshadowed by another gloss written 
in the early sixteenth century, by Kul Ahmed (d. 1535?). The latter has hundreds of manuscript 
 El-Rouayheb, Relational Syllogisms, p. 86. 218
 Burhâneddin, Farā'id al-Burhaniya, MS BY 7449, fl. 1b. 219
 Burhâneddin, MS BY 7449, fl. 1b.220
 Burhâneddin, MS BY 7449, fl. 1b.221
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copies in Turkish libraries alone, and was published a few times.  This gloss was popularly 222
known by its author's name, though some called it Kavl-i Ahmed (Ahmed's Discourse).  
 In his preface, Kul Ahmed stated that although Fenârî's Fawā’id was not devoid of artful 
and closed expressions, it still drew a lot of interest from contemporary students.  In a manner 223
similar to Burhâneddin, Kul Ahmed noted that he attached glosses that would unveil Fenârî's 
artful expressions, and reveal the closed meanings of the Fawā’id, so that it becomes easy for 
students to study.  Therefore, Kul Ahmed's preface confirms the crucial role of madrasa 224
students in stimulating commentaries and glosses on Fenârî's Fawā’id.  
 Though these glosses directly engage Fenârî's text, they were all intertextual, as they 
implicitly criticized each other. Kul Ahmed, for instance, implicitly noted his disagreement with 
some of Burhâneddin's interpretations, which I will show below. Drawing much interest from 
students, this text also inspired new superglosses on it, as many students studied Fenârî's text 
together with Kul Ahmed's gloss. Among these, I should note Hafiz Ibn 'Ali al-'Imādī's super-
gloss on Kul Ahmed.  It is ironic that, al-'Imādī would also describe Kul Ahmed's gloss as 225
 One such edition, i.e. Fenârî ve Kul Ahmed, (Istanbul: Kırımlı Abdullah Efendi, 1312AH), was furnished with 222
many marginal notes from other commentaries and glosses "in order to solve the ambiguities and difficulties of this 
beautiful book." The following titles were utilized to add superglosses and explain the gloss in relevant sections: 
"Yusuf Efendi; Imaduddin; Kara Halil; Sherh-i Matali'; Abdurrahman; Abdurrahim; Tuhfe-i Avamil; Kara Musa; 
Arabzâde; Develüzâde; Mevlana Nureddin; Seyyid Şerif [al-Jurjānī]; Hocazâde; Barda'i; Muhammed Emin 
[Şirvânî]; Mahmud Efendi; Misbah; Davud Efendi; Hoca Ebu'l-Kasım; Hasan Efendi; Rahmi Efendi; Ali Murteza; 
Şeyhzâde; Tercüman; Seyyid Osman; Muhyiddin; Kutbuddin; Şevki; Hasan Çelebi; Süleyman Karabaği; Sadruddin; 
Kırımi; Hüsam Kati; İsmail Sabi; Feyzullah Efendi; Ahmed Hamdi; Kasım Erzurumi; Kankiri [Çankıri]; İbrahim 
Efendi; İbn Hallikan; Burhân li-Gelenbevi; Dürrü Nâci; Yusuf Hasani (Hüsni?); Fethullah Efendi; Şerh-i Akaid; 
Muhtasar-ı Meani; and other glosses." Most of these are texts on logic, and many of them are commentaries or 
glosses of Fenârî's Fawā’id. It is noteworthy that most of these titles have namesake of the author, a common way of 
entitling textbooks.
 Kul Ahmed (1253AH) p. 38.223
 Kul Ahmed, p. 38.224
 I use the copy of al-‘Imādī in Konya Manuscripts Library, MS BY 7449, fl. 60b-68b . This seems to be an 225
incomplete super-gloss, but it does include glosses on the first sections, which I am analyzing in this chapter. 
Al-‘Imādī's glosses on the customary prayer is quite long, compared to the rest of the glosses.
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inaccessible, and irregular, adding, "just as his name Ahmed is irregular (la yanṣarif)" in 
Arabic.  He therefore wished to write a super-gloss over Ahmed's gloss for students at the 226
elementary level who wished to study the latter text. 'Imādī pointed out that he preferred short 
and incisive comments.   227
  Kul Ahmed's gloss on Fenârî did not only stimulate superglosses, it also seems to have 
inspired partial commentary treatises on Fenârî’s Fawā’id, which were devoted to the issue of 
jihat al-waḥda.  At least one such treatise, namely Zeynüddin Biradost's Ta‘liqat ‘alā mas'alat 228
jihat al-waḥda, seems to be directly inspired by Kul Ahmed's gloss, as indicated by a marginal 
note in one of its manuscripts.  Prefaces of other treatises devoted to the interpretation of the 229
issue jihat al-waḥda also point out that this issue was popular among students, and that they were 
compelled to interpret it in order to explain Fenârî's discussion of the issue.  Yet although these 230
treatises were based on Fenârî's text, they all responded to the previous glosses of the larger text, 
including that of Burhâneddin and Kul Ahmed.  
 Hafiz Ibn ‘Ali al-‘Imādī, MS BY 7449, fl. 60b, Normally, Arabic words decline in a regular way in different parts 226
of speech, the name “Ahmed” is among the exceptional words as its form is also in the pattern of af‘al which is 
irregular.
 Al-‘Imādī, MS BY 7449, fl. 60b. 227
 It appears that in Fenârî’s commentary, his discussion of the unity of science was the most ambiguous as it 228
generated commentaries and glosses devoted specifically to this issue.
 It is written that Molla Zeynüddin composed this treatise on jihat al-waḥda in Kul Ahmed. See MS BY 109, fl. 229
85.
 Students’ interest in challenging issues is also attested by their attraction to the issue of ithbāt al-wājib (proving 230
the necessary being). Saçaklızâde in his Tartīb al-‘Ulūm, which I discussed in the previous chapter, complained 
about students’ obsession with Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī’s treatise on this difficult issue.
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Abdurrahim, Muhammed Emin Şirvânî, and Kara Halil's glosses on 
Jihat al-Waḥda 
 Among the commentaries devoted to Fenârî’s prolegomenon, I believe Abdurrahim's 
Ta'liqa 'alā Jihat al-Waḥda (Notes on the Aspect of Unity) was the first to be written. This was 
followed by Muhammed Emin Shirwānī's (d. 1627) treatise, written in the first quarter of the 
seventeenth century. Kara Halil wrote an expansive gloss on Şirvânî’s treatise in 1105 AH 
(1693-94CE).  There were other texts devoted to the interpretation of the issue of jihat al-231
waḥda by later scholars, including Zaynaddin Baradost, Veliyuddin Efendi, İsmail Gelenbevi, 
Salih Tokadi and others.  In the early nineteenth century, an ostensible Turkish translation of 232
this issue was written by Eskicizâde, and published.  All of these texts demonstrate that the 233
unity of science issue acquired substantial consideration from the early modern Ottomans. It also 
shows that there was an intellectually vibrant environment that led to the production of these 
philosophical discussions in a period that has wrongly been described as a period of stagnation 
and decline, following some military misfortunes of the empire. In fact, prefaces by Abdurrahim, 
Şirvânî, and Kara Halil testify that there was great interest on the part of students and scholars in 
such theoretical issues.  
 Kara Halil, Hāshiya 'alā jihat al-waḥda (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1257/1842) p. 2. 231
 For some copies in Turkish libraries, search the online catalogue of ISAM library at http://ktp.isam.org.tr/232
 Eskicizâde, Terceme-i Cihet-i Vahde (1274/1857). This text actually seems to be an independent interpretation, at 233
least compared to the Arabic texts I have studied so far. The author did not mention any author of Arabic, so it could 
be just a translation of the issue rather than being a translation of a specific Arabic treatise on this issue. There is a 
brief note on Eskicizâde and his works in Bursalı Mehmed Tahir, Osmanlı Müellifleri, p. 312.
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 Though we don't know much about Abdurrahim, we can infer his name from the preface 
of his treatise where he introduced himself as "the most weak of all servants of God, the most in 
need of his Lord, adjunctive to the name al-Rahīm."  From this, we learn that the author's name 234
is ‘Abd al-Raḥīm (Tr. Abdurrahim). Following in the footsteps of Fenârî, Abdurrahim claimed 
that a beloved group of companions incessantly asked him to write the commentary. He noted 
that despite challenges and difficulties, he rushed to their needs by writing the treatise. 
Abdurrahim stated that he wrote what he could recall (wa khaṭara bi-al-bālī khuṭūran) of his 
teacher's exposition and inventions.  Compared to other glossators, Abdurrahim was quite 235
humble, and he not only acknowledged but also emphasized his teacher's contributions.  
Unlike Abdurrahim, his alleged student Muhammed Emin Şirvânî,  was quite 236
ostentatious about his own contributions. In his preface to his treatise on the jihat al-waḥda, 
Muhammed Emin Şirvânî  appears too confident about his contributions to the issue. He wrote 237
that he studied the text so much that none of its meanings remained hidden to him. Şirvânî added 
 Abdurrahim, MS YZ 0030, fl. 21b.234
 Abdurrahim, MS YZ 0030, fl. 21b.235
 According to Kara Halil (p. 20) and a marginal note of MS BY4455 (fl. 3a), Muhammed Emin was a student of 236
Abdurrahim Shirwānī [they were from the same hometown, hence their shared epithet].
 For more information on Şirvânî see Muhibbī, Khulāsat al-Athar fī A‘yān al-Qarn al-Ḥādī ‘Ashar, v. 3, pp. 237
475-476. Ömer Çelik, “Muhammed Emin b. Sadruddin eş-Şirvani’nin Hayatı İlmi Kişiliği ve Eserleri,” (This is a 
biographical and bibliographical piece on Şirvânî).; A wonderful discussion of Şirvânî’s life and works was written 
by Zāhīd al-Kawtharī (see the collection of his articles Maqālāt al-Kawtharī (1388AH, 627-630); There are some 
works that discuss various treatises or books written by Şirvânî, See Hülya Alper, XVII. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Düşünce 
Dünyasında Bir Gazzali Şarihi Olarak Sadreddinzâde eş-Şirvani ve Şerhu Risaleti’l-Kudsiyye Örneğinde Şerh 
Geleneği (Alper discusses Şirvânî’s commentary on al-Ghazālī’s The Treatise of al-Quds on the Principles of Creed, 
as an example of commentary tradition in seventeenth century Ottoman Empire. She points out that Şirvânî goes 
beyond the original text by expanding its meaning, introducing new discussions, and modifying the ideas of al-
Ghazālī. Moreover, Alper’s discussion shows that Şirvânî was a critical thinker and a muhaqqiq (verifier).); Ahmed 
Kamil Cihan, "Şirvani’nin İlimlerin Tanımı ve Meseleleri ile İlgili Eseri: El-Fawā’idu’l-Hakaniyye" (Cihan provides 
a bio-bibliography of Şirvânî, and reviews the book. He claims that it is not clear based on what criteria Şirvânî 
classified sciences in his exposition.); For a most recent Turkish account of Şirvânî’s life and works, see Ömer 
Mahir Alper, Osmanlı Felsefesi, pp. 338-342. This book also contains a modern Turkish translation of Şirvânî’s 
treatise on jihat al-waḥda by Mehmet Özturan (pp. 373-403) and translations of a few sections from the Fawā’id al-
Hāqāniya. 
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that he grasped the finest nuances of the text, which could not be acquired without the guidance 
of an intelligent person (al-alma‘ī), and none except the unique scholar of the age or epoch could 
lead to them.  In other words, Şirvânî claims that he penetrated the ambiguous or closed 238
meanings of Fenârî’s prolegomenon without the help of a teacher, solely by studying it.  239
Apparently, there was an emerging trend in resolving the ambiguities of a text by repeated 
readings. To be fair, Şirvânî briefly paid lip service to his teacher by noting that he added to the 
text what he heard from his teacher. Nevertheless, he clearly did not think highly of his teacher’s 
contribution; in his remarks immediately following, Şirvânî claimed that his treatise includes 
things that nobody had touched before, including men and jinn, an allusion to a Qur’anic 
verse.  A note on one of the manuscripts explained that this statement suggests that Şirvânî's 240
teacher did not come up with these ideas.   241
Perhaps Şirvânî’s self-praise contributed to the positive reception of his treatise, as the 
number of surviving manuscripts indicates that it was the most popular commentary on the issue 
of jihat al-waḥda. However, it is not clear whether this fame is owed to Muhammed Şirvânî’s 
ingenious interpretation, or because the author was well connected to an authoritative genealogy 
of learning, as well as to the political elite. A study of his biography, and a close and comparative 
analysis of these texts might give us some clue in this regard. 
 Muhammed Emin Şirvânî, Muhammed Emin ‘alā jihat al-waḥda (1277AH/1861) p. 2.238
 Şirvânî, ibid. p. 2. Recently, Khaled El-Rouayheb has discussed a couple treatises on private reading, or “deep 239
reading”, which he sees as a new mode of learning in the early modern Ottoman Empire. El-Rouayheb’s chapter is 
interesting. However, in my view, it is not exactly a new kind of reading as students, during their formal education, 
were supposed to read and study (muṭāla‘a) texts the day before class. Hence, this would be expressing a common 
practice in a treatise, or writing about a common knowledge.
Şirvânî, Jihat al-waḥda, p.2, cf. Qur’an: Chapter of Raḥmān, verse 56. 240 ”لم يیطمسهھن إإنس قبلهھم ووال جانن“ 
 See Muhammed Emin Şirvânî, Jihat, MS BY4455, fl. 2a. On top of the allusion to the Qur’anic verse it is stated 241
"ay qīla ustādhunā, wa’l-jam‘u li’l-ta’zīm” meaning that the teacher did not come up with the ideas.
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 A few icazetnames (licenses, Ar. ‘Ijaza) from the late Ottoman period indicate that 
Muhammed Emin Şirvânî was part of a strong network of scholars. They place Şirvânî amidst 
one of the prevalent chains of transmission of theoretical or rational sciences in post-classical 
Islamic history.  According to one such icazetname  from 1326 AH (1908), Muhammed 242 243
Şirvânî was a key link connecting Ottoman scholars with the pre-Ottoman scholarly lineage, 
which reached all the way back to al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) and his predecessors via intermediaries 
such as Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī (d. 1274) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī (d. 1209). It is noted that 
Muhammed Emin Şirvânî was a student of Husayn Khalkhāli (Tr. Halhali), who was a student of 
Mirzājān, a student of Jamāl al-Dīn Mahmūd Shirwānī, a student of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī, 
who received sciences from Muhyiddin Kashkanānī, who received them from al-Jurjānī, a fellow 
of Fenârî from his time in Cairo.   244
Although such licenses should be studied by comparing them with other historical 
material, at least with regard to Şirvânî, we can see the information is in line with his 
biographical accounts. Although Muhammed Emin Şirvânî was born in Shirwan (currently in 
Azerbaijan), his family was exiled due to increasing Safavid incursions on his hometown. 
Muhammed Emin's family migrated to the Sunni dominant Ottoman territories. Şirvânî settled in 
 For some icazetnames (Ar. ‘ijāzas) that include Şirvânî in the genealogy of knowledge, see MS BY 140; MS BY 242
1633; and MS BY 5848. 
 See MS BY 140, p. 3.243
 It is interesting that in each generation only one mentor is mentioned, despite the fact that a scholar most likely 244
studied with many teachers. Therefore, even though Abdurrahim was noted as being a teacher of Muhammed Emin, 
licenses do not include his name. As a matter of fact, they also ignore his father who was one of Şirvânî's teachers. 
Clearly only one or two scholars from a generation are included in the chain of transmission, despite the fact that 
they had numerous students who themselves taught other scholars. How does one ensure a place in the chain? This 
also needs to be verified by a comprehensive study of the figures in order to see if there was a pattern. For a few 
similar chains of transmission of philosophical and rational sciences, see El-Rouayheb, Seventeenth Century Islamic 
Intellectual History (pp. 13-59).
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Āmid (a.k.a. Diyarbakır, in modern day Southeast Turkey) and taught there for a number of 
years. Hence, his students in the chain of transmission are known as al-Āmidī. However, Şirvânî 
came into contact with Nasuh Pasha (d. 1614) while in Āmid, and he eventually moved to 
Istanbul with this patron.  There he continued to teach in medreses. It is perhaps due to this 245
political connection that he became well known.  
Şirvânî was a prolific author, and dedicated many of his works to his patrons, including 
his classification of sciences entitled Fawā’id Hāqāniya,  which, like Nev’î’s Netâyic, was 246
written in the genre of unmūzaj al-‘ulūm. However, Şirvânî’s treatise on the aspect of unity of 
science was not produced in order to gain favor with the political elite since it was not dedicated 
to any patron as his preface shows. In fact, I have not yet encountered any dedicatory remarks to 
the sultan or other members of the ruling elite in the prefaces of the texts studied in this chapter. 
This shows that the treatises on the issue of the aspect of unity (jihat al-waḥda) were not of the 
kind consumed by the political elite. Şirvânî’s preface also confirms this view since he noted that 
the issue of the aspect of unity (jihat al-waḥda) had become popular among students. This shows 
that the interest in the issue was mainly an academic interest and was generated in the madrasa 
environment, rather than that of the court.  
 For a biography of Nasuh Pasha, see Ömer İşbilir, “Nasuh Paşa,” in DİA.245
 For a manuscript of Şirvânî’s Fawā’id al-Hāqāniya li-Ahmad al-Khāniya see MS Amcazâde Hüseyin 321. The 246
collection of books that includes this manuscript was endowed by Amcazâde Hüseyin, who was one of the Köprülü 
family viziers in the late seventeenth century. It is interesting that the manuscript of Şirvânî’s book was owned by 
this vizier and endowed to the library of the complex he commissioned. The colophon of the manuscript states that 
the draft of this book was completed on Wednesday, Safar 8, 1023AH, in the center of the (Ottoman) sultanate, in 
Constantinople (fl. 92a). There is another treatise of Şirvânî found within the volume that contains Fawā’id al-
Hāqāniya, which states in the colophon that it was written at the hand of the author Şirvânî, indicating that it is an 
autograph. Since this has the same handwriting as the Fawā’id al-Hāqāniya it appears that this too was the author’s 
copy. The book and the collection are accessible at Süleymaniye Manuscripts Library. 
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I do not want to suggest that there is not any relationship between scholarship and politics 
at large. In fact, Şirvânî’s relationship with the court might have increased his popularity among 
medreses patronized by the imperial elite. However, with regard to the content of these treatises, 
if there is such a connection, it is rather implicit and at the level of unconsciously shared 
paradigms, as none of the commentators articulate such a connection between the issue of unity 
of science and legitimizing or challenging the political authority. However, I should note that a 
couple treatises do allude to the military in their explanation of the muqaddima and jihat al-
waḥda,  but both of these were comments made in passing, and did not occupy a major place in 247
shaping discussions on the unity of science. My purpose here is not to bifurcate science and 
politics. In fact, as I have shown in the previous chapter with the example of Nev’î’s Netâyic, the 
court and the ruling elite could and did play a major role in scholarship of a certain kind. This is 
also demonstrated by Şirvânî’s above-mentioned treatise on the classifications of knowledge and 
the representative issues of sciences, namely Fawā’id al-Hāqāniya. As noted above, this treatise 
was in fact written in the same genre as Nev’î’s Netâyic. In this treatise, Şirvânî classified 
science in a way that was modeled on the battle divisions of the Ottoman military. Thus, sciences 
were grouped as those of the left flank, those of the right flank, those in the front (muqaddima), 
and those in the center (qalb, lit. heart).  Moreover, a total of 53 sciences were represented, a 248
number equal to the numerical value of Sultan Ahmed I’s name. This shows that the closer the 
connection between the political elite and the production of the text, the more straightforward the 
 Zeynüddin Baradost noted that the muqaddima in sciences was modeled on the muqaddima in the military 247
structure (MS BY4455, fl. 18b); Kara Halil (p. 15) used the example of the military when explaining jihat al-waḥda, 
noting that despite its variations, it is known as the military as a whole due to an aspect of unity which is fighting 
and desiring to propagate God's word (i'lā'i kalimatu'llāh).
 Şirvânî, Fawā’id al-Hāqāniya, MS Amcazâde Hüseyin 321, fl. 3b.248
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relationship between politics and knowledge. Hence, even if all scholarship is political at some 
level, we can see that some of it is more and visibly so than others. Therefore, my analytical 
approach to the madrasa and court-related production of knowledge is further confirmed by the 
contrast between these two treatises of Şirvânî.  
Kara Halil and Carullah on Şirvânî’s Gloss 
 Şirvânî's text itself was studied by later generations. Glosses on this treatise were also 
inspired as a result of discussions in madrasas. Two such glosses, by Kara Halil and Carullah,  249
are by far the most expansive texts focusing on the issue of the aspect of unity. In fact Carullah’s 
gloss on Şirvânî was a criticism of Kara Halil’s gloss. Fitting with its size, Kara Halil also 
included a relatively longer discussion about the circumstances or conditions in which he wrote 
his gloss. The author noted that during the year 1693-94, while he was discussing (mudhākara) 
Şirvânî’s treatise on Jihat al-Waḥda, a group of brothers and true friends asked him to write a 
gloss on it that would unveil its precious phrases, as well as add new issues that belonged to the 
theme, which Şirvânî’s treatise had neglected.  Halil remarked that Şirvânî's text was short, and 250
therefore did not include all the relevant issues in an elaborated manner. According to Halil, 
studying the issue of jihat al-waḥda (unifying aspect) was valuable for gaining insight before 
studying any one of the rational or transmitted sciences in detail. Therefore, he asserted, whoever 
acquires this knowledge, acquires everything.  251
 Halil’s remarks indicate the centrality of the issue in studying various sciences. In other 
words, learning about the aspect of unity that ties together the issues of a science is, for Halil, 
 See Kara Halil, Ḥāshiya ‘alā Muhammed Emin [Şirvânî](Tr. Muhammed Emin Haşiyesi) (Zh. 1258/1843).249
 Kara Halil, Ḥāshiya ‘alā Muhammed Emin (Tr. Muhammed Emin Haşiyesi), (zh. 1258/1843), p. 2. 250
 Kara Halil, Ḥāshiya, pp. 2-3.251
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crucial for studying any science. He claimed that with this in mind, he explained (īḍāḥ) Şirvânî's 
treatise by a clear exposition in order to assist beginners. Halil noted that for this reason he 
entitled his gloss al-Risāla al-‘Awniya fī Īḍāḥ al-Hāshiya al-Sadriya, (The Assistant Treatise for 
Unveiling the Gloss of Sadr) so that the name and the named correspond. Finally, Halil pointed 
out the ideal audience for the text, stating that "they are seeking the truth, they are not stubborn, 
they resist the path of imitation, they are aiming at the right course, their goal is to learn the bare 
truth, lastly they are not describing falsehood under the guise of apodeictic truth.”  These are 252
characteristics of the ideal student for Halil. He also excused himself for any mistakes that might 
occur as that was considered without a doubt a human characteristic. Lastly, Halil noted the 
differences between the various manuscript copies of Şirvânî's treatise. Out of all of them, he 
asserted that the copy by Şirvânî's grandson, Muhammed Sadık ibn Feyzullah, was the most 
reliable both in terms of its transmission and meaning (riwāyatan wa dirāyatan).  In fact, Halil 253
did mention in his discussion of the text some manuscript variations with regards to certain 
statements, and asserted that he prefers the superior copy just mentioned.  
 Halil's critical attitude toward Şirvânî's interpretation, his evaluation of sources, and his 
engagement with the much wider intertextual allusions throughout the gloss, all indicate a much 
more formidable scholarship in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century Ottoman 
medrese circles. Halil was not alone in providing a more diligent study of texts in that century. I 
should note the names of Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede (d. 1702), Yanyalı Esad Efendi (d. 1731), 
Şeyhülislam Veliyuddin Efendi (d. 1768), and Muhammed Akkirmani (d. 1760) among the 
 Kara Halil, Ḥāshiya, p. 3.252
 Kara Halil, Ḥāshiya, pp. 3-4253
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rigorous scholars of that century. Moreover, the use of dictionaries and the increasing amount of 
references in the margins of manuscripts from the eighteenth century show that there was a 
crucial shift in the standards of scholarship during that period. These developments, I argue, 
might be a significant link in the emergence of modern forms of writing and scholarship in the 
late Ottoman Empire, and hence provided a case for considering the period as early modern. 
Overall evaluation of prefaces  
 The above-discussed prefaces to the commentaries and glosses of Fenârî's Fawā’id reveal 
that they were mostly produced as a result of social influences. In other words, it was either 
colleagues or students who encouraged scholars to write commentaries. These commentaries or 
glosses were also quite often written as a manifestation of the author’s intellectual capability, 
another example of external social acknowledgment serving as an impetus. In addition to the 
pedagogical orientation of texts, commentaries and glosses were adding new problems, new 
material, and covering new ground by expanding on the original, and rephrasing it. Hence, they 
were not only pedagogical in scope but also acted as sites of intellectual contributions, 
conversations, and creativity.  
 Surveying these prefaces, it seems that these commentaries were as much the product of a 
commentator's teachers as they were that of the commentator. The impact of the oral 
transmission on past authors is very much neglected in modern times, due to the privilege given 
to the written text.  It is not uncommon to see criticism of the early modern Ottoman scholars 254
 Actually, I will posit that even today many writers form their ideas by learning through instruction or 254
conversations that are not always well acknowledged. Unlike writing, these moments of instruction are fleeting, and 
cannot be reaccessed unless there are records such as notes or audio-visual media.
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for being unproductive. However, this is more because the role of oral transmission is often 
neglected. In other words, if not that many scholars wrote commentaries and glosses on texts, 
they certainly articulated their views in class. Indeed, some commentators acknowledged that 
their commentaries included knowledge they had learned orally from their teachers in class. 
Again, we learn from Şirvânî and Kara Halil that they were discussing the text with others. All of 
this shows that it is really difficult to determine which ideas belong to a certain individual, since 
they are the products of collective learning.  It is possibly due to this social learning that we 255
find many similarities or overlaps between various commentaries and glosses, notwithstanding 
their unique contributions. 
 Besides collective learning, scholars also emphasized their own contributions. In other 
words, we see individual contributions to the discussions as well. Interpreters such as Şirvânî and 
Kara Halil claimed that they had uncovered hidden meanings of the text by studying it 
repeatedly. There seems to be an emphasis on discovering, through repeated readings, the text’s 
meaning beyond what was transmitted. This perhaps allowed them to insert new ideas by 
alleging that they had discovered them rather than acknowledge that they had invented the new 
meanings. To put it differently, in addition to learning from instructors, there was an increasing 
confidence in explicating a text by reading it over and over again.  We can see that learning is 256
 Extending Foucault’s critique of authorship, we might ask where, with regard to the commentaries, does the 255
authorship of the teacher stop and that of the student begin. Can we assign authority to texts that are products of 
discussions among peers, continuation of points made in class etc.? For Foucault’s views on authority, see Foucault, 
Michel, and Alan Sheridan. The Archaeology of Knowledge. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972; “What is an 
author?” in Michel Foucault, James D. Faubion, and Paul Rabinow, The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984: 
Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology (2000) pp. 205-222.
 This has been observed by El-Rouayheb as well, who argues that there was a rise of “deep reading” in the 256
seventeenth century. Although, I agree with El-Rouayheb’s account in general, it seems to me that he puts too much 
emphasis on private reading. After all, muṭāla‘a (reading) was part of madrasa learning. See El-Rouayheb, 
Seventeenth Century Ottoman Intellectual History, Chapter 3.
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not limited to the transmission of earlier knowledge from master to student. Rather, there is an 
attempt to go beyond existing commentaries by rectifying them or introducing new themes in 
order to advance knowledge. In this way, the commentary and gloss format provided a venue for 
creativity, and the possibility of shifting conversations in new directions, despite the appearance 
of continuity due to a shared text or form. The emphasis on finding the meaning of texts by 
persistent reading verifies the role of writing that has been emphasized in Jack Goody’s work. 
Goody pointed out that writing enables skepticism and critical engagement with transmitted 
knowledge, and hence gave way to critical inquiries and disciplines such as history and logic.  257
Fenârî’s prolegomenon on aspect of unity (jihat al-waḥda) 
 Now that I’ve introduced some of the main figures and texts relevant to the subject matter 
of this chapter, as well as pointed out the value of prefaces for intellectual history of the early 
modern period, I analyze the content of the prolegomenon of Fenârî’s commentary on al-
Abharī’s logic. This is crucial for understanding the paradigm of science during that period. The 
concept of “aspect of unity” (jihat al-waḥda) is central to this discussion. Madrasa students, who 
were probably introduced to logic via al-Abharī’s Isagoge, also commonly studied one of its 
commentaries as a mid-level exposition on logic. Many in Ottoman Anatolia and its surroundings 
studied Fenârî's commentary on the Isagoge, which introduced the subject of logic with the 
following statements:  
 Goody has written profusely on the impact of writing as a technology on the development of thought and 257
knowledge. See, for example, Jack Goody and Ian Watt, “The Consequences of Literacy,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 5:3 (April, 1963); Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind, (Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977); Goody, The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society, (Cambridge, 
Cambridgeshire: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
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(I’lam) Know that it is the duty of all seekers (or students) to know multiplicity that is 
held (or tied) together by an aspect of unity, and to grasp it by that aspect before 
beginning to seek it, so that they are safe from leaving out matters they have intended [to 
seek], and they are secured from expending effort on things that are not intended. And [it 
is also their duty to] know its purpose so that they become more determined and excited, 
and their effort is not in vain and misguided. Since all sciences consist of a multiplicity 
held (or tied) together by an aspect of unity that is essential (jihat waḥda dhātīya) and by 
which their issues are considered one science, this is the kind [of aspect of unity] that 
considers the essential accidents of one thing, that has a real (haqīqī) or imaginary 
(i‘tibārī) unity. And [it is held together by] the accidental aspect of unity (jiha waḥda 
'araḍīya) that follows the former [i.e. essential aspect of unity] for it is a tool, and asking 
(or seeking) to follow it as a purpose (istitbā‘uhā ghāyatan). [Therefore] It is the custom 
of scholars to begin by perceiving (shu‘ūr) via the definition of sciences using either one 
of its aspects (of unity), its purpose, and its subject matter before delving into its issues. 
Therefore, with regard to the first aspect we say that logic is a science in which essential 
accidents of conceptions and assertions are investigated with regard to its utility in 
(acquiring) the unknown. Or [we define logic as a science investigating] essential 
accidents of secondary intelligibles, which do not have any correspondence in the 
external world. With regard to the second aspect [of unity], logic is the canon by which 
true and false views are known. The former includes information about the subject matter 
based on two schools [predecessors and successors]; the second includes knowledge of 
the purpose.  258
 The translation of the passage is mine and it inherently includes my interpretation and 
reading of the text, which is informed by the commentaries and glosses on the text that I have 
studied. Without prior knowledge of the issue, it is indeed difficult to grasp Fenârî's dense Arabic 
text for several reasons. First of all, as the later commentators noted, Fenârî intentionally wrote a 
concise commentary in order give due space to the matters paralleling the length of al-Abharī's 
articulation of issues in the Isagoge. Secondly, the text lends itself to various readings due to 
vague expressions and ambiguities in certain phrases, as well as difficulties in ascertaining 
references of pronouns. Add to these the further challenge of Arabic writing in general that 
 Fenârî, Fawā’id al-Fanāriya (Kırımlı Abdullah Efendi, 1312AH, annotated edition), pp. 3-5.258
 111
presents various possibilities of reciting.  In fact, this possibility for various readings of the text 259
gave rise to the contestations and creativity in arguing for or against a certain meaning. 
Nevertheless, it is quite challenging to grasp the meaning of the text without the help of various 
commentaries and glosses, or considering the background of Fenârî's discussion. Perhaps as I 
suggested before, the ambiguity of ideas together with linguistic difficulties stimulated separate 
commentaries on this issue itself.  
 Before delving into the sources of Fenârî’s statements, I discuss a few early modern 
glosses and partial commentaries on some phrases in this prolegomenon. Textual study of these 
interpretations, I argue, will demonstrate the reigning conception of science in the late medieval, 
and early modern madrasa circles. This further corroborates my argument in the first chapter on 
the classification of sciences, that the idea of science was quite different and thus problematizes 
our modern approaches to the concepts of that period. In other words, our understanding of 
science and religion in the modern period is inherently particular to our contemporary context 
and institutions, and so in studying the early modern period we should shake ourselves of our 
current categories and questions. This requires that we take the early modern texts more 
seriously, and listen to how they perceive or imagine matters, rather than imposing our own 
categories, questions, or concerns on them. Furthermore, the discussion of the content of these 
texts will confirm my argument based on the prefaces that contrary to the common conception, 
the early modern period was not, intellectually speaking, static. As these philosophical 
discussions show, there was a growing interest in theoretical issues.  
 See chapter five of Mitchell's Colonizing Egypt, for a discussion of Arabic writing as contrasted with European 259
writing.
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Glosses on multiplicity: Burhâneddin and Kul Ahmed  
 As previously mentioned, Burhâneddin and Kul Ahmed's glosses were not devoted to the 
specific issue of jihat al-waḥda (aspect of unity), which occupied little space in the beginning of 
Fenârî’s commentary. Rather they commented on the whole text, covering all issues of logic 
included in the commentary of Fenârî, including the introductory section (prolegomenon) 
translated above. Beginning with a study of their discussions, we can see how the earlier 
interpreters understood the aspect of unity issue.  
 Glossators, including Burhâneddin and Kul Ahmed, frequently provided piecemeal or 
fragmented interpretations of Fenârî's statements by quoting relevant phrases and interpreting 
them atomically. This practice is due to a focus on contentious remarks, especially in the genre of 
glossing (hāshiya). In their interpretations on Fenârî's statement, "inna min ḥaqqi kulli ṭālib 
kathra…” [It is the duty of all seekers of multiplicity],  some commentators discussed the word 260
“ḥaqq" (duty or right), some discussed the word "kathra" (multiplicity) while others discussed 
the phrasing, or all of these together. Indeed, they all are crucial for understanding or determining 
the meaning of this sentence, and evaluating Fenârî’s argument in the prolegomenon. According 
to glossators in general, the word ḥaqq, which clearly indicates an obligation, could signify a 
rational necessity, a religious necessity, or a customary necessity.  In this context, the 261
possibility of religious necessity was ruled out. It was asserted that the word ḥaqq, in this text, 
260 ”إإنن من حق كل ططالب كثرةة“ 
 Some commentators mention these. For instance, Kara Halil (Ḥāshiya, bottom of p. 14, and marginal notes) 261
pointed out that ḥaqq refers to that which is firm (thābit) or necessary (wājib). It could be religious (shar‘an) or 
rational (‘aqlan), the latter is divided into rational necessity (ḍarūrī) and particular (mu‘ayyan) necessity.
 113
signified a customary necessity, rather than a rational necessity, as the latter would mean that 
none had the will to avoid it.  
 There were contentions regarding Fenârî’s phrasing as well. For instance, according to 
Burhâneddin, it would’ve been better if Fenârî had stated "min ḥaqqi kulli ṭālib kull kathīr [It is 
the duty of all seekers of all multiplicity]” adding a quantifier to the word “multiplicity” so that it 
is not assumed that this command is limited to those who seek some kind of multiplicities (al-
katharāt) that are sought after.  Burhâneddin held the view that the lack of a definite article 262
(ihmāl) in the word “kathra” implies the form of some (of the things referred to), adding, “unless 
it is claimed that the nunnation (tanwīn) signifies quantity [definiteness] (fi'l-ithbāti sūrun), as 
some had maintained."  Burhâneddin stated, "it is possible to respond to them in another way, 263
i.e. that according to rhetoricians, indefiniteness has the power of universals (bi-quwwat al-
kulliya) in cases where one needs to prefer one of the two equally possible choices. Thus, 
Fenârî’s original sentence is interpreted as stating "min ḥaqqi kulli ṭālibin kullu kathratin”.  264
This supposedly further clarifies and removes ambiguity in Fenârî’s original phrasing. 
 As we can see, Burhâneddin took issue with how Fenârî phrased his intended meaning. 
Of course, based on this sentence alone the intended meaning is not clear at all, considering the 
possibilities of different readings. However, many interpreters looked at the larger context of this 
statement, i.e. the argument for providing a prolegomenon at the beginning of a science. In line 
with this larger intention of Fenârî’s prolegomenon, Burhâneddin suggested a revision that would 
 Burhâneddin, Farā’id al-Burhāniya, MS BY7449, fl. 3a.262
 Burhâneddin, Farā’id, MS BY7449, fl. 3a. Incidentally this statement shows that there were other commentaries 263
on Fenârî's text prior to Burhâneddin’s gloss, and he engages their interpretations in his gloss. 
 Burhâneddin, Farā’id, MS BY7449, fl. 3a. 264
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remove some ambiguities and thus fix Fenârî's expression.  Nevertheless, other scholars such 265
as Şirvânî contested this revision and argued that it was not necessary due to the possibility of 
yet another reading that is more appropriate to the discipline of logic.   266
 Commentators also reflected on various meanings of the word “kathra” (multiplicity) in 
Fenârî’s statement. Burhâneddin pointed out that "multiplicity" in Fenârî's expression could 
either be referring to a specific multiplicity in written sciences (‘ulūm al-mudawwana), or to a 
more general meaning that includes multiplicity in various aspects of life, including wealth, and 
non-disciplinary knowledge. An example of the latter, according to Burhâneddin, is the science 
of writing, which is indeed a craft.  Incidentally, these remarks are significant as they show that 267
the conception of science was not limited to discursive and written disciplines taught at 
madrasas, but also science was inclusive of other forms of knowledge, such as the knowledge of 
crafts, or embodied knowledge that was not primarily textualized. To put it differently, pre-
modern scholars did not look down on what nowadays is called artisanal or embodied 
knowledge  as non-scientific, despite Aristotelian distinction between episteme and techne. 268
They did not consider such knowledge to be non-science just because it was not composed in 
books and taught, but rather they considered it as belonging to non-established or non-textualized 
sciences.  
 Abdurrahim noted Burhâneddin's view, however he preferred the other explanation that was cited by 265
Burhâneddin. See MS YZ0030, fl. 22a. 
 Muhammed Emin Şirvânî, Jihat al-Waḥda, pp. 4-5.266
 Burhâneddin, Farā’id, MS BY 7449, fl. 3a. 267
 For more information on the distinction between artisanal knowledge and science in the Aristotelian episteme see 268
Pamela Smith's The Body of the Artisan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).
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 Kul Ahmed, in his interpretation of the word “multiplicity" in Fenârî’s statement, also 
considered the statement’s larger setting, and thus understood “kathra” to mean absolute 
multiplicity. He stated that "whether this multiplicity is of non-sciences [everything], or it is of 
textual sciences, or non-textual sciences, it is intended to state that, ‘it is the duty of all seekers of 
all multiplicity…’”  It is considered that Fenârî was making an argument for interjecting a 269
prolegomenon to al-Abharī’s text. To do so, he had to have a major premise, and a minor 
premise. Otherwise, Kul Ahmed asserted, the sentence would not produce the intended meaning 
i.e. “It is the duty of all seekers of logical issues to know them [the multiplicity] by that aspect 
[of unity]."  Kul Ahmed also pointed out that there were two main strategies to interpret the 270
sentence in a way that would yield the intended meaning for those who did not accept that the 
sentence had the form of the universal. One of these strategies was to assert that the nunnation 
(declining) at the end of the word kathratun (multiplicity) gives it the force of the universal, thus 
it refers to all kinds of multiplicity. Others claimed that in cases where indefiniteness signifies 
two equally possible meanings of a word, then it is preferable to give that indefinite form the 
power of definite form, thus universalizing its meaning. This was the practice of rhetoricians. By 
encouraging his reader to think and reflect about these arguments, it seems that Kul Ahmed did 
not hold these views.  271
 In his commentary on this issue, Şirvânî criticized Burhâneddin and Kul Ahmed’s 
interpretations. He asserted that they unnecessarily complicated the matter. Şirvânî rejected their 
 Kul Ahmed, p. 42.269
 Kul Ahmed, ibid.270
 Kul Ahmed, p. 42.271
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claim that Fenârî's first sentence "Inna min ḥaqqi kulli ṭālibi kathratin..." does not produce the 
intended conclusion, i.e. "inna min ḥaqqi kulli ṭālibi al-masā’ili-l-manṭīqiyati an ya‘rifahā bi 
tilka’l-jiha” (It is the duty of all students of multiple issues of logic to know them by that aspect 
[which unites them under the science of logic]) because the word kathra is not definite, that is, it 
does not refer to all kinds of multiplicities in general. To put it differently, previous scholars 
asserted that the first sentence should be a comprehensive general statement in order to deduce 
from it a conclusion about a particular case, i.e. that of logic. However, due to the indefinite use 
of the word "multiplicity" it does not produce the desired outcome. Hence, as mentioned above, 
earlier commentators such as Burhâneddin suggested that the sentence should state "kulli ṭālibi 
kulli kathratin." Şirvânî suggested that it was possible to avoid this situation all together if it was 
considered that the word “kull" (all) at the beginning of the phrase not only applied to the word 
ṭālib but it also modified the word "kathra," thus producing a generality. This reading required 
that the pairing, "ṭālibi kathra" be considered an adjunctive phrase, rather than being read as 
subject and predicate.  Şirvânî claims that all of this nonsense was introduced by one 272
commentator (according to Halil, this commentator was Burhâneddin) who could not think 
through the issue, and that later commentators (referring to Kul Ahmed and Abdurrahim Şirvânî, 
according to Halil) merely followed Burhâneddin without questioning his reading.  Şirvânî also 273
added that they thought they were making the text better, and concluded that if they could they 
would have realized how bad their deeds were.  
 Muhammed Emin Şirvânî, Jihat, pp. 4-5.272
 Muhammed Emin Şirvânî, Jihat, p. 5; Kara Halil, Ḥāshiya, p. 23.273
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 We can see how one ambiguous sentence had stimulated intellectual vitality by forcing 
commentators to make sense of it using various disciplines including grammar, semantics and 
logic. It is also noteworthy that commentators engaged each other implicitly by always building 
on the previous commentaries rather than interpreting from scratch. Even the partial 
commentaries on the prolegomenon were not completely independent of the larger commentaries 
of the text; they all built on the previous discussions. Commentaries of Abdurrahim and 
Muhammed Emin Şirvânî, which focused on the prolegomenon only, differed from glosses on 
the whole text by their extensive discussion of the phrase "jihatu waḥdatin.” Now we can turn to 
these commentaries devoted to the most important issue of Fenârî’s prolegomenon, by which 
these treatises came to be known. 
Glosses on Aspect of Unity: Abdurrahim, M. Emin Şirvânî, and Kara 
Halil 
  Although there is plenty of material that can be discussed in these partial commentaries, I 
will focus on their interpretations of the sentential adjective, "taḍbiṭuhā jihatu waḥdatin," (the 
unifying aspect that holds it), which modified the word "kathra" (multiplicity) in Fenârî's 
statement. As Asad Ahmed has discussed, the word jihat is multivalent, and it was used in a 
variety of contexts in logic books, including logical moods.  As the following discussion will 274
show, jihat in treatises on unity of science means “aspect,” “side,” or “face.” 
 According to Abdurrahim, the word jihat (aspect) in Fenârî's statement "taḍbiṭuhā jihatu 
waḥdatin" refers to a matter or thing that relates the multiplicity (amrun yunāsibu al-kathra), and 
 Asad Q. Ahmed, "Jiha/tropos-mādda/hūlē Distinction in Arabic Logic and Its Significance for Avicenna’s 274
Modals" in The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition, ed. Shahid Rahman et al. (Dordrecht; London: Springer, 
2008).
 118
just like the subject matter or the purpose of science, jihat becomes one of the things that grabs 
the multiplicity (muta‘alliqāt). Abdurrahim noted the relationship between jihat and waḥdat as 
that of definite adjunction, i.e. this is "the aspect" that brings about unity in things that are 
multiple in themselves (kathra fī nafsihi).   275
 Abdurrahim discussed the matter more specifically in relation to the sciences: each and 
every science that is composed or textualized (mudawwana) consists of particular issues (masā’il 
mukhtaṣṣa), however, they become particular or specific sciences by mediation of a thing or 
matter that relates (yunāsibuh) their issues, and by which some are tied or connected (yartabiṭ) to 
others. As a result of this connection or relationship due to this matter or thing, it becomes 
preferable to consider those issues as a science, and to give them an identity (infirāduhu, 
individualize) by composing them together.  From, this description, we can see that the aspect 276
of unity is like glue that sticks various issues together, and thus turns them into a science. 
 Abdurrahim discussed two kinds of matters that provide an aspect of unity, although he 
recognized the possibility of other matters in playing the same role. The matter that relates 
various issues, he noted, is either the subject matter of the science (mawḍū‘) or the purpose 
(ghāya) of the science. The subject matter is the subject that is signified in particular inquiries of 
a science. Abdurrahim gave the example of numbers in arithmetic. Like other sciences, 
arithmetic is a science that consists of many issues, all of which refer back to numbers (‘adad), 
which is the subject matter of this science.  The purpose of a science, Abdurrahim asserted, is 277
 Abdurrahim, Ta‘liqa ‘alā jihat al-waḥda, MS YZ0030, fl. 22b.275
 Abdurrahim, MS YZ0030, fl. 22b. 276
 Abdurrahim, MS YZ0030, fl. 22b.277
 119
the shared purpose of various inquiries of the science.  To put it differently, either a shared 278
purpose unites various issues, or these issues are considered one thing because of the unity of 
purpose.  
 Of the two aspects of unity, the issue of subject matter (mawḍū‘) drew relatively more 
discussion. Abdurrahim reiterated a prevalent view that the subject matter of a science is one (i.e. 
there is not more than one subject per discipline). This subject matter, it was claimed, along the 
lines of Fenârî's discussion, could be either real (haqīqīya) or mental (i‘tibārī, imaginary).  A 279
common example for real subject matter was "numbers" (‘adad) in arithmetic. The imaginary or 
mental subject matter is that which consists of many things that are related with a relation 
reckoned as such,  however it is counted as one due to this relationship. Logic, according to 280
later logicians, was used as an example. According to later logicians, as Fenârî also noted in the 
prolegomenon, logic was a science that investigated essential accidents of conceptions and 
assertions. Abdurrahim noted that though conceptions and assertions were two different things, 
they were considered one subject matter due to their relation to accomplishing the tasks that were 
taken into account in the science of logic. Abdurrahim also mentioned a different definition of 
logic, related by Fenârî as well, which considers its subject matter to be one thing, i.e. secondary 
intelligibles.  281
 Abdurrahim, MS YZ0030, fl. 22b-23a.278
 Abdurrahim, MS YZ0030, fl. 23a.279
 "tanāsuban mu'taddan bihi," ibid.280
 For an analysis of post-classical discussions on these two definitions of logic, see El-Rouayheb, "Post-Avicennan 281
Logicians on the Subject Matter of Logic”. For Avicenna’s views, see A I Sabra, "Avicenna on the Subject Matter of 
Logic,” Journal of Philosophy 77.11 (1980): 746-764.
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 Before, looking at Şirvânî's interpretation, I should note Abdurrahim's view of the 
modifying sentence i.e. “taḍbiṭuhā jihatu waḥdatin” [held (or tied) together by an aspect of 
unity].” According to Abdurrahim, Fenârî's statement "taḍbiṭuhā jihatu waḥdatin," is a sentential 
attribute of "kathra." However, Abdurrahim claimed that this modification or conditioning 
(determination) of multiplicity (taqyīduhā) with this attribute is not for precaution or restriction 
against something (iḥtirāz), i.e. to distinguish it from other kinds of multiplicity i.e. multiplicity 
that is not held by an aspect of unity. Rather, Abdurrahim thought that the sentential attribute was 
an actual condition (qaydun wāqi‘īyun).  Abdurrahim suggested that all kinds of multiplicity 282
are held together by an aspect of unity. Abdurrahim thought that this interpretation was more 
appropriate for the context. Abdurrahim also considered the less favored counter view (qīla), 
which held that Fenârî used the sentential attribute as a precaution against multiple issues that 
were gathered from various sciences, yet did not possess an aspect of unity. Abdurrahim pointed 
out that this interpretation went against "what our esteemed teacher Dāwūd decided or concluded 
in his Ḥāshiya on Ḥāshiya al-Saghīra of al-Sharif [al-Jurjānī], i.e. that there is no barrier (māni‘) 
for considering every issue as a science, separately (‘alā ḥidatin)."  It seems that Abdurrahim 283
focused on the meaning of jihat in the sentence rather than the word kathra. Hence, he stated, 
"unless it is claimed (an yuqāla) that what is meant by "jihat" here is either essential or 
 Abdurrahim, MS YZ0030, fl. 23a.282
 Abdurrahim, MS YZ0030, fl. 23a-b. There is confusion in the sources about the identity of this Dāwūd; some 283
refer to him as Kara Davud. This supergloss was widely circulated in the Ottoman Empire. al-Jurjānī's gloss was 
also a well-known gloss on Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Qawā‘id al-Manṭiqīya, which was a commentary on al-Kātibi’s 
previously mentioned summa on logic namely al-Shamsīya. As I discuss in the last section of the chapter, these 
commentaries also dealt with the same matters in a similar context, i.e. with regard to the place of 
"muqaddimah" (prolegomenon) in the scientific texts. Though, these were commentaries on a different text, as we 
can see, the commentators put them in conversation by such references. Incidentally, Katip Çelebi also held that 
there was no barrier for considering a variety of issues that were randomly put together as a science. See Katip 
Çelebi, Kashf, v. 1 p. 30.
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accidental, and not absolute (lā muṭlaqan)" then it is likely that the word kathra signifies all 
kinds of multiplicities.  As we will see, Muhammed Emin Şirvânî criticized this view and noted 284
his disagreement with Abdurrahim. 
 Although there is a lot of overlap between Muhammed Emin Şirvânî’s and Abdurrahim's 
interpretations, it is still worth it to paraphrase Şirvânî's interpretation in order to attend to the 
nuances in their views. According to Şirvânî, "the aspect of unity" is "an aspect or a thing 
(amrun, matter) that became the cause of unity of those matters that were multiple in essence 
(dhawātihā), and numerous in themselves, however, they became worthy of being considered 
one thing because of that aspect, and they deserved to be called by one name, and they acquired 
an identity (tafarrudihā) by being composed together, if they were of sciences."  For example, 285
according to Şirvânî, every science consists of numerous issues, yet scholars consider them one 
science, name them by one name, and make them one thing by grouping various issues together. 
There is no doubt, Şirvânî added, that there is a matter or thing (amrun) that relates (yunāsibu) 
this multiplicity, and connects some of them with others. As a result of this mediation (wāsiṭa), it 
became preferable (istuḥsina) to consider them one science. This matter or thing is called "jihat 
al-waḥda" i.e. the aspect of unity (or unifying aspect).  In other words, Şirvânî explained, it is 286
the aspect that became the cause of imaginary unity (waḥda i‘tibārīya) for those numerous 
matters.  
 Abdurrahim, MS YZ0030, fl. 23b.284
 Muhammed Emin, p. 3.285
 Muhammed Emin, pp. 3-4.286
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 It is noteworthy that Şirvânî thought that the unity in sciences was not a real unity, or 
ontological unity, but an imaginary or mental unity. We can call it an epistemological or 
discursive unity, and possibly a nominalist unity. From the succeeding explanations we see that 
Şirvânî was making a choice, and that there was another position, probably alluding to 
Abdurrahim's above-discussed view, which considers unity in sciences not as a mental and 
imaginary unity, but as a real unity. As we have seen with Abdurrahim's text, these perspectives 
are reflected in the interpretation of the sentence "taḍbituhā jihatu waḥdatin" that modified the 
word "kathra" (multiplicity) in Fenârî's statement. As mentioned above, Abdurrahim considered 
this a real attribute of all kinds of multiplicity. However, Şirvânî interpreted the sentence as a 
restrictive or binding limitation (iḥtirāzan), which would exclude some kinds of multiplicities in 
such situations where numerous issues of various sciences that have nothing to do with each 
other are randomly collected.  An example from that period would be majmū‘as (notebooks or 287
collections) that included brief notes on various issues of different sciences.  Şirvânî noted that 288
even if these divergent issues were related with regard to sharing judgments based on one 
another that still would not make them worthy of being considered one science.  We can see 289
that despite asserting that unity in scientific disciplines is imaginary or mental, Şirvânî rejected 
the possibility of randomly or arbitrarily putting together various issues and claiming that they 
constituted a science. In other words, all issues of a science should share an aspect of unity that 
makes them worthy of being called by one name and considered one science. This aspect, Şirvânî 
 Muhammed Emin, p. 4.287
 In fact, I have come across manuscripts that include such a variety of notes on various disciplines, which do not 288
appear to have any relation. 
 Muhammed Emin, p. 4.289
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suggested, could not merely be the space (i.e. a book or collection) in which various issues are 
collected. 
 Şirvânî also reports his father's view, which is that there is no multiplicity that does not 
have an aspect that holds them together (taḍbituha) and furnishes them with an imaginary unity 
(waḥda i‘tibārīya): all things at least share the fact that they exist. So if there was nothing else in 
common, the mere fact that these various things share existence would make them one thing. 
Şirvânî concurred with his father's view in general, but with regard to the unity in sciences, he 
contested it by suggesting that this view depends on the assumption that Fenârî's statement does 
not envision a particular kind of aspect. In other words, any kind of aspect that unites divergent 
issues is not enough. Rather there should be a kind of aspect that makes various issues worthy of 
being considered one science.  
 Şirvânî pointed out that some scholars accept that jihat (aspect) refers to the thing that 
makes multiplicity worthy of being considered one thing, yet they still interpreted the phrase 
"kathra taḍbituha jihatu waḥdatin" to signify a real limitation, that is, they did not see the 
sentential adjective as distinguishing this kathra (multiplicity) from other kinds of kathra, since 
there is no multiplicity without an aspect of unity. Halil, in his supergloss, and a marginal note in 
another manuscript,  indicated that the person referred to here is Abdurrahim Şirvânî, the 290
teacher of the author or glossator (muḥashshi) i.e. Muhammed Emin Şirvânî.  The whole 291
discussion also shows that Şirvânî was not merely following his teacher and father as authorities, 
but also questioning their views respectfully.  
 Halil, Ḥāshiya, p. 20; Muhammed Emin Şirvânî, Jihat, MS BY 4455, fl. 3a.290
 These notes confirm that Abdurrahim's treatise was written before Muhammed Emin Şirvânî's commentary.291
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 Though, it is odd that in the case of his teacher Şirvânî did not mention his name at all. 
Perhaps it was because he did not want to disagree with his teacher openly. But Kara Halil and 
others did know that Şirvânî was referring to Abdurrahim. By gathering such information about 
the networks and relationship between scholars and texts through the study of manuscript copies 
of commentaries and glosses will further enrich our understanding of issues and tensions 
embedded in these texts. 
 From the foregoing interpretations, we can conclude that Abdurrahim and Şirvânî 
concurred that jihat al-waḥda (aspect of unity) is the matter that makes it preferable to consider 
multiple issues as comprising one science. However, they disagreed with regard to whether 
Fenârî thought that all multiplicities had an aspect of unity, or only some had that kind of aspect 
of unity that makes them preferably one science. Although these contentions revolved around 
Fenârî, allusions to other texts (such as that by Dāwūd) show that they might be responding to 
various authors that had discussed the issue elsewhere. In other words, the discussion on the 
concept involved relevant material beyond the commentaries and glosses devoted to Fenârî’s 
Fawā’id. Due to that kind of intertextuality, it is worth tracing genealogies of Fenârî’s 
articulation in order to note other textual trajectories that were probably being followed and 
informed the one I study here. Hence, it is important to point out the pre-Fenârî discussions on 
the issue in order to map the relevant literature that not only informed Fenârî’s articulation, but 
also were studied by later generations of commentators and glossators such as Kara Halil.  
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Fenârî's Contemporaries and Predecessors on the Unity of Science 
 As I just suggested, the idea of unity of science was discussed prior to Fenârî’s writing, 
but it was his texts that generated a number of commentaries and glosses on the issue by 
providing a venue for various scholars to argue about the nature of science and its characteristics 
across disciplines. Most importantly, the topic of prolegomenon, and its content was considered 
in Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on al-Kātibī’s al-Shamsiya also included a similar 
discussion which was pursued by later glossators’ of that text.  Below, I point out this longer 292
history of the conception of science as having a unifying aspect, such as the subject matter or the 
purpose.  
 Besides logic texts, the subject matter of Fenârî's prolegomenon could indeed be seen in 
the introduction to a variety of other disciplinary texts as well, including legal theory, and 
theology among others. For example, both al-Jurjānī and al-Taftāzānī discussed these matters in 
the introduction of their various works, including Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid (on theology) and al-Talwīḥ 
(on legal theory) by al-Taftāzānī, and Sharḥ al-Mawāqif (on theology) by al-Jurjānī. In fact, 
Fenârî himself reiterated the issue of unity of science in his works on various disciplines 
including Qur’anic exegesis, and legal theory.  As mentioned earlier, Fenârî's formidable 293
education brought him in touch with this intellectual heritage of the post-classical Islamic world, 
and most probably with the texts I just mentioned.  
 Qutb al-Din Maḥmūd Ibn Muḥammad Al-Rāzī, Taḥrīr Al-Qawāʻid Al-Manṭiqīyah Fī Sharḥ Al-Risālah Al-292
Shamsīyah, (Miṣr: al-Maṭbaʻah al-Maymanīyah, 1889).
 See for instance Fenârî’s Fuṣūl al-Badāi‘ fī Uṣūl al-Sharāi‘ (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmīyah, Manshūrāt 293
Muḥammad ʻAlī al-Bayḍūn, 2006), a mid-level (iqtiṣad) exposition on legal theory. Similar discussions regarding 
this issue can be found in his introduction to his exegesis on the first chapter of the Qur’an, entitled ‘Aynu’l-A’yan 
(Istanbul: Rifat Bey Matbaası, 1908). For a Turkish study of Fenârî’s conception of Qur’anic exegesis as a science, 
see M. Taha Boyalık, ‘‘Molla Fenarî’nin Tefsir İlminin Mahiyetine Yönelik Soruşturması,” İslâm Araştırmaları 
Dergisi, 18 (2009): 73-100.
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 Of the previous discussions on the issue noted above, I believe Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī's 
discussion of the issue was the most influential on Fenârî's articulation. In fact, a few sentences 
in al-Taftāzānī's Sharḥ al-Risāla al-Shamsīya (the commentary on Kātibī’s al-Shamsiya) and 
Talwīḥ (a commentary on legal theory) appear almost verbatim in Fenârî's commentary.  I 294
discuss the resemblances to al-Taftāzānī’s commentary on logic as an example. 
 As noted previously Al-Risāla al-Shamsīya was a popular summa on logic written by 
Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī, a student of al-Abharī. Of the many scholars who commented 
on it, al-Taftāzānī was among the well-known commentators. At the end of his preface, al-Kātibī 
noted that his text consisted of a prolegomenon (muqaddima), three treatises (maqālāt), and a 
conclusion. Al-Kātibī further divided the prolegomenon into two sections, the first dealing with 
the essence of logic, and the need for it. The second section of the prolegomenon dealt with the 
subject matter of logic. Commentators such asal-Taftāzānī, and before him Qutb al-Dīn al-Razī, 
explained what al-Kātibī meant by the "muqaddima" i.e. prolegomenon. In fact, al-Taftāzānī 
mentioned that the interest in the prolegomenon was a characteristic of later scholars 
(muta’akhirūn, successors), those belonging to what is nowadays considered the post-classical 
period. Al-Taftāzānī noted some changes in the science of logic, pointing out that successors left 
out the five arts (ṣinā‘āt al-khams, which were originally part of Aristotle’s Organon), expanded 
various issues of syllogism, such as concomitance, conversion (al-‘aks), conjunctions, and began 
chapters of logic by explaining the essence (māhiya) of logic, the need for it, and its subject 
 Al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-Shamsiya li’l-Imām al-Taftāzānī (Dar al-Nur, 2011). This edition also includes the text of 294
al-Shamsiya (pp. 52-83). For a copy of al-Talwīḥ, see Sharḥ ̣al-Talwīḥ ʻalā al-Tawḍīḥ li-matn al-Tanqīḥ fī uṣūl al-
fiqh: wa-bi-al-ḥāmish sharḥ ̣al-tawḍīḥ li’l-Tanqīḥ al-madhkūr (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmīyah).
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matter.  Al-Taftāzānī further explained muqaddima as that which is mentioned prior to delving 295
into the targeted issue (maqāṣid) i.e. the goal or objective, in so far as they are related. The 
prolegomenon mainly consists of three matters: the essence (definition of discipline), subject 
matter, and purpose of logic. The essence of a science, he stated, pertains to explaining it in a 
general way that includes all of its aims and distinguishes it from other subject matters.  Here 296
al-Taftāzānī actually describes what logicians present as characteristic of definitions, which is 
being inclusive (co-extensive) of all members, and co-exclusive of the non-members.  
 Of the three issues discussed in the prolegomenon, it was the issue of subject matter 
(mawḍū') that occupied many commentators. Al-Taftāzānī explained the subject matter as 
determining (ta‘yīn) the thing that distinguishes a science from other sciences. As a result, the 
science acquires a name by being individuated (infirād). Al-Taftāzānī repeated a common idea 
that various sciences are only distinguished by their subject matters. He added that if the subject 
matter of this science is not different from the subject matter of that science, in essence or in 
perspective [imagination] (bi al-dhāt aw bi al-i‘tibār), then they are not two distinct sciences. 
Thus, they cannot have two definitions from two aspects. Al-Taftāzānī concluded that a science 
consists of all things that investigate the essential accidents of the subject matter from one 
perspective (i‘tibār wāḥid).  In other words, a science is a totality of issues that are related to 297
one subject from one angle.  
 Al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-Shamsīya, p. 92. 295
 Al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-Shamsiya, p. 94.296
 Al-Taftāzānī, ibid. p. 94.297
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 Taftāzānī further explained how the issues (maqāṣid) of a science are related to the 
matters discussed in the prolegomenon. He stated "every science is a multiplicity held together 
by one aspect (jiha wāḥida) with regard to it, it [multiplicity] is considered one science." Al-
Taftāzānī differentiated two kinds of aspects, the first one being the aspect of unity that is 
inclusive of all things that deal with the essential accidents of a subject matter. This is what 
Fenârî called the essential aspect of unity. The second kind of aspect of unity does not have a 
specific definition, as there are many such aspects of unity for a science, be they of purpose or 
instrument.  As discussed above, Fenârî called this second kind “the accidental aspect of 298
unity”. However, Fenârî seems to have considered the accidental aspect to be mainly the purpose 
of science.  
 Similarities between Fenârî’s and al-Taftāzānī’s articulation of these issues are 
remarkable. However, I don't think that al-Taftāzānī himself was the first to express these ideas, 
rather I believe they were part of the general learned discourse, though there were some 
disagreements about specific issues. Thus, there may have been other shared sources. It is 
worthwhile to consider the place of these discussions in Islamic peripatetic philosophy. 
Nevertheless, it is more likely that Fenârî himself learned these from al-Taftāzānī’s works, as he 
was familiar with them. Apparently he even cancelled classes when he was a teacher in order to 
have the students make copies of al-Taftāzānī’s works. 
Conclusion 
 Al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-Shamsīya, p. 94.298
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 In this chapter I looked at a genre of writing in order to follow both a chronological 
development of discourses about science as well as the philosophy of science that was prevalent 
among Ottoman madrasa graduates. I focused on the commentaries and glosses on the issue of 
jihat al-waḥda (the aspect of unity, of a science) as introduced in Fenârî’s Fawā’id, itself a 
commentary on al-Abharī’s Isagoge. I have analyzed both the prefaces and the prolegomena of 
these commentaries and glosses, as well as the possible origins of Fenârî's discussion. These 
interdependent texts show that scholars living in the same period shared many ideas. However, 
they also fiercely disagreed on many issues, nuances of which can only be seen by a close study 
of texts, which were frequently written in the form of commentaries and glosses. It is also 
noteworthy that the impact of oral learning and discussions among peers is neglected due to the 
lack of proper documents. However, in considering intellectual life in the earlier periods, we 
need to give due weight to the oral transmission of knowledge as well. 
 Based on the content of the prolegomena to the sciences, and specifically to the 
commentaries and glosses on Fenârî's prolegomenon to logic, we can see that the theory of 
science was quite different from the nineteenth-century positivist conception of science: while 
the latter rejected assertions that were not positive, or verifiable, the post-classical Muslim 
scholars conceptualized science in terms of certain shared principles across disciplines. It seems 
that the modern conception of science is inherently biased toward natural-mathematical sciences. 
The reason that social sciences are considered sciences is due to their adaption of methods used 
in the natural sciences. However, scholars of the early modern period emphasized commonalities 
among sciences, i.e. that particular issues of a science (be it rational or religious) share a 
common subject matter or purpose that is not characteristic of any other branch of science. Of 
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course, this does not mean that they uncritically accepted all kinds of bodies of knowledge as 
scientific. Rather, there was a formidable approach to what counts as a science: a unifying 
aspect, subject matter, and a shared purpose were three main characteristics of scientific 
disciplines. It is important to note that at this stage of theorizing, there was no differentiation 
between theoretical sciences and practical sciences, rational sciences and transmitted sciences, or 
high sciences and instrumental sciences which were some common classifications during that 
period. These sciences did not differ with regard to the above-mentioned characteristics, but they 
did diverge with regard to the dominant ways of acquiring knowledge. In other words, the theory 
of science prevalent at that time was much more abstract and hence inclusive than the positivist 
theory of science. In fact, we could say that the main discussion was ontological, rather than 
being epistemological. Thus, there was not any bias toward either religious or natural-
philosophical disciplines as being scientific. Rather, the controversies were regarding the value 
of studying a specific science, which was a separate matter. Therefore, it was the ethical concern 
rather than ontological views that created fissures. 
 I conclude that nineteenth-century ideas of what constitutes science should not color our 
perception of earlier histories, especially with regard to the relationship between science and 
religion. Following such recent conceptions, many scholars anachronistically forged a history of 
the conflict between science and religion. However, studying sources from the later Islamic 
period, we can see that the scientific paradigm was quite different from the (post) enlightenment 
conception. Therefore, we should approach the question with caution, as it does not seem to be 
an issue for the scholars of the period. 
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CHAPTER III: Updating Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah: 
Cevdet’s Turkish Translation 
Introduction 
 In the preceding chapter, I examined various prolegomena to sciences, especially with 
regard to the dominant conception of science in the early modern period. In this chapter, I study 
the Prolegomenon (Muqaddimah) by Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406), which exemplifies the well 
established habit of scholars in introducing a science with a discussion of its subject matter, 
purpose, and benefit.  Rather than further exploring “prolegomenon,” in this chapter I study the 299
Ottoman Turkish translation of the Muqaddimah in order to follow change and continuity in the 
conception of sciences in the late Ottoman Empire. 
 For a discussion of Ibn Khaldun’s appropriation of this established trend of post-classical scholars in the 299
Muqaddimah, see Ömer Türker, “Mukaddime’de Aklî İlimler Algısı: İbn Haldûn’un “Bireysel Yetenekler” Teorisi,” 
İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi, 15 (2006) cf. idem.,“The Perception of Rational Sciences in the Muqaddimah: Ibn 
Khaldun's Individual Aptitudes Theory" Asian Journal of Social Science. 36.3 (2008); cf. 
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 The chapter begins with Ibn Khaldun’s reception in the Ottoman Empire via Pîrîzâde’s (d. 
1749) translation of the first five chapters of the Muqaddimah as a precursor to Ahmed Cevdet’s 
(d. 1895) Ottoman Turkish rendering of the sixth chapter. Subsequently, Cevdet’s translation is 
situated in the context of the reorganization of the state and society in the mid-nineteenth century 
Ottoman Empire, commonly known as the Tanzimat period (1830s-1870s). I point out that 
Cevdet’s translation updates and modernizes the Muqaddimah, as indicated by his explicatory 
rendering of the translation, and the extensive commentaries he added to it. I show Cevdet’s 
modernization of the Muqaddimah by comparing his and Ibn Khaldun’s conception of human 
beings, the existence of the soul, and their historiography of rational sciences. Analysis of these 
issues reveals that Cevdet’s various attempts at updating this classic not only illustrate the 
reformist aspect of the translation but also the intertwined nature of science, politics, and 
historiography in the modern period.  We will see that there were both similarities and 300
differences in Cevdet’s and Ibn Khaldun’s discourses on what it means to be human, as there are 
similarities and differences in their historiography of rational sciences. By subjecting the original 
Arabic of Ibn Khaldun and Cevdet’s translation to a detailed comparison, we will follow the 
transmission of knowledge from late medieval-early modern to the modern period. Thus, we see 
not only change but also continuity between the pre-modern and modern Ottoman-Islamic 
intellectual history. Lastly, I contend that Cevdet’s historiography of sciences in the Islamic and 
Ottoman period provided a model for the emerging history of sciences as a new field of inquiry 
in the late Ottoman Empire. 
 In the modern period the Muqaddimah had received the status of a classic due to the immense popularity it has 300
enjoyed since the nineteenth century. It is noteworthy that this reception itself indicates a historical shift in the 
conception of science, especially the emergence of social sciences. I believe that a “historical turn” in the humanities 
has brought this about. 
 133
Pre-Tanzimat Engagement with Ibn Khaldun: Pîrîzâde’s translation of 
the Muqaddimah 
 The Ottoman encounter with Ibn Khaldun reaches back to at least the turn of the 
seventeenth century, if not earlier.  According to Cornell Fleischer, the earliest year an Ottoman 301
scholar acquired a copy of the Muqaddimah was 1598.  However, there were some Ottoman 302
scholars such as Molla Fenârî (d. 1431) who may have been familiar with Ibn Khaldun’s work as 
they studied in Cairo during the Mamluk rule. Fenârî visited Cairo a few times after he returned 
to the Ottoman territories.  Yet we do not have any mention of Ibn Khaldun’s work in post-303
Fenârî texts such as Taşköprüzâde’s (d. 1560) Miftāh al-Sa‘āda, or Yahya Nev‘î’s Netâyic-i 
Fünûn, which enumerated sciences and provided bibliographies of contemporary disciplines.  304
Furthermore, Muslim and Jewish people who settled in the Ottoman capital after they had 
escaped or were expelled by the Spanish Reconquista must have known Ibn Khaldun’s book. 
However, we unfortunately do not have any comprehensive studies of their intellectual 
 Secondary scholarship on Ottoman interest in Ibn Khaldun includes Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu, “Türkiye’de İbn 301
Haldunizm”; Bernard Lewis, “Ibn Khaldun in Turkey”; Cornell Fleischer, “Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism, and 
"Ibn Khaldunism", in Sixteenth-century Ottoman Letters” in Ibn Khaldun and Islamic Ideology, ed. Bruce B. 
Lawrence (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984); and Yavuz Yıldırım, “Mukaddime’nin Osmanlı Dönemi Türkçe Tercümesi,” 
DÎVÂN İlmî Araştırmalar, 21 (2006/2): 17-33 cf. also Yıldırım’s introduction to a recent Turkish edition of the 
Muqaddimah: Ibn Khaldūn, and Pîrîzâde Mehmet Sahip, Mukaddime: Osmanlı Tercümesi, (Vefa, İstanbul: Klasik, 
2008).
 Ottoman scholar and poet Veysî acquired a copy of the Muqaddimah from Cairo. See Fleischer, “Royal 302
authority,” p. 47.
 For a brief biography of this scholar, see Chapter Two of this dissertation, cf. Aydın, “Molla Fenârî,” in DİA, v. 303
30, p. 245.
 For my discussion of Netâyic and other texts on classifications of sciences, see the first chapter of this 304
dissertation.
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contribution to the Ottoman letters to see if they had introduced Ibn Khaldun’s work to Ottoman 
readers at the turn of the sixteenth century. 
There is a gap between the publication of the book and its reception in the Ottoman 
domains.  A possibility is that Ibn Khaldun’s book, when it first came out, was not as 305
revolutionary or particularly controversial enough to become popular among the Muslim learned 
elite. Rather, it seems to have gained recognition for its familiar points. As Fleischer’s 
comparison between the Ottoman historian, Mustafa Âli’s (d. 1600) historiography and that of 
Ibn Khaldun demonstrates, Ibn Khaldun’s ideas regarding political change were not unlike those 
shared in the Ottoman circles.  Fleischer therefore argues that Ottomans welcomed Ibn 306
Khaldun’s ideas because they were “familiar and relevant.”  To this, I would like to add that 307
Ibn Khaldun had a particular audience. As pointed out below, the changing reception of Ibn 
Khaldun proves the importance of reader-centered study of texts in order to explain its modern 
popularity.  Following the history of Ibn Khaldun’s translation in the eighteenth and nineteenth 308
 For instance, the same cannot be said of the works of non-Ottoman scholars such as al-Taftāzānī and al-Jurjānī, 305
who became popular among the learned during their lifetime. Ibn Khaldun, as I noted was active in Egypt at the time 
when Ottoman Muslims were studying there. Perhaps the Muqaddima, as I will argue below did not become an 
immediate success in the larger Muslim world due to its more limited audience, i.e. bureaucratic and military elite, 
whereas the works of above mentioned Timurid court scholars were directed to the learned branches as 
demonstrated by the fact that they were mostly studied in the madrasas.
 I would like to note that Yazıcızâde’s views regarding different groups are quite similar to Ibn Khaldun’s view of 306
nomad and settled communities. See Yazıcızâde’s Tevarih-i Âl-i Selçuk; Concurring with Fleischer, I believe that 
some of the similarities in this regard are due to some shared textual sources as well as the experiences of Ibn 
Khaldun and Ottoman historians. Among these possible shared sources, Qazwīnī’s works are noteworthy in this 
regard, especially his Āthār al-Bilād wa-Akhbār al-ʻIbād (Bayrūt: Dār Bayrūt, 1984).
 Fleischer, “Ibn Khaldunism,” p. 47.307
 There were some Mamluk period historians such as al-Maqrīzī, Ibn Ḥajar and Ibn Taghribirdi (Tr. Tanrıverdi), 308
who studied or were influenced by Ibn Khaldun’s work. For a discussion of Ibn Khaldun and al-Maqrizi’s attitude 
toward occult sciences, see Robert Irwin, “Al-Maqrizi and Ibn Khaldun, Historians of the Unseen” in Mamlūks and 
Crusaders: Men of the Sword and Men of the Pen, (Farnham: Ashgate/Variorum, 2010). Irwin also notes that Ibn 
Khaldun’s reception in the medieval period was quite different from the modern period (Irwin, p. 224). For another 
study on the impact of Ibn Khaldun on Mamluk historians, see Anne Broadbridge, “Royal Authority, Justice, and 
Order in Society: The Influence of Ibn Khaldun on the Writings of al-Maqrizi and Ibn Taghribirdi,” Mamluk Studies 
Review, V. 7/2 (2003), pp. 231-245. 
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century Ottoman Empire will not only help us see why, where, and when the book was received 
and read, but it will also show the changing conceptions of matters that made Ibn Khaldun’s 
book relevant in the modern period. The early modern Ottoman interest in Ibn Khaldun’s 
Prolegomenon, I contend, was due to the shared concerns of the author and his readers, which 
were mostly Ottoman bureaucrats, clerks, in short, the ruling elite.  
There was a growing interest in Ibn Khaldun in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Leading Ottoman intellectuals and historians such as Katip Çelebi (d. 1657) and Naima (d. 1716) 
praised Ibn Khaldun’s work.  It was probably through Katip Çelebi (a.k.a Haji Khalifah) that 309
European Orientalists were introduced to Ibn Khaldun and his celebrated Prolegomenon. For 
example, Ibn Khaldun’s work was mentioned by Barthelemy d’Herbelot (d. 1695) in his 
Bibliotheque Orientale, a universal dictionary that included everything about “the Oriental 
people.”  In this work, D’Herbelot relied heavily on Katip Çelebi’s Kashf al-Ẓunūn in his 310
bibliographies. This can be attested by D’Herbelot’s entries on “Ebn Khaledoun,” and “Tarekh 
 See Çelebi, Kashf al-Ẓunūn, v. 1, p. 327.309
 For an analysis of d’Herbelot’s significance to orientalist scholarship, see Said, Orientalism, pp. 63-67.310
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Ebn Khaledoun” as well.  There were two copies of Katip Çelebi’s “Bibliotheque 311
Orientale” (Kashf al-Ẓunūn) in Parisian libraries in addition to its near translation in d’Herbelot’s 
Bibliotheque, which became one of the most popular sources of Orientalism. Katip Çelebi and 
d’Herbelot described Ibn Khaldun’s history as “hugely useful and fruitful (‘azīm al-naf‘ wa al-
fā’ida)” and “fort curieux,” respectively. In fact, this interdependent interest in Ibn Khaldun in 
the early modern period is not random. This was a period in which the nature of politics and 
history were being reconsidered, as Europeans were quickly building colonial empires while the 
Ottomans were witnessing a political transformation of their own.   312
By the first half of the eighteenth century, The Muqaddimah had acquired enough interest 
to inspire a translation of the text by Pîrîzâde Mehmed Sahib (d. 1749), a man of ilmiye (the 
learned class). Pîrîzâde was born in 1085 AH (1674) in Istanbul. His father was a janissary 
commander named Pîrî Ağa, hence his epithet (Son of Pîrî), indicating the familial connection 
with the military branch of the Ottoman system. Pîrîzâde was educated in Istanbul. It seems that 
 As it has been pointed out by other scholars, d’Herbelot’s Bibliotheque was heavily based on Çelebi’s Kashf al-311
Ẓunūn. Bibliotheque Orientale’s entry “Tarikh Ibn Khaldun/Tarikh Ebn Khaledoun” is as follows: “It is a history 
composed by Kadi Abdallah Ben Mohammed al-Hadrami, died in the year 808 of the Hegira. It is an extremely 
interesting (curieuse) history, arranged annually, about events of his time.” Clearly d'Herbelot did not read the 
history of Ibn Khaldun, which is indeed a world history. This entry, interestingly, does not mention the introduction 
of this history, i.e. al-Muqaddimah, which is mentioned in Katip Çelebi.  
 Following is Katip Çelebi's entry in Kashf al-Ẓunūn regarding “Tārīkh Ibn Kaldun”: Qāḍī Abd al-Raḥmān 
ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ḥaḍramī al-Malikī, he died in the year 808 of Hegira. It [Ibn Khaldun’s history] 
is huge, of tremendous benefit and use, it is arranged annually.” In the rest of the entry, Çelebi points out that it is 
narrated that Ibn Khaldun was Qadi of Haleb when the event of Timur unfolded. Ibn Khaldun was taken with Timur 
to Samarqand, and later he asked Timur to permit him to bring his history from Misr (Egypt). Çelebi adds, it is 
probably the same book as "al-'Ibar wa Dīwān al-Mubtadā wa'l-Khabar fī Ayyām al-‘Arab wa'l-Rum wa’l-Barbar", 
introduction of which became popular as the Muqaddimah, which was copied separately (Katib Çelebi, Kashf, v. 1, 
pp. 327-328). Cf. the entry “al-'Ibar” in Kashf al-Ẓunūn. For more information on eighteenth century Orientalism 
and Katip Çelebi’s work, see Nicholas Dew, Orientalism in Louis XIV's France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009); Eleazar Birnbaum, "The Questing Mind: Katib Chelebi, 1609-1657. A Chapter in Ottoman Intellectual 
History" in Corolla Torontonensis. Festschrift for Ronald Morton Smith, ed. Emmet Robbins et al. (Toronto: TSAR, 
1994) pp. 133-158. Incidentally, for the impact of dragomans in the creation of Turkish literature, see E. Natalie 
Rothman, "Dragomans and “Turkish Literature”: The Making of a Field of Inquiry,” Oriente Moderno 93:2 (2013): 
390-421.
 For the situation in the Ottoman Empire, see Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats; Rifa‘at Ali Abou-El-Haj, 312
Formation of the Modern State. 
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he became part of the elite network early on by serving first for Şeyhülislam Mirzazâde Efendi, 
and then as a librarian for Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi (murdered in 1703).  Pîrîzâde became 313
imam of Sadrazam Daltaban Mustafa Pasha, owing to Feyzullah Efendi’s recommendation. Later 
he served as a professor in various medreses in Istanbul. Pîrîzâde was also appointed as a judge 
in various cities. Finally, he became Şeyhülislam, the highest post in the ilmiye branch, right as 
he retired. Pîrîzâde only wrote a few books in addition to the translation of the Muqaddimah.   314
Pîrîzâde began translating the first five chapters of The Muqaddimah in 1726 and finished 
in 1730.  In fact, a translation does exist of the initial sections of the sixth chapter as well, but it 315
is not clear whether Pîrîzâde produced it. Pîrîzâde rendered The Muqaddimah into Ottoman 
Turkish in order to satisfy the interests of the political elite. To put it differently, Pîrîzâde 
translated the text for use by the prominent men of the state who were not advanced in Arabic, 
 For a study of Feyzullah Efendi and ulema networks of the late seventeenth century, and information on 313
Mirzazâde see Michael Nizri, Ottoman High Politics and the Ulema Household (New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan 2014).
 Among these texts, his “Kitâbü’s-Siyâse fî Atvâri’l-Hamse” (The Book of Politics Concerning the Five Stages) is 314
noteworthy as it is a treatise on politics. Furthermore, this text utilizes Ibn Khaldun’s ideas in explaining various 
conditions of the polities. Moreover, Pîrîzâde contrasts Christianity and Islam’s attitude toward “secular” 
government. He noted that Christianity allows kings to rule according to the norms prescribed by the king, whereas 
in Islam, governance was not detached from religion as shari’a provides norms for governing as well. Hence, he 
pointed out the different sources of governance in the land of Franks from that in the Ottoman Empire. It is also 
noteworthy that Pîrîzâde claims that Kınalızâde (a sixteenth century Ottoman author of a famous book on ethics and 
politics) took the circle of justice concept from Ibn Khaldun (fl. 8a). He also quotes al-Maqrīzī’s history Kitāb al-
Maslūk li-Ma‘rifat Duwal al-Mulūk. Overall, this treatise utilizes previous writings, and refers to certain events 
taking place in the empire. Pîrîzâde ends the treatise with a prayer that there be order. This treatise of Pîrîzâde can be 
accessed from Istanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi, in MS TY 2698. Pîrîzâde was also a poet and a calligrapher with a 
divan of poetry. He also wrote a treatise rejecting the free use of various sects in religious duties.
 The translation was presented to Sultan Mahmud I in Rabī’ al-Awwal 1143/October 1730 (Pîrîzâde, p. 4). This 315
was shortly after the insurrection that brought the rule of his predecessor, Sultan Ahmed III, to an end, while 
resulting in the execution of his vizier Nevşehirli Damad İbrahim Pasha, who I contend might have been the original 
patron. 
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the language of the elect i.e. the ulema.  He claimed that some leading ulema encouraged him 316
to translate the text. This was not unusual at all, as many previous scholars were also encouraged 
to produce literary and scientific works at the request of leading ulema.  However, it is clear 317
that the ulema would not be interested in such translations for their own sake, as they could read 
them in its original. Rather, as leading figures they were in close contact with other prominent 
men of the bureaucratic (kalemiye) and military (seyfiye) branches of the Ottoman state as well 
as the sultan and palace servants, many of whom would not have had a proficient command of 
Arabic or Persian, and thus were in need of translated texts. Thus, leading ulema mediated 
between the court and other branches of governance, as well as between the past and the present 
by rendering Arabic texts into Ottoman Turkish. It is also not surprising that these translations 
were mostly related to matters of concern for bureaucrats.  
Despite the fact that Pîrîzâde noted his encouragement from the ulema, it is possible, 
considering his previous networks, that the grand vizier Damad İbrahim Pasha (d. 1730) directly 
commissioned him for this task. Pîrîzâde presented his translation to Sultan Mahmud I (r. 
1730-1754). However, he produced this translation during the reign of Ahmed III, commonly 
known as the Tulip era (1718-1730), which also overlapped with the grand viziership of 
 Ottoman intellectuals had translated many texts from Arabic and Persian into Turkish before the nineteenth 316
century. Initially these translations were of books dealing with a variety of subjects including medicine, astronomy, 
history, ethics etc. There was a surge in translating Arabic texts after the fifteenth century (see İhsan Fazlıoğlu). 
During the reign of Ahmed III, Damad İbrahim commissioned translations of many texts especially histories. Many 
of the early modern translators would indicate that they translated books for the benefit of the ‘āmm (literally 
general public, however, I believe they refer to literate Ottomans who could not comprehend Arabic). Pîrîzâde’s 
explanation for why he translated the Muqaddimah; "Lakin bu te'lif-i merğub Arabiyyü’l-üslub olmakla nef'i havassa 
mahsus olup kelam-ı Arabiyi fehm ve idrakde racil olan rical intifadan mahrumolmakla mukaddime-i mezkurenin 
üslub-ı Türki üzre terceme ve inşası ve fehmine karib-i tabir ile imla ve edası eday-ı din gibi vacibe-i uhde-i himmet 
ve menfaat-ı 'ammeye mütezammın halet olmakla ve bervech-i meşruh tercüme-i mezkureye bazı sudur-ı ulemanın 
şevkiyle bu abd-i kalilu'l-bida'a (Muhammed Pîrîzâde)...”
 For an example, Mustafa Ali’s remarks in the introduction of many of his works that he produced them as a result 317
of requests and suggestions by the ulema closely connected with the palace, such as Hoca Sa’duddin, the tutor of 
Sultan Murad III, and Şeyhülislam Bostanzâde. See Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual.
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Nevşehirli Damad İbrahim Pasha, a well known patron of arts and sciences at the time. He 
assigned translations of many voluminous books, including historical texts, to a large group of 
learned men at the time.  Damad İbrahim also owned a manuscript of the Muqaddimah, which 318
indicates his interest in Ibn Khaldun.  Therefore, I venture to say that even if the grand vizier 319
did not directly commission Pîrîzâde’s translation, the ulema probably considered Damad 
İbrahim’s interest as they encouraged Pîrîzâde to translate this specific text. Also, he may have 
concealed a direct connection considering that a rebellion in 1730 brought an end to the rule of 
Ahmed III and resulted in the execution of Damad İbrahim Pasha. Moreover, presenting the book 
to another patron of the arts, Sultan Mahmud I, would have also led to avoiding any mention of 
the previous patrons, as commonly practiced by other authors. After all, it is clear that the 
audience for this translation was the literate Ottoman elite who could not comprehend complex 
Arabic, as noted by Pîrîzâde himself.  320
As mentioned before, Pîrîzâde only translated the first five chapters of the Muqaddimah. 
It is not clear whether this translation was intentionally left incomplete, or whether the author 
attempted, but could not finish, translating the sixth chapter, leading to some speculations. Some 
assert that Pîrîzâde’s responsibilities as a Şeyhülislam became an obstacle to translating the rest 
of the text. Cevdet, however, claimed that the sixth chapter was the most important and difficult 
 For more information on translations during the Tulip Age, see Mehmet İpşirli, “Lâle Devri'nde Teşkil Edilen 318
Tercüme Heyetine Dâir Bazı Gözlemler” in Osmanlı İlmî ve Meslekî Cemiyetleri, ed. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu 
(İstanbul 1987) pp. 33-42; Salim Aydüz, “Bilimsel Faaliyetler Açısından Lale Devri,” İstanbul Armağanı IV:Lale 
Devri, ed. M. Armağan (İstanbul 2000, No. 4) pp. 159-193.
 See MS Damad İbrahim 00863, Al-‘Ibar wa Dīwānu’l-Mubtadā wa’l-Khabar, İbn Haldun. On the title page of 319
this manuscript we find the following remark: “al-mujallid al-awwal min al-Ẓāhirī fī’l-‘İbar fī al-Tawārīkh,” on the 
top right of the page it says “...min kutub ...Mahmūd al-Shirwānī.” This manuscript includes two volumes of the 
history of Ibn Khaldun i.e. it is the Muqaddimah (sixth chapter begins with fl. 292).
 Pîrîzâde’s explanation for translating the text implies that there was a growing rate of literacy in the Ottoman 320
Empire that made readers of Arabic the elect of the people (havas). See Pîrîzâde’s preface to his translation.
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part of the book, suggesting that Pîrîzâde was not able to translate it. It is likely that Cevdet was 
emphasizing his own credentials and establishing himself as a knowledgeable authority who 
could accomplish what was left out by a former Şeyhülislam.   321
Another possibility for the incomplete translation is that Pîrîzâde did not find the sixth 
chapter worthy of the effort. Compared to the previous chapters on various aspects of civilization 
that reflect Ibn Khaldun’s philosophy of history, this chapter does not provide new theoretical 
considerations of a familiar topic, namely the classification and history of sciences. As 
mentioned in the first chapter of this dissertation, major Muslim scholars that came before Ibn 
Khaldun, such as al-Ghazālī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Bayḍāwī, and his contemporary, al-
Taftāzānī, wrote treatises and books on this subject. After Ibn Khaldun, Ottoman scholars such as 
Taşköprüzâde, Fenârîzâde, Yahya Nev‘î, Muhammed Emin Şirvânî, and Katip Çelebi, to name 
only a few authors, provided books of various lengths on the classification as well as the history 
of sciences together with the bibliographic information. Most of them had written before Pîrîzâde 
translated Ibn Khaldun’s book.  In fact, Katip Çelebi was well versed with Ibn Khaldun’s work, 322
as we have hinted before, and in his Kashf al-Ẓunūn he included much material from the 
Muqaddimah.  Moreover, as Cevdet’s commentaries show, Ibn Khaldun’s knowledge of the 323
developments in the Eastern Islamic lands was quite limited, hence in need of lengthy 
 Cevdet himself left poems untranslated which raises the question, whether he could not translate them by his own 321
standard. Clearly translating poems is a more challenging task.
 With the exception of Katip Çelebi, the rest did not know of the Muqaddimah.322
 Ibn Khaldun’s influence can be observed in the introduction of Kashf al-Ẓunūn, and in various entries on 323
sciences, such as “‘ilm al-ḥikma,” (v. 2, pp. 40-41, quotes Ibn Khaldun’s account of rational sciences and that Greek 
and Persian surpassed all nations in these sciences, which I discuss below) and “‘ilm al-falsafiyāt” etc.
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commentaries or qualifications. With that in mind, I posit that the last chapter of the 
Muqaddimah was perhaps not particularly salient by then. 
 Furthermore, the gist of Ibn Khaldun’s ideas regarding history, civilization, the state, and 
disciplines of craft were already presented in the first five chapters of the book. Ibn Khaldun did 
not provide further theoretical contributions in the last chapter with the exception of allusions to 
earlier discussions by using terms such as habitus (malaka). Nevertheless, this term together with 
other concepts including ‘umrān (civilization, living together), ‘asabiyya (group feeling), hadāra 
(urban settlement), and badāwa (rural settlement), which are key concepts in Ibn Khaldun’s 
ideas, were all developed in the earlier chapters of the Muqaddimah. Lastly, as mentioned above, 
the audience for the translation also had a significant effect on what was being translated. As we 
can see from Pîrîzâde’s explanations, he was translating it for those who could not read Arabic, 
meaning those who were part of the bureaucracy as opposed to the ulema. Therefore, considering 
the immediate audience, translating most of the sixth chapter would have been unnecessary since 
those who would be interested in its content, i.e. the ulema, could read it in the original. This is 
also attested to by the existing manuscripts of Pîrîzâde’s translation, which were mainly 
circulated among the scribal and military elite, rather than the ulema.  
Information regarding the circulation of Pîrîzâde’s translation of the Muqaddimah can be 
garnered from the endowment passages on the manuscripts and the names of the owners of 
manuscripts, as well as from the colophons. Though Turkish catalogs are not very reliable due to 
mispronunciations, incorrect and incomplete cataloguing etc., a search on manuscript copies of 
Pîrîzâde’s translation yields about twenty copies of the book. Most of these manuscripts are 
housed in Süleymaniye Library, the largest manuscript library in Turkey, which as I noted before 
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has the collections of the elite in general. Based on such information we can observe that MSS 
Fatih 04290, and 04291 were endowed by Tayfur Ağa (a janissary commander);  MS Hafid 324
Efendi 00232 was copied by a janissary scribe and endowed by Hafid Efendi, the grandson of 
Reisulküttab Mustafa Efendi and son of Şeyhülislam Aşir Efendi. They have all established a 
library or endowed their collections to one. These collections are accessible at Süleymaniye 
Manuscripts Library in Istanbul.  MS Halet Efendi 00581 was owned by Halet Efendi, a 325
leading figure during the reign of Selim III and Mahmud II, and the Ottoman ambassador to 
Paris, also owned.  MS Serez 01852 was owned by the former accountant of the two holy 326
sanctuaries of Mecca and Madina.  It is not clear who owned MS Esad Efendi 02230 which 327
remained incomplete as it only included the first three chapters.  A few manuscripts were 328
 In the beginning of MS Fatih 04290-91 it is noted that this copy belongs to Tayfur Ağa, a military commander 324
serving in the palace, and those reading it should not forget him in their prayers (“İşbu cild-i evvel-i Tarih-i İbn 
Haldun devletlu darul-saadet afrika ağası Tayfur ağa hazretlerinin vakf u hayratlarıdır. Her kim mütalaa buyururlar 
ise ağa-yı müşarun ileyh hazretlerini hayır duadan feramuş buyurmamaları müstercadır. Sene 1264AH”).
 MS Hafid Efendi 00232, Mukaddime-i İbn Haldun Tercümesi, Pîrîzâde, endowed by Muhammed Hafid, copied in 325
1196 AH. At the end it is stated that the fifth chapter is completed and the last i.e. the sixth chapter that deals with 
various rational and transmitted sciences, will be translated.
 A note on the title page and a stamp indicate that MS Halet Efendi 00581 belongs to the books of Halet, who 326
established a library as well.
 MS Serez 01852, Mukkadime-i İbn Haldun Tercümesi, Pîrîzâde. Owned by Muhammed Hakkı ibn Kamil Ahmed 327
el-Vezir (?), former accountant of the Endowment of the two noble sanctuaries [of Mecca and Madina], in 1198 AH. 
Clearly another officer who dealt with bureaucratic matters owned this copy. The manuscript was copied by Mustafa 
Nureddin ibn el-Hâc Abdulkadir in the madrasa of Mahmud Pasha in 1193 AH. This is interesting as it shows that 
the book was indeed reproduced in a madrasa context, however, used by the scribal and military branches of the 
Ottoman state. MS Serez 01852 was based on another manuscript copied by the librarian of Atıf Efendi Library in 
Receb, 1171 AH. The endower of the library, Atıf Efendi, was himself a scribe.
 Esad Efendi 02230, İbn Haldun Mukaddimesi Tercümesi, İbn Haldun, Pîrîzâde, (kitabı evvelin üçüncü faslının 328
onyedinci faslında kitab na-tamam kalıyor).
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endowed to libraries by Sultans, including MSS Nuruosmaniye 03225 and 03226 by Sultan 
Mustafa III (r. 1757-1774), and MS Hamidiye 00926 by Sultan Abdulhamid I (r. 1774-1789).   329
Overall as we can see most of the copies of Pîrîzâde’s translation were either owned or 
copied by men involved with the scribal or military branch, or endowed by Sultans themselves. 
So far as I have noted, only one copy of the manuscripts of Pîrîzâde’s translation was 
reproduced. The only manuscript copy that belonged to a scholar teaching in a madrasa is the MS 
Mehmed Asım Bey 00378. Perhaps the situation with the audience of the Arabic original might 
be different.  However, it is also noteworthy that the few copies that were produced in the 330
madrasa context were from Istanbul, and hence in the vicinity of the court. I have not seen copies 
of the Muqaddimah’s translation circulated among the ulema who were not connected with the 
ruling or administration of the state. The few copies that are in provincial libraries, for instance, 
were endowed or owned by administrators. There is no indication that scholars in the provinces, 
who were far from having official positions, had owned any copy. This shows that Ibn Khaldun’s 
text had a particular use, and thus a particular audience, and that it did not appeal to the larger 
 MS Hamidiye 00926, endowment note says that it is endowed by Sultan Abdulhamid [I], (mentions a certain 329
Seyyid Ali?).; MS Pertev Paşa 00477, a stamp on this copy states that it is endowed to the library of the Sufi center 
(hangâh) of Selimiye.; MS Nuruosmaniye 3225, Mukaddime-i İbn Haldun Tercümesi. It seems that Mustafa Han 
[III] endowed this manuscript, as indicated by the endowment stamp. It was copied by Baltacızâde İbrahim Çavuş in 
the beginning of (fi ğurreti) Zi’l-hicce, 1158 AH. This is the first volume of Pîrîzâde’s translation. MS 
Nuruosmaniye 3226 is the second volume. This also includes an endowment note on fl. 1. So both of these volumes 
were endowed by Sultan Mustafa III to the waqf (foundation) of Haramayn al-Sharifayn (the two noble sanctuaries); 
MS Nuruosmaniye 03227, Mukaddime-i İbn Haldun Tercümesi, Pîrîzâde, this copy is also endowed to the waqf of 
Haramayn el-Sharifayn by Mustafa III. But at the end of the manuscript Mahmud I’s name is mentioned, so he may 
have been involved. This is an important note... See fl. 1, endowment note... of the waqf administrator. …. dated 
Safer, 1163 AH.
 A noteworthy manuscript copy of the Arabic original that was owned by scholars is MS Esad Efendi 02418, 330
Muqaddima. It was owned by a Maliki scholar (malakahu wa ta’ammalahu al-faqīr al-Sayyid Ahmad ibn al-Sayyid 
Ahmad al-Fayumī al-Mālikī, 1195 AH.). At the end of this manuscript it says it is copied by 
(nasakhahu) ...Muhammad al-Shafi’i al-Jannājī al-Mālikī. As there were not many Maliki’s in the Ottoman 
heartland, I assume this copy might have been brought to the Ottoman center or these figures must either be from 
North African or Andalusian emigrants.
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reading public. A similar survey of the printed edition of the Muqaddimah in the nineteenth 
century might confirm this particular audience, even if it would enlarge the book. 
Pîrîzâde’s translation did make the Muqaddimah available for new readers. However, it is 
noteworthy that nobody attempted a full translation of the remaining sixth chapter concerning 
sciences until the nineteenth century (a gap of one hundred and thirty years), regardless of 
whether the initial sections of the sixth chapter were translated by Pîrîzâde. This actually shows 
that despite the Ottomans’ awareness of Ibn Khaldun’s ideas there was not enough interest to 
prompt a translation of the remaining third of the book. This indicates a lack of patronage and 
interest in undertaking such a daunting task. Perhaps the elite who were reading Ibn Khaldun 
were not particularly interested in what he had to say about the sciences until the mid-nineteenth 
century.  The gap between Pîrîzâde and Cevdet’s translations shows that it was the nineteenth 331
century moment that triggered a new interest in thinking about sciences that brought about the 
translation of the sixth chapter. 
Cevdet’s translation in context 
 In the mid-nineteenth century, new publications of the Muqaddimah appeared in Cairo, 
Paris, and Istanbul, all within a short span of time, indicating another wave of global and 
interconnected interest in the Muqaddimah. This new interest in the Muqaddimah, especially the 
 According to Cevdet, another Turkish intellectual translated the initial sections of the sixth chapter. This 331
translator, Cevdet asserted, was İsmail Ferruh (d. 1840) who was a merchant, originally from Crimea. He served as 
the Ottoman ambassador in London during Selim III’s reign, and established an informal scientific society in 
Istanbul after his return. He also translated a Qur’an commentary. For more information, see Carter Findley, 
Bureaucratic Reform, pp. 130-131; Brett Wilson, Translating the Qur’an in the Age of Nationalism.
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sixth chapter, was also simultaneous with the European Orientalist interest in Ibn Khaldun.  It 332
was also during this decade that Pîrîzâde’s translation of The Muqaddimah was published by the 
Bulaq press in Cairo in March 1858.  This translation included the yet to be translated sixth 333
chapter in its original Arabic, which suggests that the publishers noticed its importance and made 
sure not to leave it out. A year after the Bulaq edition, Pîrîzâde’s translation was printed in 
Istanbul in early March 1859.  Cevdet’s translation of the sixth chapter followed suit.  334
 Cevdet’s translation of the sixth chapter was in a sense a response to the social and 
political events of his time, which were also formative to Cevdet becoming an Ottoman 
bureaucrat and scholar. Born in 1822 in Lofça (currently in Bulgaria) to an established family of 
the town, Ahmed Cevdet was well educated and equipped to translate most of the text.  He 335
attended both mektep and medrese, and took lessons from state functionaries including the 
town’s mufti. A pivotal step in Ahmed’s education was the decision to seek higher education in 
Istanbul. He attended classes of prominent scholars at both the medreses and the prestigious 
Fatih mosque. Some of these were formal and others were lectures open to the public. Moreover, 
 For bibliographic information on European editions of the Muqaddimah see ʻAzīz ʻAẓmah, Ibn Khaldūn in 332
Modern Scholarship: A Study in Orientalism (London: Third World Centre for Research and Pub, 1981).
 Mehmed Ali Pasha was interested in Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah and ordered that its manuscript be copied and 333
taught to students. It is through his orders that the Muqaddimah was eventually published in Egypt. Pîrîzâde’s 
translation of the Muqaddimah was published by Bulaq press in the beginning of Şaban 1274 AH (p. 626), Mustafa 
Vehbi Efendi was the editor (pp.261-274). For a copy of this edition see Celal Ökten 00627. These dates correspond 
with 1858 and 1859 CE. For more information on the Bulaq edition, see Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, Mısırda Türkler ve 
Mirasları [Turks and their Legacy in Egypt], pp. 147-149.
 The first volume of the Istanbul edition came out at the end of Receb, 1275 AH, as noted at the end of the first 334
volume (Pîrîzâde, p. 352) (For a copy, see Hacı Mahmud Efendi 04767-002). This edition includes a depiction of Ibn 
Khaldun. The second volume of the translation was published in the beginning of Zil-hijja, 1275 AH/July 1859 
(Pîrîzâde, p. 356). For bibliographic information on the Istanbul edition, cf. Yıldırım, Mukaddime, I, xxviii.
 Some sources on Cevdet’s biography include: Richard Leon Chambers, “Ahmed Cevdet Paşa the formative years 335
of an Ottoman transitional” (Ph. D. Diss. Princeton University, 1968); Fatma Aliye, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa Ve Zamani 
(Dersa’adet: Kanaat Matbaası, 1913); Following entries in DİA are also relevant: “Cevdet Paşa,” “Encümen-i 
Dâniş,” “Üniversite,” and “Tanzimat.”
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Cevdet attended study circles at Sufi centers and arranged private lessons with professors of the 
new military schools. All of these activities show a tendency to acquire as much knowledge as 
possible. Cevdet was not particularly unusual in this regard, as a look at the education of many 
leading Ottoman intellectuals of his day and from the previous centuries show.  These include 336
his predecessors Katip Çelebi, historian Naima, İsmail Gelenbevî, and Şanizâde, his 
contemporaries Münif Pasha and Ali Suavi, as well as his successors. Bereketzâde İsmail Hakkı 
and Mehmet Akif (Ersoy), all sought a wide-ranging education from different institutions.   337
 Recent political developments also played a major role in setting the discursive context of 
Cevdet’s scholarship. Beginning in 1774, these events (which overlapped with the content of 
Tarih-i Cevdet) included the devastating wars with Russia, Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt and the 
subsequent rise of Mehmet Ali there, the Greek War of Independence (1820s), the rise of 
nationalism in the Ottoman territories, and the increase in diplomatic relations with European 
powers.  It is also noteworthy that Cevdet started his education in Istanbul just as the Gülhane 338
rescript initiated Tanzimat reforms.   339
 Figures such as Cevdet and Ibn Khaldun are seen as exceptional. However, throughout Islamic history and lands 336
we find numerous scholars whose training is wide-ranging. For some examples of such learned intellectuals in 
Egypt, see Peter Gran, Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt 1760-1840. Gran discusses works of ‘Attār, al-Jābartī, 
Tahtāwī et al. whose scholarship follows a trajectory that is similar to Cevdet’s works. Marwa Elshakry’s Reading 
Darwin in Arabic provides a discussion of many more scholars from later nineteenth-century Arabic speaking areas 
of the Ottoman Empire who had wide-ranging academic interests. 
 In his study of the Ottoman educational system, Benjamin Fortna also points out the intertwined educational 337
system of the Empire, as many of the teachers appointed in new schools had a medrese background, and were 
mosque imams. See Fortna, Imperial Classroom.
 For more information on larger transformations that happened immediately before and during Cevdet’s life see 338
Christine Philliou, Biography of an Empire; Findley, Bureaucratic Reform; İlber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun 
Yüzyılı [The Longest Century of the Ottoman Empire]; Hanioğlu, A Brief History of Late Ottoman Empire.
 For a discussion of the Gülhane decree see Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript,” 339
Die Welt Des Islams 34 (2) (1994): 173-203.
 147
The Gülhane rescript was a blueprint for resolving the challenges the Ottomans were 
facing. As usually noted in the historiography of the Ottoman Empire, there were many treatises 
(lahikas for instance) noting the problems with and solutions for reforming the Empire, since at 
least the late sixteenth century. However, the Empire’s problems were changing prompting 
Ottoman statesmen and historians such as Ahmed Cevdet to forge a continuous history of 
struggle for reform, thus forging a connection between their own reform projects and those of the 
earlier advice literature.  Reforming the Empire took a particularly international turn in the late 340
eighteenth and early nineteenth century with the rise of diplomacy and the Eastern Question. 
Consequently, as ambassadors’ reports emerged, the Empire’s problems were increasingly 
thought about in terms of the developments occurring in the surrounding states.   341
Cevdet not only grew up in the midst of these later transformations, he also participated 
in reform activities. He played a major role in various fields such as language, legal institutions, 
and historiography, in his capacities as a member of the newly established institutions including 
the Ottoman Academy of Sciences (Encümen-i Dâniş) and the Council of Education (Meclis-i 
Maârif). As noted above, Cevdet actually wrote a history of the Empire from 1774 until 1826 
that was commissioned by the Ottoman Academy of Sciences in October 1853.  Cevdet was 342
 As Fleischer pointed out, we can see a continuation of themes in Mustafa Âli, Selânikî, Koçi Bey, Katip Çelebi, 340
and Naima’s counsels. Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, pp. 99-103. I would like to note that modern studies of 
Ottoman history tend to follow that kind of teleological historiography as exemplified by Niyazi Berkes, and 
Bernard Lewis’s works, to name only a few.
 Sefaretname literature (ambassadors’ reports) attests to this new international turn. For the first ambassador’s 341
report, see Fatma Müge Göçek, East Encounters West. See also Phillou’s Biography of an Empire for emergence of 
diplomacy in the late Ottoman Empire.
 BOA, İ. DH. 282/17685.342
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translating the sixth chapter of the Muqaddimah while he was fulfilling his task as official 
historian.  
Political and personal concerns influenced Cevdet’s oeuvre. In his remarkable study of 
Cevdet’s history, Christoph K. Neumann points out that Cevdet’s political views were indeed 
reflected in his historiography, and that Tarih-i Cevdet was an argument for Tanzimat reforms.  343
Although it deals with sciences and knowledge, rather than political history, Cevdet’s translation 
of the Muqaddimah played a similar role showing that ordering politics and ordering knowledge 
were intertwined. To put it differently, political transformations were simultaneous with the 
transformations in the production of scientific knowledge. Cevdet did not simply provide a literal 
translation, but rather a reformed text. As we can see from the discussion of various issues in the 
translation and commentary, Cevdet used this undertaking as a site for propagating new 
developments in sciences, and justifying Tanzimat initiatives such as establishing the academy of 
sciences and a university (darülfünûn). Moreover, the translation shows both continuity and 
change in Islamic as well as Ottoman intellectual history. 
Ibn Khaldun and Cevdet on humankind and human thought 
Conceptions of history are tied to conceptions of human (insān) or man (ādam). The 
reverse is also the case as our notion of history informs how we think about our species. 
Therefore, defining human or humanity in a certain way makes possible particular teleologies for 
humankind that would no longer be possible if such conceptions changed. We can see this 
 See Christoph K Neumann, and Meltem Arun. Araç Tarih Amaç Tanzimat: Tarih-i Cevdet'in Siyasi Anlamı, 343
(Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000).
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connection between the understanding of humanness and history in Ibn Khaldun’s and Cevdet’s 
notion and historiography of rational sciences. In agreement with the Western Asian tradition 
(Aristotelian and Qur’anic/Biblical tradition), they both define and distinguish human beings 
from other living beings by their capacity to employ “intellect” or “reason” (fikr). Therefore, the 
rational sciences are considered the ultimate endeavors through which the humanity of human 
beings can be perfected.  
Ibn Khaldun’s discourse furnished two approaches to human beings and their knowledge: 
metaphysical and historical.  He essentialized human beings, that is, he defined them as having 344
distinct qualities and characteristics that set them apart from other animals. Yet Ibn Khaldun also 
provided abundant explanations of institutions and disciplines that historicize human activities, 
which purportedly distinguish them from the rest of the animals. This is best demonstrated in Ibn 
Khaldun’s conception of human or humanity (insān) and his account of various disciplines.  
Throughout his prolegomena, Ibn Khaldun distinguished human beings from other 
animals as either political beings or thinking beings. The sixth chapter of the Muqaddimah, 
which included descriptions of various disciplines, began with a discussion on human 
thinking.  This discussion reveals Ibn Khaldun’s views on knowledge (‘ilm) and various 345
sciences or disciplines. Ibn Khaldun asserted that human beings are distinguished by their ability 
 Historical and metaphysical approaches to human beings are not specific to Islamic and Ottoman intellectuals. 344
We can see these tendencies in Christian and European intellectuals such as Hegel and Marx. In his discussion of 
Nietzsche’s concept of genealogy, Foucault also pointed out mainly two kinds of perceptions of history: 
metaphysical or supernatural history (history of origins), and genealogical or contingent history. Nevertheless, 
Foucault’s genealogical history can be called “radical historicism,” as he considers nothing about human beings to 
be stable. Yet “genealogy” is also a product of history, i.e. it was not conceived before the modern age. This leads 
me to wonder whether such conceptions of history are only possible under certain conditions. To put it differently, is 
it possible to have a Foucauldian radical historicism before the modern period? Or does it emerge with the idea of 
progress and evolution? For historical trends in philosophy, see Ian Hacking, Historical Ontology, especially the 
introduction and chapter 3. 
 Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddima, v. 2, pp. 337-338.345
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to think (al-fikr) while acknowledging that human beings share with animals an awareness 
(shu‘ūr) of the external world through the five senses. However, humans go beyond these senses 
by their ability to perceive the external world through thinking as well.  
Ibn Khaldun puts forward three levels of human thinking. The first level is the level of 
comprehending external order, be it natural or conventional. This is called the categorizing 
reason (or discerning intellect as Rosenthal translates al-‘aql al-tamyīzī), which enables human 
beings to acquire what is useful for them and their livelihood, and to defend against dangers. The 
second level of thinking expresses views and manners when people interact with each other. 
Most of this level is related to assertions (apperceptions) acquired through accumulated 
experience. This level of thinking is called practical reason (or experimental intellect, as 
Rosenthal renders al-‘aql al-tajrībī).   346
The third level of thinking is that which expresses knowledge and assumptions by 
seeking what is beyond the senses and does not relate to practice. This is called theoretical reason 
(speculative intellect, as Rosenthal translates al-‘aql al-naẓarī). It consists of both perceptions 
and apperceptions (concepts and assertions) specially organized by specific conditions, which 
bring about other knowledge of its kind, either conceptual or assertive (assertoric). These 
concepts and assertions are further organized together with some other material, which in turn 
produces new knowledge in the same manner. Its purpose is to perceive existence as it really is 
with all its genera, differences, reasons (sabab), and causes (‘illa). Thinking is therefore 
 Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddima, v. 2, p. 338, cf. Rosenthal, The Muqaddimah.346
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perfected in its reality, and becomes pure intellect and perceptive soul. This is the meaning of 
‘the essence of humanity’ (al-haqīqa al-insāniya).  347
According to Ibn Khaldun’s classification of human thinking, which itself owes much to 
previous Islamic philosophical discourse,  all knowledge produced by human beings can be put 348
into the three categories mentioned. It is not clear whether any discipline can be primarily 
associated with the first level of thinking as put forward by Ibn Khaldun. However, since this 
level concerns initial perceptions of the world, I would contend that aspects of disciplines such as 
logic and dialectics perhaps belong in the first category, as they mostly categorize the world. The 
rest of the disciplines would be put into the theoretical and practical levels of thinking. Overall, 
Ibn Khaldun’s discourse about human beings, and what differentiates them from animals, is very 
abstract and metaphysical. It is not based on any specific period or geography, rather it is an 
abstraction of the ideal human, a form that is different in its essence from other forms, such as 
that of the rest of the animals. This articulation of humanity by Ibn Khaldun manifests his 
metaphysical approach in the Muqaddimah, despite his very interesting historical analysis of 
man-made disciplines, artifacts or institutions. 
Cevdet, for the most part, concurs with Ibn Khaldun’s metaphysical assertion that humans 
are distinguished by their ability to think. This is attested from the beginning by his customary 
invocation of God and the Prophet in the preface of his translation of the Muqaddimah, as well as 
his responses or silence to Ibn Khaldun’s above-discussed assertions. Cevdet praised God for 
making human beings superior (nev‘-i beni ademi ser-efrâz eyledi) by giving them a natural 
 Ibn Khaldun, ibid. p. 338.347
 Nevertheless, there seems to be a difference as Ibn Khaldun uses a trifold division rather than two fold division of 348
theoretical and practical thinking. 
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ability to recognize genera and differences as well as roots and branches (usûl u fürû), by 
allowing them perceive rational and transmitted [theoretical and practical knowledge] things, and 
by enabling them to understand artful exposition in the world.  This demonstrates a continuity 349
with regard to essentializing “human’” and seeing the human as superior to all other creatures.  
In his comments, Cevdet not only confirmed but also further justified Ibn Khaldun’s 
discussion of human thought (al-fikr al-insānī) and its essentialist and metaphysical perspective. 
In a rather long comment on Ibn Khaldun’s assertions, Cevdet stated that “human thought” is a 
blessing from God specific to human beings. Though Ibn Khaldun mentioned that human beings 
only share “perception” with the other animals, and that of the five senses in particular, Cevdet 
added that humans and animals also share external as well as internal senses, which include 
common sense (hiss-i müşterek), imagination (hayal), the power of composition (kuvve-i 
mütesarrife), the power of estimation (vehm), and the power of memory (hafıza). Humankind’s 
distinguishing trait is intellect, or reason (akıl). Through this intellect, human beings apply the 
power of composition (kuvve-i mütesarrife) to the knowledge of the particulars, which are stored 
in memory and imagination, and thus derive universal knowledge.  Cevdet uses Avicennian 350
views here, and explains issues not mentioned by Ibn Khaldun. Despite different articulations, 
they both agree on an essential difference between humans and the rest of the animal kingdom: 
“human thought.” Cevdet’s lengthy commentary serves as an opportunity to clarify Ibn 
 Cevdet began his preface stating that “[A]rts of manifestations of sincerity, such as using synonymous words of 349
thanking, being grateful etc. are deserved only by the Initiator of the beginning of being and nonbeing, and creator 
(artist or innovator, mubdi’) of the unknown and known, i.e. necessary being, who, through his uncreated wisdom, 
made human beings superior by their ability to know…” Tercüme-i Mukaddime, p. 2. 
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, pp. 7-8. 350
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Khaldun’s assertion in a way that would remove possible contentions, however, as we will see he 
also challenged Ibn Khaldun’s narrative when it contradicted nineteenth century knowledge. 
Cevdet’s commentary on Ibn Khaldun’s assertion that “of all human beings, scholars are 
the furthest from politics” further shows that he did not challenge the general metaphysical 
approach of the Muqaddimah. Ibn Khaldun argued that scholars did not grasp politics due to the 
fact that they were busy with generalizations, and making analogies. Their universalist thinking 
was not particularly apt in the practical realm of politics. According to Ibn Khaldun, average 
humans were more reliable in matters political since their thinking was not tainted by the 
abstractions, which were a habit of smart people and scholars.  Cevdet concurred with Ibn 351
Khaldun that scholars were not reliable in politics in general. However, he added that it was 
possible to become an expert in both theoretical and practical philosophy, pointing out examples 
of Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd, Ibn Khaldun himself, among the pre-Ottoman Islamic scholars, and 
Kemal Paşazâde, İdrisi Bitlisi and Ebu Suud Efendi, among Ottoman scholars, who aided 
politicians.  Nevertheless, Cevdet, acknowledged that these were rather exceptional figures, 352
and that it was rare to see those who specialize on both theoretical and practical philosophy. 
Thus, Cevdet confirmed that Ibn Khaldun's assertion was accurate, in general. It is rather 
interesting to see where Cevdet intervenes in the text and makes such explications. In this 
context, I think Cevdet's intervention can be interpreted as self-serving, as he himself had an 
ulema background, and then joined the bureaucratic and administrative branch of the Ottoman 
government. Cevdet probably would not wish that other political elite take this point to state a 
 Ibn Khaldun, Al-Muqaddima, v. 3, pp. 227-228.351
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, p. 236.352
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universal truth and thus apply it to even prevent somebody like himself get consulted on political 
matters. Cevdet wanted to make sure that he be considered an exception to the rule, and thus 
continue working in the bureaucratic and administrative branch of the Ottoman government. 
Therefore, despite the fact that Cevdet shared Ibn Khaldun’s tripartite view of human thinking, 
and professionalization, he intervened in the text to prevent any spillovers that might be 
hazardous to his own career. 
At the end of this section, which in fact demonstrates diverging knowledge of practical 
and theoretical philosophy (or sciences), Cevdet added another note which is very telling about 
changes in his time about knowledge, science, and philosophy. Alluding to the above discussed 
views of Ibn Khaldun, Cevdet stated that the purpose of theoretical philosophy was to know 
things as they exist (in themselves), and since philosophers assumed that human happiness was 
possible with theoretical philosophy they put their efforts in knowing things in themselves. 
According to Cevdet, ancient philosophers spent too much effort on this matter in vain as they 
only gained assumption and estimation (vehm u şekk) as a result. However, Cevdet claimed, 
European philosophers delved into the path laid out by Ibn Khaldun, i.e. the path of experience 
even as they delved somewhat into the theoretical philosophy. Cevdet stated that they did not 
stay away from the shore of sensibles as they busied themselves with the mathematical and 
natural sciences to the extent that it was not imaginable. He added that European philosophers 
elevated crafts (sanayi') to a level that was shocking and surprising.  As we can see, for Cevdet, 353
what really distinguished contemporary European philosophers was their interest in the 
mathematical and natural sciences and their immersion in experimental philosophy. This 
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, pp. 236-237.353
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European interest in natural sciences was well received by nineteenth century Muslim scholars 
such as Cevdet since it overlapped with a history of Islamic critiques of metaphysics. In fact, 
Cevdet made use of this new knowledge produced in Europe, as he made comments on the 
matter of soul to further criticize philosophical metaphysics. 
Ibn Khaldun’s and Cevdet’s discussions on the human soul were also essentialist.  Their 354
thoughts on soul are interesting as they reveal that Cevdet adopted new information while 
keeping his essentialist perspective. In a section of the sixth chapter, entitled “the Sciences of 
Human Beings and the Sciences of Angels,” Ibn Khaldun pointed out that we come to intuit by 
our thinking the existence of three worlds: the world of sensual perception, the world of the 
human soul [intellectual world], and the world of angels.  It is through the acquisition of 355
scientific knowledge that goes beyond sensual perception that we recognize the existence of the 
soul. 
In a rather long comment on the discussion of soul—the original discussion being less 
than two pages, while the commentary runs longer than three pages—Cevdet stated that the 
matter of soul was always a subject of disagreement among philosophers.  Cevdet noted that 356
philosophers generally agreed that reason distinguishes human beings from animals. However, 
they disagreed about whether human beings had a distinct spiritual essence. According to 
Cevdet, the majority of philosophers asserted that human beings have a spiritual essence that 
 For a special issue of the Muslim World on the issue of soul in the Medieval Islamic thought, see Ayman 354
Shihadeh, The Ontology of the Soul in Medieval Arabic Thought, (Malden, Mass: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).
 Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddima, v. 2, p. 343; cf. Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, p. 13. I would like to note here that 355
there is a correspondence between Ibn Khaldun’s epistemology and ontology. As we have seen, there are three levels 
of thinking, which correspond to three levels of existence.
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, p. 15.356
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other animals lack. Cevdet also noted their arguments for the existence of a unique human 
soul.  357
 In this context, Cevdet made his position clear by providing his views on some of the 
controversial issues. These include the cosmology of philosophers and the ten intellects, as well 
as the problem of the soul. Cevdet criticized the views of the Peripatetic philosophers (mashā’ī) 
despite conceding that they were generally right in their proof of the existence of the soul and the 
angelic world. However, he asserted that these philosophers made mistakes in the details 
(tafsilat) of these issues, stating that the noble religion (şer'-i şerif) rejects these details. 
Notwithstanding his reference to religious discourse, Cevdet utilized new developments in 
sciences to disprove the claims of the peripatetic philosophers. For instance, in his refutation of 
philosophical cosmology, which was intertwined with metaphysical and ontological views on 
God and the soul, Cevdet pointed out that it is necessary for there to be more than the ten 
intellects assumed by ancient philosophers (hükema-yı mütekaddimin) since modern 
philosophers (hükema-yı müteahhirin) had discovered many more planets. Therefore, new 
philosophy (hikmet-i cedide) disproved the ancient philosophers’ statements on the issue of ten 
intellects.  It is noteworthy that Cevdet used age-old categories such as predecessors 358
(mütekaddimin) and successors (müteahhirin) to refer to ancient and modern philosophers. It is 
also significant that Cevdet referred to contemporary European philosophers as moderns or 
successors (müteahhirin). In this regard, Cevdet conceived a continuity between modern 
European contributions and previous Islamic philosophical discourse, as they are connected by a 
 Cevdet, ibid. p. 15. 357
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, pp. 15-16.358
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relation of anteriority and posteriority. However, there was a discontinuity with regard to natural 
philosophy. Hence, Cevdet’s criticism of the peripatetics was based on the information provided 
by the new philosophers, mainly of Europe. 
 Cevdet’s contention with the materialist critique of the soul is noteworthy as well since he 
used new medical knowledge in his considerations. He mentioned what the French called 
"somnambule" i.e. sleepwalkers (seyrülnevm), who go to places they would not dare to tread 
while awake, as well as eat and drink what they find while asleep, and if they were asked about 
such matters the next morning, they would remember nothing.  In his proof for the existence of 359
the soul, Cevdet refers to such people who could know about external events without observing 
them. He claimed that although surgeries on the brain showed particular places for memory etc. 
surgeries on these people who could foresee things showed that there were no physical 
complications in the brain, which proved for him that the soul exists.  The Ottoman 360
transliteration of the French word "somnambule" further indicates that Cevdet was reading or 
following French discussions. Clearly, Cevdet was not merely translating Ibn Khaldun’s work, 
but updating and modernizing Ibn Khaldun’s ideas in light of recent developments in astronomy 
and medicine that were being transmitted from European sources.  
 However, despite his utilization of new knowledge, Cevdet concluded with an orthodox 
view, shared by Ibn Khaldun as well,  that our reason cannot grasp or understand the soul’s 361
essential reality, and thus, reason is discharged (ma'zul) from this inquiry. He therefore suggested 
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, p. 18.359
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, pp. 17-18.360
 See Ibn Khaldun’s discussion of the science of theology in the sixth chapter.361
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that leaving the details of the spiritual world (alem-i ervâh) and the next world (dâr-ı ukbâ) to 
religious proofs was the way to go for attaining the path of salvation and peace. Furthermore, 
Cevdet asserted that appealing to the way of reason and philosophy in dealing with this issue 
would result in devastation and regret.  This rather pessimist note on the inquiry into the soul 362
and the afterlife stems from Cevdet’s observation that previous inquiries into the soul’s details by 
peripatetics were proven false by modern science. Joining a long history of the critiques of 
philosophical metaphysics in Islamic intellectual history,  Cevdet sought satisfaction by 363
refraining from such inquiries. This also seems like a strategy to leave aside contentious issues 
since judgments on these issues could be falsified by future science. Therefore, both a traditional 
attitude and the impact of a progressive history of science led Cevdet to avoid metaphysics. In 
short, Cevdet takes advantage of new findings in modern science in order to reject older 
metaphysical beliefs. But instead of wholeheartedly embracing the new positivist philosophy, 
Cevdet took a more skeptical approach, rejecting the possibility of arriving at an absolute 
knowledge on metaphysical matters such as the nature of the soul and the after life. Cevdet 
therefore stuck to the traditional Sunni beliefs on these matters. Cevdet’s commentary on Ibn 
Khaldun shows that the classical Islamic critique of philosophical metaphysics played a key role 
in encouraging nineteenth century Muslim scholars to embrace wholeheartedly the experimental 
sciences. However, this tradition of criticizing metaphysics also delineated the limits of 
contemporary metaphysics that was being based on new natural scientific findings. Overall, 
Cevdet’s attitude shows that there was an ambivalent relationship with new sciences, and that 
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, p. 18.362
 See al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut al-Falāsifa; Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddima; Al-Shahristani, Struggling with philosophers. 363
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nineteenth century Muslim scholars were creating a continuity between Islamic and 
contemporary European philosophical thought by updating classical texts such as Ibn Khaldun’s 
Muqaddimah through commentaries. Continuity and break between Ibn Khaldun’s and Cevdet’s 
thought can be further seen in their accounts of rational sciences. 
  
History of Rational Sciences 
Notwithstanding their metaphysical approach to humanity and human thinking, both Ibn 
Khaldun and Cevdet show a historical sensibility in regards to the rational sciences. The 
historical approach in Khaldun’s Muqaddimah is reflected in his discussion on the forms of 
living together collectively, as well as in the crafts and sciences that accompany such forms. 
Cevdet’s historical approach to the philosophical views mentioned above attest to his historicism. 
They both depict the sciences as something that has a history and that has come into being under 
certain conditions. Nevertheless, we also see divergences between Ibn Khaldun’s and Cevdet’s 
expositions of rational sciences.  
Ibn Khaldun classified knowledge into three categories: knowledge of the angels, 
knowledge of human beings, and knowledge of the prophets.  He further divided knowledge 364
into transmitted sciences and rational sciences, based on the hierarchy of existence (marātib al-
wujūd).  Rational sciences are not specific to any religion, as all religious groups partake in 365
these sciences, whereas transmitted sciences are posited by an authority, and so they are religion-
 Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddima, pp. 343-347.364
 Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddima, p. 358.365
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specific (or as we might say nowadays, culture specific).  Transmitted sciences, according to 366
Ibn Khaldun, include revelation, prophetic traditions, and the religious disciplines that are not 
directly revealed, but are derived from revelation, such as jurisprudence. Incidentally, Cevdet 
does not make any comments about Ibn Khaldun’s classification of sciences.  This is due to the 367
fact that Ibn Khaldun’s classification itself has roots in the works of previous scholars such as al-
Ghazālī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who were sources for the Ottoman classification of sciences. 
In other words, Ibn Khaldun’s classification would have been common knowledge among 
Ottoman scholars. Therefore, Cevdet remained silent on this issue.  
There is a tendency among scholars to conflate the categories of transmitted and rational 
sciences – as classified by Ibn Khaldun and other Ottoman scholars – with the modern categories 
of religious and worldly sciences. However, Cevdet does not seem to view the former 
classification as overlapping with the worldly and religious classification of knowledge, a stance 
he expressed in a comment he made on Ahmed Midhat’s classification of sciences. Midhat 
classified the sciences into religious sciences, worldly sciences, and mathematical sciences. 
Cevdet noted that he never heard of such a classification, suggesting that it was not in line with 
the familiar parlance of traditional scientific terminology.  Therefore, we should not conclude 368
that there was a contrast between worldly or secular knowledge, and religious knowledge. 
 Ibn Khaldun, ibid. p. 358.366
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, pp. 26-28. 367
 See Cevdet’s comments on Ahmed Midhat’s History of Sciences BOA, Y. EE. 37/50. We don’t have any 368
publication of Midhat’s Tarih-i ulûm [History of Sciences], but we do have Cevdet’s comments on this history as it 
was presented to him before publication. Cevdet praised Midhat as a litterateur, however, and noted the immensity 
of the task that Midhat was taking on. This may have discouraged Midhat from publishing his history of sciences. I 
come back to these comments in the last section of chapter four while discussing Ahmed Midhat’s correspondence 
with Fatma Aliye.
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Rather, even the so called religious sciences such as fiqh (Islamic law), as Cevdet and al-Ghazālī 
noted, included sections about worldly matters such interactions among people (mu‘āmalāt). In 
short, rather than seeing transmitted and philosophical or rational sciences as dealing with two 
different realms, religion and philosophy (or reason) were seen as parallel attempts at 
understanding existence, morality, and nature. Therefore, they actually differ in regards to the 
methodology rather than the content or subject matter of their inquiries. The dominant 
instruments or methods used by the disciplines determined whether they would be classified into 
the categories of transmitted or rational.  369
Organizing the sixth chapter of the Muqaddimah based on a classification of sciences, Ibn 
Khaldun first discussed religious sciences, then rational or philosophical sciences, which were in 
turn followed by pedagogy, finally ending with Arabic linguistics and literary sciences. Ibn 
Khaldun’s and Cevdet’s historiography of rational sciences is particularly pertinent to our 
purposes here, as they were initial attempts at writing a history of sciences. In fact, Cevdet 
viewed the sixth chapter of the Muqaddimah as a history of sciences.  Moreover, these histories 370
show the changing discourses about the origins of rational sciences. 
 It is noteworthy that a late Ottoman scholar, İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, criticized Spencer’s classifications based on 369
ways of knowing for being inaccurate, noting that all sciences use these ways of knowing.
 BOA, Y. EE. 37/50. While acknowledging that there were numerous books on classification of sciences in the 370
Islamic history, Cevdet only recognized the sixth chapter of the Muqaddimah as a kind of history of science. Cevdet 
immediately noted that there was a huge difference between the sciences in his time and the condition of the 
sciences during Ibn Khaldun’s life.
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Pre-Islamic History of Rational Sciences 
Despite Ibn Khaldun’s apriori assertion that all polities are able to engage in rational 
sciences, his historical accounts suggest otherwise. Ibn Khaldun pointed out that the Persians and 
the Greeks were the two pre-Islamic nations most excelled in philosophical-rational sciences. 
This, Ibn Khaldun asserted, was because “they possessed an abundant civilization and were 
ruling nations immediately before Islam.”  However, it is clear that Ibn Khaldun was not racist, 371
as he considered superiority of Persians and Greeks over other nations, or the Islamic East over 
the Islamic West in sciences, as due to the rich civilization and political power, rather than 
considering them as naturally superior.  According to Ibn Khaldun, other ancient nations such 372
as the Assyrians, the Chaldeans, and the Copts were interested in magic, astrology, and 
talismanic disciplines.  The Persians and the Greeks took these sciences from them. However, 373
Ibn Khaldun added that since various religions forbade magic, astrology, and talismanic sciences, 
they gradually shrunk to the point that they almost vanished.  Of the two leading propagators of 374
rational sciences, Ibn Khaldun suggested that Persians developed sciences first. When Alexander 
the Great conquered the Persian Empire, the Greeks appropriated the Persian material. This story 
 Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddima v.3, p. 73; cf. Rosenthal, The Muqaddimah, v.3, p. 113. 371
 Ibn Khaldun stated that sciences increase when livelihood (‘umrān) and civilization (hadāra) increases. al-372
Muqaddima, v. 2, pp. 356-357, cf. also the previous section pp. 350-355. Despite the fact that Ibn Khaldun’s theory 
of scientific progress is not racist, I believe it was appropriated as such during the nineteenth century when various 
nationalists conflicted on their contributions to sciences.
 Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddima, v. 3, p. 73, cf. Rosenthal, ibid.373
 As we can see, there is tension between Ibn Khaldun’s initial assertion that all people are equally able to develop 374
rational sciences. Of course, this reflects a potential rather than the actuality, as some nations seem to have fared 
better with regard to certain disciplines. Nevertheless, there seem to be certain conditions, such as abundant 
civilization, for the proliferation of rational sciences.
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is based on Ibn Nadim’s al-Fihrist, and constitutes one of the myths that went into the history of 
the beginnings of Islamic science, as shown by Saliba.   375
Ibn Khaldun also informed his readers about the destiny of rational sciences in the Greek 
and Roman hands.  He pointed out the emergence of various philosophical schools, such as the 376
Peripatetics, the Rawwaqiyyun — which Rosenthal translates as Stoics assuming that Ibn 
Khaldun did not know much about them, and thus conflated it with Aristotle’s followers, 
however, Cevdet interpreted it as Alexandrian school citing previous Arabic use in this regard.  377
Moreover, Ibn Khaldun’s genealogy of philosophy reflects an Islamic twist, which was 
introduced much earlier by other Muslim scholars, asserting that philosophical sciences 
descended from Luqmān to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.  This Luqmānic genealogy is in itself 378
remarkable, since it demonstrates an attempt to legitimize these sciences and reflects Islamic 
conceptions of knowledge as being transmitted from teacher to student, paralleling the 
transmission of revelation and prophetic tradition. This challenges Ibn Khaldun’s above-
mentioned contrast between rational (philosophical) and transmitted sciences as well, since the 
 See Saliba, “Question of Beginnings II” in Islamic Science and the Making of Renaissance.375
 Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddima, pp. 73-74.376
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, p. 110. Cevdet pointed out this interpretation in his own account of history of 377
rational sciences. It is quite interesting that Cevdet discussed the Museum in Alexandria (Museon), which he 
claimed functioned as both a university and academy of sciences (darulfünûn, encümen-i dâniş), two institutions that 
were emerging in the Ottoman Empire at the time. 
 Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddima, p. 74, cf. Rosenthal, The Muqaddimah, p. 114. For an earlier version of this 378
genealogy see the work of Andalusian scholar. Ṣāʻid A Andalusī et. al., Science in the Medieval World: Book of the 
Categories of Nations (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991). Yahya Nev‘î’s Netâyic (discussed in Chapter One 
of this dissertation) also refers to this genealogy. I have also come across this genealogy of philosophy in some notes 
in manuscripts. See for instance MS 01 Hk 216 fl. 105a (notes preceding the fourth treatise of the collection entitled 
“Muqaddimat al-‘Ulūm,” a treatise on the subject matter, problems and purpose of sciences, accessible at the 
National Library in Ankara). In this genealogy of philosophy Dāwūd precedes Luqmān. See also MS Fatih 3181, fl. 
3b, which has a note that precedes a book entitled Jāmi‘ al-‘Ulūm. It is noted that Socrates was a student of Luqmān, 
who was in turn a student of the Prophet Dāwūd [David]). As we can see, this genealogy is noted when ‘ilm was the 
subject matter of discussion.
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Luqmānic genealogy emphasized transmission of rational-philosophical sciences. In fact, this 
supposedly religious origins of rational-philosophical sciences further contradicts Ibn Khaldun’s 
following account which pointed out that the Romans cultivated these sciences after the Greeks, 
but as the Romans became Christian they neglected these sciences “as religious groups and their 
laws require.”  However, rational sciences were preserved in books, and kept in libraries. It is 379
not entirely clear why religious groups would object to rational sciences, if these sciences were 
received from prophets or religious people such as Luqmān and Dāwūd. Saliba traces these 
narratives regarding the origins of sciences to early attempts at legitimizing astrology. 
Cevdet provided a counter history of the origins of rational sciences in his commentary 
on Ibn Khaldun’s text. He frequently broke Ibn Khaldun’s narrative, either by providing 
alternative accounts or appending additional information to modernize the Muqaddimah.  To 380
begin with, Cevdet challenged Ibn Khaldun’s Greek and Persian origins of rational sciences by 
adding further information to this account. He pointed out that the Persian nation succeeded the 
people of Babylonia, and therefore the Persians inherited Babylonian sciences. Although the 
Greeks took some sciences from the Chaldeans, Cevdet noted that they frequented Egypt more 
often due to the fact that it was closer as compared to the greater distance between Babylonia and 
Greece. Thus the Greek received most of their philosophical sciences (ulûm-ı hikemiye) from the 
Copts.  Cevdet concluded then that the Babylonian and Egyptian peoples were the first of those 381
 Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddima, p. 74; Rosenthal, The Muqaddimah, p. 115.379
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, pp. 103-111. I should note that Ibn Khaldun’s account on the origins and pre-380
Islamic history of rational sciences amounted to less than two pages, Cevdet’s commentaries and glosses 
substantially extended this account.
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, p. 103.381
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nations whose history is known who had an interest in philosophical sciences. It is not entirely 
clear who among those two peoples produced these sciences first, but Cevdet asserted that the 
Babylonians were more likely to have preceded the Egyptians. Cevdet also added that some 
scholars have even asserted that the Babylonians received these sciences from the Indians, 
suggesting yet another origin for rational sciences.  Cevdet’s counter history of origins was, 382
perhaps, informed by recent developments on ancient history in Europe. There was a huge 
interest in the origins of languages, civilization, and sciences, as Europeans proceeded to 
colonize much of the world. These studies on origins usually championed the European’s 
superiority over all others.  However, as we will see, late Ottoman intellectuals such as Cevdet 383
were aware of the impact of this historiography as they encountered Orientalists’ claims over 
their nations and forms of knowledge. Ottoman intellectuals such as Cevdet, and as we will see, 
Ali Suavi, therefore adopted these discourses in a way that did not condemn for eternity the 
colonized to their “backward” condition. 
Cevdet also doubted the connection between Luqmān and the Greek philosophers such as 
Socrates and Empedocles.  In his brief biography on Empedocles, Cevdet alluded to some 384
exegetes who reported that Luqmān was Eyūb’s (Job) grandson, or that he was the son of his 
cousin Bā'ūra. Some reported that he was one of Āzar's (the father of Abraham) children, and 
that he lived one thousand years to finally become a contemporary of Dāwūd (David). There was 
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, p. 103.382
 See Edward Said, Orientalism, on the scientific racism of philological studies of Ernest Renan et al.383
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, pp. 106-107384
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disagreement among the ulema on whether Luqmān was a prophet.  According to the majority, 385
he was not a prophet, but a sage philosopher. In any case, Cevdet stated that just as Luqmān was 
ascribed anonymous philosophical statements, so was he mentioned in the chain of learning of 
those whose teacher was not known. That is why some claimed (kail olmuşlar) that Empedocles 
– or Socrates – transmitted philosophy from Luqmān. Otherwise, Cevdet concluded, “there is no 
trustworthy historical report in this regard.”  386
As we can see, both Cevdet and Ibn Khaldun shared an interest in the origins of rational 
sciences. However, Cevdet’s genealogy of rational sciences was different from Ibn Khaldun’s 
account. Moreover, Cevdet’s narrative was in line with the nineteenth-century history of science. 
Evidently, Cevdet was familiar with contemporary writings. Furthermore, Cevdet’s genealogy 
was not only in contradistinction to that of Ibn Khaldun, but it also departed from the dominant 
contemporary European historiography, which was mainly centered on the Greek origin of 
sciences and civilization. By emphasizing the Babylonian and the Egyptian origin of sciences, 
Cevdet was proposing an itinerant theory of scientific development, i.e. that sciences travel as 
civilization shifts from place to place. This theory, compared to European scientific racism, was 
much more liberating, as it did not fix sciences as the property of one nation or race alone 
(Greek, Aryan, or European). Rather, sciences, like property and wealth, were subject to decline 
and development as well as to exchange or transmission. In this regard, his theory was more 
Khaldunian. 
 There is also disagreement about his duties; some say he gave fatwa/legal opinions before the time of David. 385
When David was sent as a prophet, Luqmān was prevented from giving fatwas. Some say that he was a qadi (judge) 
among the Israelites. Clearly, terms such as fatwa and qadi appear as anachronisms, as these concepts developed 
later during Islamic history.
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, p. 107.386
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Islamic History of Rational Sciences 
There are noteworthy similarities and differences between Ibn Khaldun’s and Cevdet’s 
accounts of rational sciences during the Islamic period. In his account, Ibn Khaldun briefly 
described the emergence of interest in the philosophical disciplines during the reign of ‘Abbasid 
caliphs, Abu Ja’far al-Mansūr (r. 754-775 AD) and al-Ma’mūn (r. 813-833 AD). He pointed out 
that Muslim philosophers surpassed their predecessors, which included Aristotle. Ibn Khaldun 
mentioned four of the most prominent Muslim philosophers: al-Fārābī and Ibn Sina (Avicenna) 
in the eastern Islamic domains, and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and Abu Bakr ibn Sā’igh (a.k.a. Ibn 
Bāja or Avempace) in the western Islamic domains. Commenting on this brief history, Cevdet 
noted that the interest in philosophy emerged during the second century of Islam (from 718 to 
815AD), which suggests that he considered a slightly earlier date for the introduction of 
translations.  Moreover, Cevdet added more information about philosophy in the third century 387
of Hegira, and provided brief biographical accounts of al-Kindī, Qustā ibn Luqā, Hunayn ibn 
Ishāq, Thābit ibn Qurrā, and other prominent philosophers.  
Cevdet provided other information that further demonstrates a contemporary sensitivity 
to the writing of the history of science and philosophy. This can best be illustrated by Cevdet’s 
account of Ibn Rushd (Averroes). After making a case that Ibn Rushd was a master of both 
rational and transmitted sciences, Cevdet added that his works enjoyed great popularity in 
Europe. This mass appeal greatly worried the church, which feared that Christians would change 
 For two wonderful texts on the early history of rational-philosophical sciences in Islamic history, see George 387
Saliba, Islamic Sciences and the Making of the European Renaissance; Dimitri Gutas, Greek Thought Arabic 
Culture.
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their beliefs upon reading it. Thus, he concluded, many of Ibn Rushd’s works were burned on 
papal orders.  This account indicates that Cevdet was aware of the contemporary discussion 388
regarding the reception of Averroes in Europe, and perhaps he was informed about Orientalist 
studies, such as that of Ernest Renan on Averroism in Europe.  We can therefore see that both 389
the pre-Islamic and Islamic periods were subject to new considerations. Especially, Cevdet’s 
emphasis on the European interest in Ibn Rushd’s works suggests that Cevdet conceived of an 
Islamic genealogy of contemporary European philosophy.  
Ibn Khaldun pointed out that, in regards to the condition of rational sciences in the post-
classical period, sciences decreased in the western Islamic lands, while they were still flourishing 
in the eastern parts of the Muslim world.  He particularly mentioned Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī 390
as a learned scholar in theology, legal theory, and exposition (kalām, uṣūl al-fiqh, bayān), and 
noted that his works on these disciplines proved that he was very well acquainted with 
philosophical disciplines as well. Cevdet added that in fact there were many more leading 
scholars in the Eastern Islamic domains, which Ibn Khaldun was not aware of due to their far 
distance. Among noteworthy post-classical scholars living in the same age as al-Taftāzānī, 
Cevdet named Qutb al-Dīn al-Shirāzī (who was considered allâme i.e. the most learned), Sadr al-
Sharī‘a, ‘Aḍuḍ al-Dīn al-Ījī, and Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī.  Sayyid Sharīf (al-Jurjānī), Cevdet also 391
noted, was a great contemporary scholar, as well as a rising star as al-Taftāzānī’s life was coming 
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, p. 113.388
 Ernest Renan, Averroès Et L'averroïsm: Essai Historique (Paris: Michel-Lévy frères, 1866). 389
 Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddima, p. 75, cf. Rosenthal, The Muqaddimah, p. 117.390
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, p. 239. 391
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to an end.  These were scholars whose authority was invoked throughout the Ottoman Empire, 392
from its inception until its abolition, as I noted in my discussion of the early modern 
classification of disciplines in Chapter One. Unfortunately, to my knowledge, we still do not 
have any expansive studies on al-Jurjānī and al-Taftāzānī’s impact on the transmission and 
transformation of rational, as well as transmitted, sciences during the Ottoman Empire.  393
Cevdet not only amended Ibn Khaldun’s account but also added a brief history of rational 
sciences after Ibn Khaldun’s time. Cevdet noted that sciences and knowledge (ulûm and 
maârif)  continued to shine for a while after the author’s day. However, the effects and products 394
of civilization decreased in Persia as well as Transoxania due to political corruption and 
disturbances.  Nevertheless, he proclaimed that Ibn Khaldun was writing at a time when the 395
Ottoman star was rising. He suggested that the Ottomans were making up for the losses in al-
Andalus, which Ibn Khaldun had mentioned, by conquering the Balkans. This appended history, 
as we can see, further indicates an Ottomanization of the text, as it was updated to quench the 
curiosity of modern readers who may have wondered about later developments, and to connect 
the Ottomans to previous Islamic history. 
Cevdet provided a state-centered explanation for the rise and decline of sciences, in line 
with Ibn Khaldun’s views. Cevdet noted that Ottoman sultans were interested in sciences, and 
thus rewarded scholars according to their level of knowledge by establishing a scholarly 
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, p. 114.392
 This is not to say that there are not any studies on their ideas and works. In fact, there are some studies on aspects 393
of al-Jurjānī and al-Taftāzānī’s works. However, I contend that their impact on posteriority is not explored fully.
 Cevdet differentiates between ulûm and maârif. He uses the former in order to refer to theoretical knowledge, 394
higher knowledge, and the latter to refer to general information.
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, p. 114.395
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trajectory (tarîk-i ilmiye, hierarchy).  Many scholars from the Eastern and Western Islamic 396
lands came to the Ottoman Empire, making the land of Rum a center of science and learning 
(maârif and ulûm). However, sciences declined later on in the Ottoman Empire due to 
administrative corruption.  Cevdet cited the ‘decline’ theory, which has a long history in 397
Ottoman literature, beginning with the late sixteenth century.  
 Cevdet’s brief foray into the post-Ibn Khaldun history of rational sciences included a 
brief recognition of developments in Europe. Cevdet noted that Europe progressed in 
philosophical sciences to an extent that was not previously imaginable. He claimed that this was 
made possible by first translating Greek and Arabic books into Latin, and then translating them 
into other (vernacular) languages.  Cevdet asserted that European nations commissioned 398
translations in order to become powerful and prestigious. This comment on the role of 
translations into vernacular languages shows that Cevdet’s own engagement can be seen as a 
means of increasing the power and prestige of the Ottoman Empire as well as that of the 
Ottoman language. This nationalist perspective on scientific language itself is a modern 
development and shows that leading Tanzimat reformers such as Cevdet were aware of the 
connection between scientific language and political power, hence the official attempt by the 
state to commission translations of scientific texts and to stimulate production of new texts 
through institutions such as the Academy of Sciences (Encümen-i Dâniş), and later Ottoman 
 For more on Cevdet’s view on the Ottoman educational system and its rise and decline, see Tarih-i Cevdet, v. 1, 396
pp. 108-117.
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, p. 114.397
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, p. 114.398
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Scientific Society (Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye).  Cevdet was at the forefront of these 399
developments and contributed to the production of knowledge that would enhance the power of 
the state. The translation of the Muqaddimah was only one among the many texts he published 
during his lifetime which were subservient to establishing a modern nation state. 
Besides the impact of translation on strengthening national power, Cevdet also noted the 
increasing specialization or expertise in each discipline in modern times. He added that although 
not many polymaths such as Ibn Sina lived in his own time, there were, however, experts who 
were superior to Ibn Sina in their specialty.  This theme of specialization was a point that 400
Cevdet would dwell on again in the comments he made on a draft of Ahmed Midhat’s history of 
sciences. 
Cevdet employed the term “the bride of civilization” (ârûs-ı medeniyet), a metaphorical 
figure that alluded to sciences and crafts, in the conclusion of his brief account of the later 
history of philosophical sciences. According to Cevdet, the bride of civilization is mobile as she 
moves from one place to another wearing different clothes. Currently, Cevdet wrote, the bride is 
in Europe, and it is not clear where she will travel next, and what form she will take.  These 401
remarks show that Cevdet saw both continuity and change in the philosophical-rational sciences 
as represented by the metaphor of the bride, who has an identity but changes appearance 
depending on the place. The bride essentially personifies sciences and civilization, and her 
 For more information on the role of the Academy of Sciences and the Ottoman Scientific Society see Kenan 399
Akyüz, Encümen-i Dâniş (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Yayınları, 1975); Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, 
Osmanli Ilmî Ve Meslekî Cemiyetleri: 1 (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basimevi, 1987); Mardin, Young Ottomans, pp. 
226-251. Other works on the period by Tanpınar, Berkes, and Fortna include discussions on the issue. For primary 
documents on Ecümen-i Dâniş, see BOA, İ. MVL. 208/6740.
 Cevdet, Tercüme-i Mukaddime, p. 115.400
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changing clothes represent the transformations taking place in its content and appearance at 
different contexts. Moreover, this historiography of rational sciences emphasizes the itinerant 
nature of sciences and civilization, making it a property of no nation, European or Asian. Rather, 
this view is based on a universalist approach to disciplines designed to give hope to the colonized 
people and dominated polities. 
Conclusion 
Cevdet’s translation of and commentary on the sixth chapter of Ibn Khaldun’s 
Muqaddimah is remarkable for the study of late Ottoman intellectual history in general, and 
conceptions of science and its historiography in particular. Cevdet’s translation emerged in a 
particular context that had both historical roots and contingent causes. The historical origins of 
interest in Ibn Khaldun’s book go back to the turn of the seventeenth century and gradually 
increase, which culminated with Pîrîzâde’s translation in the latter part of the 1720s. Based on 
manuscript copies of the Muqaddimah translation, I showed that non-ulema members of the 
ruling elite were most interested in the book. This bureaucratic interest might have sparked 
Cevdet’s interest in reading and translating the theretofore untranslated sixth chapter. However, it 
was particularly the early nineteenth-century developments and mid-nineteenth-century interests 
in sciences and history that brought about new publications of Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah and 
inspired Cevdet’s translation of the sixth chapter of the book. 
In addition to providing the history of the Muqaddimah’s translation into Ottoman 
Turkish, I compared and contrasted Ibn Khaldun’s and Cevdet’s views on certain issues that 
reflected their conceptions of science (’ilm). These included the ideas of human, the human soul, 
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and the historiography of rational sciences. Looking at these issues, I asserted that both Ibn 
Khaldun and Cevdet held two approaches: metaphysical and historical. Therefore, both 
continuity and change were evident in Islamic and Ottoman intellectual history. I concluded that 
Cevdet’s translation and commentaries indicated that he consciously updated the Muqaddimah in 
order to Ottomanize and modernize the text as part of his reform activities. Moreover, this 
translation shows that reform of the polity and reform of the epistemology went hand in hand. To 
put it differently, science and power are two sides of the same coin, as their histories are 
interdependent.  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CHAPTER IV: Reconfiguring Science and Religion in the 
Late Ottoman Empire 
Introduction  
 In the preceding chapters I pointed out that early modern Ottomans conceptualized 
science in a manner that was inclusive of various disciplinary discourses, including those later 
excluded from the history of the sciences. This was best reflected in the concept of the unity of 
science, which defined a science in terms of its subject matter or purpose, which I discussed in 
the second chapter. Yet, these sciences were classified hierarchically, reflecting a value system. 
In the first chapter, I argued that those value-based classifications were situated in the milieu in 
which they were constructed, such as the court or the madrasas, and represented interests present 
in those environments. By the middle of the nineteenth century there was an ongoing shift in the 
notion of science or sciences (more properly in the Ottoman context), as discussed in the third 
chapter on Cevdet’s translation of Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah. This change came about not only 
due to the encounter with European colonial-imperial domination and its forms of knowledge, 
coupled with the continuing legacy of the Ottoman-Islamic genealogies as noted, but also as a 
result of contemporary political contingencies within the Ottoman Empire. As shown in the 
preceding chapter, the Ottoman elite undertook a multifaceted reform and reorganization project 
that involved the establishment of new bureaucratic institutions, military and civil schools, 
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translation projects, printing presses, and periodical publications, amidst which the translation of 
the Muqaddimah of Ibn Khaldun was accomplished.  
 In this chapter, I point out that the modern separation of science, religion, and politics 
came about as a result of the interplay between schools, various state institutions, scientific 
societies, and mass media. The process of change and/or separation can be observed in 
discourses preserved in a variety of print and archival documents, including official documents, 
newspapers and journal articles, translations, reform proposals, textbooks, and various curricula. 
All of these artifacts manifest that ideas of science and religion were negotiated, contested, and 
reconfigured simultaneously with the reform and reorganization of state institutions and the 
proliferation of printing enterprises.  I contend that we should not look for an age-old conflict 402
between science and religion. Instead, studying this modern history shows that conflict and 
compatibility theses were the products of new circumstances.  
 I begin this chapter by looking at the relationship between printing and the state, and then 
analyze documents from the Prime Ministry archive in Istanbul, containing the permits issued to 
establish scientific societies or publish periodicals. These seemingly mundane and ordinary 
bureaucratic matters were instrumental in performing and reinforcing a separation between 
“sciences” (ulûm ve fünûn), religious issues, and politics while they were being reconstructed. 
Following a discussion of these documents, I analyze Ali Suavi’s Ulûm Gazettes (Journal of 
Sciences) as an example of a scientific journal that did not set strict boundaries between sciences, 
religion, and politics in the manner that would have appeased the government. This journal 
 My argument in this chapter is informed by Benedict Anderson’s study of printing and nationalism in Imagined 402
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991) and Michel Foucault’s 
theoretical rumination on discursive formation of disciplines in The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1972).
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exemplifies the type of periodicals that were a threat to the government owing to their content, 
which included matters that could be perceived as disruptive to the status quo. The government 
therefore took measures to prevent such publications. Lastly, I look at a public/private 
correspondence between Ahmed Midhat and Fatma Aliye, as it reflects the changing notions of 
related concepts including scientist, learned men, philosopher, and sage that juxtaposed Islamic 
and European discourses. I will consider these publications together with the archival material in 
rethinking the issue of the separation of science, religion, and politics in the modern period. 
 As I pointed out in the introduction, unlike the formative and early modern period of 
Ottoman intellectual history, the secondary literature on nineteenth-century Ottoman history is 
abundant. This stemmed from the growing interest in modernization, Westernization, and 
secularization in the second half of the twentieth century that manifested in the works of Bernard 
Lewis, Niyazi Berkes, Roderic Davison, and Şerif Mardin, to name only a few. The literature on 
the concepts of science and religion in the late Ottoman Empire is also receiving its share as a 
number of dissertations dealing with these issues have appeared over the last few decades.  403
İsmail Kara’s pioneering article on the concepts of ulûm, fünûn, and sanat (sciences, techne, and 
 See Berrak Burc̦ak, “Science, a Remedy for all Ills Healing "The sick man of Europe": a Case for Ottoman 403
Scientism,” (Ph.D. Diss. Princeton: Princeton University, 2005) http://books.google.com/books?id=I4Y-
AQAAIAAJ.; Serdar Poyraz, “Science versus Religion the Influence of European Materialism on Turkish Thought, 
1860-1960” (Ph.D. Diss. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University, 2010) http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view.cgi?acc
%5Fnum=osu1290905453.; Mehmet Alper Yalçınkaya, "Their Science, Our Values" Science, State, and Society in 
the 19th Century Ottoman Empire” (University of California, San Diego 2010) http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/fullcit?
p3412268. 
                                                                                                                                       
 177
art) is of most immediate interest to this chapter’s inquiry.  In line with the preceding literature 404
on modernization and Westernization in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, Kara stated that there 
were a few factors that generated attention to the concepts of ulûm (sciences) and fünûn 
(sciences, techniques, arts) as a problematic in the modern period. First and foremost, military 
defeats against European powers and Russia were mainly attributed to technical-technological 
insufficiency,  which gained them an understanding that the sciences were instrumental for 405
gaining global power. Secondly, the opening of modern schools proliferated the new idea of 
science via foreign teachers, foreign textbooks or adaptations of such textbooks, with French 
being the most common language used for educational purposes. Moreover, Kara alludes to the 
impact of translation bureaus, and of students who studied abroad in Europe, on the formation of 
the new conception of science.  Last but not least, the late Ottomans mainly viewed European 406
civilization as a paragon of science and progress, and sought to emulate this success. As a result, 
Kara argues that the concept of ulûm ve fünûn, in the modern period, increasingly referred to 
secular sciences, and overtime excluded religious sciences.  
 Kara’s contribution is significant in sketching out a preliminary map of these concepts as 
they were used by the late Ottomans. However, his sources were limited mainly to dictionaries, 
journal articles, and various talks given by leading Ottomans, which was in line with the general 
 İsmail Kara, “Modernleşme Dönemi Türkiye'sinde “Ulûm”, “Fünûn” ve “Sanat” Kavramlarının 404
Algılanışı” [Understanding Concepts of “Ulûm,” “Fünûn,” and Sanat” in Modern Turkey], in Din ile Modernleşme 
Arasında: Çağdaş Türk Düşüncesinin Meseleleri (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2003), cf. also Seyfi Kenan’s chapter 
“III. Selim Dönemi Eğitim Anlayışında Arayışlar” [Soul-searching in the Educational Thought During the Reign of 
Selim III] in Kenan, Nizâm-ı Kādîm'den Nizâm-ı Cedîd'e III. Selim Ve Dönemi =: Selim III and His Era from Ancien 
Régime to New Order, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi (İSAM), 2010).
 Kara, "Modernleşme Dönemi Türkiye’sinde,” p. 128.405
 Kara, "Modernleşme Dönemi Türkiye’sinde,” p. 134.406
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trend regarding the writing of intellectual history. Consequently, Kara does not consider the role 
of the bureaucratic administration and internal challenges that provoked a change in the 
conceptions of science and, as a result, that of religion in the nineteenth-century Ottoman 
Empire, although he does note the larger global context that also influenced the reconfiguration 
of these concepts.  
 A recent contribution by Alper Yalçınkaya provides a theoretically informed companion 
to Kara’s study, as the author analyzes discourses on science, state and morality through the lens 
of science and technology studies. Yalçınkaya’s argument is especially inspired by the notable 
assertion of Shapin and Schaffer, that states solutions to the problem of knowledge are solutions 
to the problem of order.  Moreover, relying on other sociological theories, such as Thomas 407
Gieryn’s studies on boundary-work, Yalçınkaya explores the emergence of a new group of 
bureaucrats as a product of European influences.  Following Kara, Yalçınkaya views 408
engagement with European thought as the marker of the new knowledge and the new group. 
Therefore, as much as he acknowledges the internal Ottoman debates, these are seen mainly as 
repercussions of engagements with European discourses.  Moreover, like Kara, he relies 409
 M. Alper Yalçınkaya, Learned Patriots: Debating Science, State, and Society in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman 407
Empire (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015); Steven Shapin et. al., Leviathan and the Air-Pump: 
Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life: Including a Translation of Thomas Hobbes, Dialogus Physicus De 
Natura Aeris by Simon Schaffer (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1985) pp. 15, 21 et passim. 
 Yalçınkaya, states that "in the early mid-nineteenth century, a new group emerged in the Ottoman Empire 408
comprising of individuals who had been to Europe, or who spoke a European language, or who had been educated in 
Europe or at a European-style school in the Ottoman Empire, or some combination of the above." See Yalçınkaya, 
Learned Patriots, p. 22.
 In a footnote, Yalçınkaya states “it is important not to reduce the Ottoman Empire simply to Westernization, or to 409
seeing them as projects that the Ottomans were forced to undertake and followed blindly due to the irresistible 
influence of the European powers” (Learned Patriots, p. 241, n. 29). However, Yalçınkaya's narrative is one that 
contributes to a Eurocentric narrative, rather than pointing out the internal contingencies that brought about an 
Ottoman modernity.
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mainly on the published literature that commonly reflects engagements with European 
interlocutors as opposed to focusing on the events and measures taken by the state.  
 Complementing Kara and Yalçınkaya’s work, I emphasize in this chapter the role of the 
state in delineating the boundaries of science, religion and politics, not merely as a result of 
engagements with European powers, but also as an outcome of reasons of state in governing the 
Ottoman population by controlling publications, societies, schools, and curricula. To put it 
another way, I concur with their findings that the notion of science was being reformed through 
interaction with European sources. However, I will add that science as a distinct discourse was 
just as much an outcome of state regulations and the Ottoman Islamic discursive tradition. The 
state was not trying to establish a separation of science and religion in the European style. 
Rather, it was pursuing policies to control its population in addition to meeting the challenge of 
European powers. The separation came about by the government’s attempt to suppress political 
opposition, and to prevent religious conflicts in the Empire. I will demonstrate this by looking at 
the history of regulations on printing presses, printed books, journals, and the establishment of 
scientific societies. 
Sediments of “ulûm ve fünûn” in the Archive 
 The Prime Ministry Archives in Istanbul includes a heterogenous body of knowledge and 
a variety of documents related to the subject matter of this chapter. These documents reveal the 
role of various agents, including the state, in the reformation of categories such as sciences, 
religions, and politics. They also show both the positive and prohibitive powers of the state in 
delineating the boundaries between these categories, and hence ensuring their separation. The 
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late Ottoman state itself was not homogenous, as its policies were determined by various rival 
groups in the bureaucracy, each of which attempted to exercise control over the government. 
Also, at any given moment the state consisted of interdependent branches, which together played 
the major role in changing the concepts of sciences, religions, and politics. In other words, the 
state contributed through various ministries, agencies, and bureaus to the creation of science as a 
separate discourse from religion. This came about through the state’s power over regulating 
publications, controlling the movement of foreign scholars, rewarding scientists, and 
establishing, administering, staffing, and funding institutions such as schools and colleges. The 
state was therefore reifying these concepts, which made it possible to juxtapose science and 
religion, or politics and religion. 
 In addition to archival documents, state involvement in the demarcation of science, 
religion, and politics can also be seen in press and printing regulations. These regulations show 
that the state exercised a negative power through censorship or by limiting existing institutions or 
societies, as well as civil or private initiatives in that it controlled, regulated and allocated 
permission to Ottoman subjects in their endeavors. Therefore, the possibility of alternative or 
subversive approaches was limited. However, the late Ottoman state was by no means 
omnipotent, as demonstrated by the history of various opposition movements and publications, 
such as Ali Suavi’s journal Ulûm, which will be discussed below.   
Periodicals and Scientific Societies 
 Amidst a set of practices that together produce science, religion, and politics as separate 
objects or categories, I would like to draw attention to the governmental role in this separation 
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through the regulation of scientific societies and publications, especially periodicals. Of course, 
both the periodicals and scientific societies appeared rather late despite the early introduction of 
the printing press in the Ottoman Empire. However, the history of state control over the printing 
press had already set the norms that were to govern related activities.  
 As the printing press proliferated in the Empire, the government became increasingly 
wary of its impact among the various Ottoman communities. Consequently, some regulations 
were put in place in order to make sure that publishers were refraining from disrupting the 
existing order. The governmental intervention in the printing industry, according to some 
speculations, dates to the first introduction of the printing press in the Ottoman Empire by the 
Jewish community in 1493.  Even if that was not the case, the history of the later presses 410
demonstrates state intervention in the form of confiscating and halting their activities when rival 
Ottoman communities made complaints. For instance, the first Greek printing press in the 
Empire was established in order to limit the influence of Jesuit missionaries among the Greek 
Orthodox community in Istanbul in 1627. The first book published by this press was a work 
against the Jews. Jesuits were threatened by the reach and outcome of the Greek press against 
their missionary work. Hence, they complained to the authorities on the ground that the owner of 
the press was conspiring against the Ottomans. Furthermore, they provoked the authorities by 
noting that the book published by the press contained blasphemous statements. Soon afterwards 
 A K. Offenberg, "The Printing History of the Constantinople Hebrew Incunable of 1493: A Mediterranean 410
Voyage of Discovery." British Library Journal 22.2 (1996): 221-235. It is not clear whether Sultan Bayezid II was 
against printing. There was an interval in Jewish printing, which continued after twelve years in 1505 during the 
reign of Bayezid II. Offenberg also speculates about the possibility that this interval in printing might have been due 
to the war with the Venetians, which might have prevented the supply of paper from Italy. In any case, it is 
acknowledged in the colophon of the first book printed in Constantinople that it was printed during the reign of 
Sultan Bayezid II. See also Selim Nüzhet Gerçek’s speculations in Türk Matbaacılığı I [Turkish Printing], (Istanbul: 
Devlet Basımevi, 1939), pp. 26-28.
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the Greek press was confiscated and the printed text was examined to no avail due to printers 
self-censorship. Recent scholarship has demonstrated that the offending passages were self-
censored by the press owner.  This governmental intervention shows the sensibilities of the 411
Ottoman state in the early modern period, long before intense contact with Western European 
powers. 
 The first printing press established by Muslims in the Ottoman Empire provides another 
example of state intervention or control in this sector. The limit put on İbrahim Müteferrika’s 
printing press is quite well known. The state allowed this press, which was established in 
Istanbul about a century after the Greek press (in 1727), to publish books related to instrumental 
sciences (ulûm-ı âliye). In other words, it was not supposed to print books related to Islamic 
religious disciplines including Qur’anic exegesis, Islamic law and legal theory, ḥadīth, etc.  In 412
fact, most of the books printed by that press concerned history, geography, and linguistics. These 
examples of early modern Ottoman interventions in the printing press and book trade 
demonstrate that the Ottoman state was particularly sensitive to the publication of religious and 
political material, which could cause disturbances among the Ottoman communities.  
 It is worth noting that the Müteferrika press, and the presses later established in the 
imperial engineering school, were under state control. That is to say, these presses were limited 
 See Nil Palabiyik, "An Early Case of the Printer’s Self-Censorship in Constantinople,” The Library: the 411
Transactions of the Bibliographical Society 16.4 (2015): 381-404.
 Alpay Kabacalı, Başlangıçtan Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın Sansürü [From Its Beginnings to Today Censorhip in 412
Turkey] (Cağaloğlu, Istanbul: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları, 1990) p. 12; cf. Berkes, Türkiyede Çağdaşlaşma, p. 
57. It is also significant that the press was allowed to print texts in the domain of “instrumental sciences,” which in 
fact is a category that is not necessarily opposed to religious sciences. Rather, instrumental sciences were, in other 
classifications, considered as part and parcel of religious sciences. Therefore, this division of sciences was perhaps 
more related to the command of the text, i.e. that instrumental sciences were much widely studied and read, whereas 
higher sciences (‘ulūm al-‘āliya) could include non-religious disciplines such as rational sciences.
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to publishing books authorized by the state.  This was acknowledged in the first regulations 413
concerning the printing of books on the imperial press (Tabhâne-i Âmire) in 1840, shortly after 
the Tanzimat. This imperial order conceded that the staff of the imperial press refrained from 
publishing many books that were useful for spreading sciences and knowledge, as well as arts 
and crafts, since the government was afraid that these books might cost the state dearly if they 
were not sold. On the other hand, it was declared that everybody could print books (ruhsat 
verilmiş) provided that they pay for the cost of the printing, indicating that the state had 
considered the potential role of such books on sciences and crafts in bringing about security, 
welfare, and civilization.    414
   
 Printing as a mass medium became not only more accessible, but also more controversial. 
The above-mentioned incidents and regulations in the Ottoman Empire testify to this aspect of 
printing. However, of more interest to me is that these governmental interventions were 
reinforcing the separation of certain issues from others. The printing press can be seen as a 
machine that manufactures science, religion, and politics into separate objects. That said, the 
limited number of presses in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not provoke a massive 
governmental intervention that would produce science and religion as separate discourses. This 
 For instance, some documents show that permission was sought from Selim III and Mahmud II to publish books 413
on the imperial press.
 See Server R İskit, Türkiyede Matbuat Rejimleri [Regimes of Printing in Turkey] (Istanbul: Ülkü Matbası, 1939) 414
p. 837. Kabacalı interpreted this as indicating introduction of a kind of licensing for printing books (Kabacalı, p. 15). 
In my view, this merely indicates that permission was given to all to publish their books in the press. Kabacalı also 
points out that the first regulation that brought about censorship dates from 1845 and concerns the workings of 
policing. According to this regulation police were required to pay attention to the libraries, book stores, and printing 
presses with regard to matters that might harm public morality and etiquette, and they must examine imported books 
and treatises prior to their circulation/publication (Kabacalı, Başlangıçtan Günümüze, pp. 15-16).
                                                                                                                                       
 184
was to change dramatically in the second half of the nineteenth century with the increasing 
number of periodical publications. 
 The first Ottoman Turkish newspapers and periodicals were published during the first 
half of the nineteenth century (such as Waqāi‘ al-Miṣriyya in 1829 in Cairo, and Takvim-i Vekâyi 
in 1831 in Istanbul). It was after the Crimean War and the Islahat Fermanı (Reform Rescript) of 
1856 that newspapers and journals proliferated. During that time various Ottoman communities 
and the state published many journals in Turkish, Arabic, Persian, Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian, 
Ladino (Judeo Spanish), and Kurdish. There was also a considerable amount of periodicals in 
foreign languages such as French, English, and Italian. These publications were crucial for 
popularizing intellectual and political matters. The Empire was going through various upheavals 
brought about by European colonial interests, nationalist movements, and the wars with Russia, 
which were coupled together through the rise of mass media and intercommunal conflicts. In 
1857, the Ottoman government promulgated new regulations in order to control newspapers and 
journals, and continued to censor books. This governmental intervention into the content of 
specific publications, which took the form of bureaucratic regulations as well as policing, 
surveillance, and censorship, contributed to the purification of the categories of science, religion, 
and politics. To put it differently, the government’s anxiety over political unrest resulted in a 
state-enforced compartmentalization, which made it possible to juxtapose science and religion. 
 Prior to the laws regulating printing presses and printed materials, the most explicit 
expression of conditions for printing were indicated in 1849, in a memorandum sent to foreign 
ambassadors. It acknowledged that in the Levant, subjects of friendly countries were establishing 
presses and printing books and newspapers (gazettes) in the language of the state [probably 
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Arabic] without getting permission from the local administration. According to the 
memorandum, this craft of printing was unlike other businesses, and thus it was against the 
current Ottoman regulations to establish presses and publish books at will. Therefore, those who 
desired to do so were obliged to apply to the local administration, and promise that they would 
not publish materials concerning religion. They were also required to show a copy of the books 
to the governor of the state prior to their publication. Newspapers also were not to be published 
without permission.  There were many missionaries active in the Levant, including Protestants 415
and Jesuits, who established printing presses in Beirut. Because of the strict ban on criticizing 
religions, it is possible that these rivaling missionaries urged the memorandum to be sent, and 
perhaps through complaints from one of the religious communities against the other. In addition, 
the memorandum shows that prior to later codes, the government intervened in the printing 
presses and publications, assuring that books and newspapers did not contain criticisms of 
various religious groups in the Empire.  
 A recent study concerning the trial of a Christian printer from Selanik shows that the 
Ottoman state was keen on preventing publications that were susceptible to political unrest, post 
Greek independence.  The trial evinces that the state accused the printer for going against the 416
orders of the state. It is implicit that there were regulations in effect. However, the defense of this 
printer reveals that there were no written orders, rather only warnings by the officials. Perhaps 
that is why the state was forced, in 1857, to promulgate the first code regulating printing 
 İskit, Türkiyede Matbuat, p. 842; Kabacalı, Başlangıçtan Günümüze, p.16415
 See Anna Vakali, “A Christian Printer on Trial in the Tanzimat Council of Selanik, Early 1850s,” Cihannüma: 416
Tarih ve Coğrafya Araştırmaları Dergisi Sayı I/2 (Aralık 2015): 23-38. 
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presses.  This code, which was in line with the memorandum sent to ambassadors, explicated 417
the conditions for establishing presses and printing books. These involved a background check 
and proper documentation, including licenses. 
 The government set new regulations in 1864. This code is interesting, as it starts by 
declaring that publishing newspapers and periodicals covering political and governmental issues 
(mevâdd-ı politikiye ve mülkiye) is not allowed without licensing (ruhsat olunmaksızın). This 
regulation was more elaborate and expansive than previous regulations, totaling about six pages 
(compared to a less than two-page order of 1857). It shows that as the number of publications 
were on the rise, so were the amount of regulations, conditions, and control by the government. It 
was during this period that the Young Ottoman party emerged as a political opposition, whose 
journalistic activities led to a memorandum in 1867, which gave the government further power to 
suppress the press.  
 It is in this longer history of printing in the Ottoman Empire that we should situate the 
government’s intervention in later scientific societies and journals that performed such 
differentiation between political, religious, and scientific matters. As a result of these regulations, 
the prospective editors or societies had to get permission from the state in order to establish their 
enterprises. Although the printing regulations do not explicitly stipulate any restrictions or 
conditions over establishing scientific societies, I should note that the matter of publishing 
periodicals had an interesting connection with the establishment of scientific societies. The first 
academy of sciences (Encümen-i Dâniş) did not print any journals however, but it was 
established for the purpose of translating and producing books to be taught in the prospective 
 Düstur, v. 2 (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1872) pp. 227-228; İskit, Türkiyede Matbuat, 846-847; cf. Kabacalı, p.18417
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university. One of the earliest societies in the Ottoman Empire, namely the Orientalist Society of 
Constantinople, was able to print only one issue of its journal.  418
 In line with these regulations, requests made for printing journals and establishing 
societies had to indicate the subject matter of the prospective publication. The separation of 
sciences can be observed in the program and permission  given to the Ottoman Scientific 419
Society (Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye), which was established in Istanbul in 1861 by Halil Bey 
and Münif Pasha, who were among the leading Tanzimat bureaucrats. The purpose of this 
society, according to Halil Bey’s petition, was to spread throughout the Ottoman Empire the 
useful sciences (ulûm ve fünûn-ı nâfia) that, as was believed, had carried European nations to the 
zenith of civilization and power.  With this goal in mind, the society was determined to 420
compose and translate books and treatises concerning all kinds of knowledge (maârif), with the 
exception of religious and political issues (mesail-i diniye ve politikiye müstesna olmak üzere), 
and to provide public courses and lectures on certain days.  These points were repeated in the 421
constitution (nizamname) of the society, which further elaborated its duties and workings to 
include among other things a publication of a periodical entitled Mecmua-i Fünûn (Journal of 
Sciences). According to their constitution, the journal would include matters related to sciences 
 See Journal Asiatique De Constantinople: Recueil Mensuel De Mémoires Et D'extraits Relatifs a La Philologie, a 418
L'histoire Générale, a L'archéologie, a La Géographie, Aux Sciences Et Aux Arts Des Nations Orientales Et 
Asiatiques En Général, Et ... Des Nations Qui Ont Habité Ou Habitent L'empire Ottoman. (Constantinople: Cayol, 
1852). 
 A.MKT.MHM. 221/33;419
 “Avrupa milletlerini evc-i âlâ-yı medeniyete ve iktidara îsâl eden ulûm ve maârif-i nâfianın Memâlik-i Mahrûse-i 420
Şahane’de intişarı.”
 I rely on Halil Bey’s petition as published in Ali Budak, Mecmûa-i Fünûn: Osmanlı'nın İlk Bilim Dergisi: 421
İnceleme Ve Seçilmiş Makaleler. (Cağaloğlu, Istanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2011) pp. 295-296. For the document cf. 
BOA İ. DH. 472/31671, dated April 19, 1861. This file also includes a copy of the bylaws. See also the response 
addressed to Halil Bey in BOA, A. MKT. MHM. 221/33.
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and knowledge (ulûm and maârif), arts (sanayi'), and trade (ticaret). However, it would refrain 
from religious issues as well as contemporary politics, and would inspect the submissions 
accordingly.  422
 Similar attempts at excluding religious matters can be seen in the Ottoman Turkish 
periodicals that were printed soon after the publication of Mecmua-i Fünûn. For instance, 
Mecmua-yı İber-i İntibah, which was the organ of the Cemiyet-i Kitabet (Society of Writing), 
included similar statements in its constitution, which was published in the second volume of the 
journal in 1863 (Şevval 1279). This was a bi-monthly journal intended for students (mekteblerde 
kıraat okunmak), so supposedly it had a plain or straightforward language in order to appeal to 
beginners.  The journal had an open call for contributions that stipulated some conditions. The 423
first article of the constitution stated that material sent for publication was not to include any 
religious or political matters.  The following articles declared restrictions on writing against the 424
state and its laws, personal attacks, and gazeliyat (obscene poetry). Interestingly the matter of 
religion and politics was brought up again in the fifth article, which stated that under no 
circumstances would the journal accept rude (or lowly) articles that intentionally ridiculed public 
opinion on matters of religion and politics.   425
 “Cemiyet mesail-i diniye ve zaman-ı hâl politikası mebâhisinden ihtiraz edip kendisine takdim olunan layihaların 422
dahi mevâdd-ı mezkureden ârî olmasına dikkat edecektir.” See Mecmua-i Fünûn, cf. Budak, Mecmua-i Fünûn, p. 
296.
 Mecmua-yı İber-i İntibah, v. 2, p. 28. 423
 “Mecmua-yı İber’de dercolunmak üzere gönderilen mevâdda mebâhis-i diniye ve umûr-ı politikiye olmayacaktır.” 424
Mecmua-yı İber-i İntibah, v. 2, p. 29. 
 “Gerek dinen gerek politikaca edna mertebe efkar-ı umûmiyeyi ifsâd niyetine mebni yazılmış olan mevâdd asla 425
kabul olunmayacaktır.” Mecmua-yı İber-i İntibah, v. 2, p. 29.
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 Another journal published by the Cemiyet-i Kitabet under a slightly different title from 
the previous one, included the same bylaws, which were condensed into three articles.  426
Considering that the articles submitted for publication were to be published with the signature of 
the author, and that they would be admitted only if the editor approved them, we can see how 
these restrictions prevented prospective writers from submitting material concerning forbidden 
subjects. Furthermore, the emphasis on excluding political and religious matters demonstrates 
how the interplay between state, audience (students), and publishers brought about spaces or 
objects that sorted these categories. 
 Although it is not immediately clear why the petitioners and publishers excluded matters 
of religion and politics from their prospective society or journal, it is most likely that they knew 
the difficulty of getting permission and sustaining this enterprise while discussing such sensitive 
subjects. Recent scholarship shows that the newspapers that avoided political issues were given 
priority in obtaining permission during the Hamidian rule (r. 1876-1908).  I should point out 427
that, unlike the common treatment of this period by scholars, Hamidian rule was not a major 
break with the Tanzimat (1839-1876). If anything, it perhaps even intensified previous policies 
with regard to the approach to publications. 
 In my view, scientific societies and periodicals excluded political and religious matters in 
order to avoid political impediments. It has been noted that one of the journals that rivaled 
Mecmua-i Fünûn was shut down because the editor criticized the founder of this publication, 
 Mecmua-yı İbretnüma, v. 10, (Tasvîr-i Efkâr Matbaası: 1282/1865) pp. 3-4.426
 Fatmagül Demirel, II. Abdülhamid Döneminde Sansür (Cağaloğlu, Istanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 2007), p. 60. 427
                                                                                                                                       
 190
namely Münif Pasha, who was situated in the higher echelons of power.  Even Münif Pasha 428
and Halil Bey’s attempt at avoiding religious and political matters possibly stemmed from their 
worry that rival political figures might impede their enterprise. After all, as Niyazi Berkes had 
asserted, Münif was representative of a different kind of modernization, which was competing 
with that of Cevdet Pasha, another Tanzimat reformer.  Such rivalry might have been a reason 429
for excluding matters political and religious in order to avoid a quagmire.  
 Despite the Ottoman Scientific Society’s objectives, the articles in the journal could not 
avoid matters that involved religious and political issues, such as the value of the sciences. As 
Kara has noted, Münif Pasha and other pro-science elites used a religious discourse to legitimize 
new sciences.  The journal was eventually shut down during the reign of Abdulhamid II for 430
publishing a witty story entitled “A Firefly and a Traveler” (Bir Yıldız Böceği ile Bir Yolcu), in 
which the sultan resided at Yıldız palace, raising Abdulhamid’s suspicion that this was a pun 
aimed at criticizing his rule. 
 The increased governmental control over separating scientific, religious, and political 
matters can be seen in later documents regarding the establishment of scientific societies and 
journals. This can be attested to in a document sent from Istanbul to the Syrian province (in 
1875/76?),  which indicates that a group of people from Beirut asked for permission to 431
 Yalçınkaya, Learned Patriots, p. 91.428
 As discussed in the earlier chapter, Cevdet Pasha contributed to the establishment of Encümen-i Dâniş (the 429
official Ottoman Academy of Sciences). For Berkes’ assertion, see Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma, pp. 235-236.
 İsmail Kara, “Modernleşme Dönemi Türkiye’sinde “Ulûm”, “Fünûn” ve “Sanat” Kavramlarının Algılanışı,” in 430
Din ile Modernleşme Arasında: Çağdaş Türk Düşüncesinin Meseleleri (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2003). cf. 
Yalçınkaya, Learned Patriots, pp. 87-88.
 MF.MKT. 27/7, dated 27 Mart 1291 Rumi/3 Rabi’u’l-awwal 1292(?) AH.431
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establish a scientific society (cemiyet-i ilmiye) under the name of Zahrat al-Ādāb (the flower of 
literature or etiquette).  This order granted permission to the society with the condition that it 432
abide by its charter, that it would not "discuss issues regarding politics and religions (politika ve 
mezahibe müteallık mesailden bahsolunmamak),” that it would allow the members of the local 
educational commission to join the society if they so desired, and that the society would stay 
under constant governmental control. The society was to be abolished if it did not abide by these 
conditions.  As is evident, the government not only barred the society from discoursing on 433
matters related to religion and politics, but it was also to be put under constant surveillance and 
open to state officials, all of which were mechanisms to ensure that these regulations were abided 
by. Incidentally, the president of the society, namely Adīb Iḥsaq, was quite politically involved 
after moving to Cairo and becoming a follower of al-Afghani. Isḥaq’s death caused tension 
between Maronite Catholics and his friends, which led to a confrontation between two scientific 
journals of the time, namely al-Muqtaṭaf and al-Bashā’ir. Apparently, the Ottoman governor sent 
warnings to both journals threatening to take measures if they continued to use illicit language.  434
This example also confirms that Ottoman authorities were keen on preventing publications that 
 MF.MKT. 27/7 . Some studies that discuss scientific societies in the Syrian province of the Empire suggest that 432
Zahrat al-Adab was established to replace the Syrian Scientific Society, in 1873. For a brief mention of this society, 
see Jibrān Mas’ūd, Lubnān wa al-Nahda al-‘Arabiya al-Ḥadītha, (1953), p. 60. 
 MF. MKT. 27/7. This directive is pointed to the governorship of Syria (Suriye vilayet-i celilesine), probably from 433
the Ministry of Education, as it is found among the documents of the latter institution. The document also shows that 
a number of regional and central governmental institutions are involved in order to provide the necessary permission 
to establish a regional scientific society – commission on education (meclis-i maârif), sublime porte (bab-i aliye), 
ministry, regional governorship, city governorship etc., which was exactly how the chain of writing for getting 
permissions for periodicals or presses was supposed to be. 
 For more on the repercussions of Adīb Isḥaq’s death, see Elie Kedourie, “The Death of Adib Ishaq” Middle 434
Eastern Studies 9.1 (1973): 95–109. For a detailed account of al-Muqtataf and al-Bashā’ir, see Elshakry, Reading 
Darwin in Arabic.
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could instigate violence. Therefore, separation of science, religion, and politics was an 
instrument for the government to exercise control over the population.  
 Clearly the Sublime Porte assumed that the boundaries between these categories were 
clear-cut, and that they should be respected by the scientific societies and periodicals. But in fact, 
the state was reconstructing them in its effort to control the societies and publications at large. 
The concept of sciences could include political or religious matters under the category of 
political or religious sciences,  but it is not clear whether the government would have allowed 435
such discussions. However, if that were the case, i.e. if the prohibition of political and religious 
matters was extended to the disciplinary discussions, it would juxtapose scientific disciplines 
with religious disciplines, and thus bring about sciences and non-sciences. At any rate, the 
government officiated a separation of sciences, religion, and politics as a result of the contract 
imposed on scientific societies. Therefore, the governmental control over the creation and 
supervision of such societies can be read as effectively producing these categories as distinct 
objects. 
 It is my sense that initially the government was wary only of polemical issues that could 
tempt communities to resort to violence. However, over time it appears that instead of warning 
against polemics, the government made general remarks that seem to forbid discussions on any 
kind of religious matter. During the reign of Abdülhamid II, there were even further discussions 
and restrictions on publications. In 1877, the first Ottoman assembly discussed a new code on 
printing press and publications, proposed by the government. Although Abdulhamid II did not 
implement this law, the minutes of the discussion over the proposed law reveal that the Ottomans 
 As the journal of Suavi indicates, being devoted to sciences does not necessarily signify an exclusion of religious 435
and political matters.
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were divided on the proposed limitations concerning the press. This division can be seen in the 
government’s response to a petition to publish a journal.  It seems that those more closely 436
connected with the government were in favor of strict regulations, while those representing 
various communities advocated for a laissez-fair approach. This further confirms that reasons of 
governing a multi-faith, multi-national Empire were at work in bringing about strict control over 
the separation of sciences from politics and religion. Though there were some reforms over the 
preceding printing regulation mentioned above, this did little to alter the outcome since the 
government dominated the process. As it is commonly known, Abdulhamid II was even more 
suspicious of the role printing could play in challenging his rule, therefore he established several 
institutions to censor printed material including the Tedkîk-i Müellefât Encümeni (Committee for 
the Examination of Publications) which was created in 1889. 
 In 1898, an official from Thessaloniki asked for permission to publish a bi-weekly 
periodical entitled Mekteb Refiki (School Companion). In response, a governmental 
memorandum  stated that since this was a school companion, it was neither useless, nor 437
harmful. Apparently, the government conducted a background check on the prospective 
publisher, which came back positive. In addition, the publisher was to fulfill a number of 
conditions in order to get the permission they sought. These conditions included the following: 
that the journal would refrain from publishing anything that touched on the sacred rights of the 
Padishah or damaged the interests of the people and state; that it would abide by the regulations 
concerning publications and printing presses; that it would not publish any articles related to 
 See Server İskit, Türkiye’de Matbuat Rejimleri [Regimes of Printing in Turkey]. These minutes of discussions are 436
important for understanding the relationship between science, politics, and technology.
 BOA, MF. MKT. 402/4 (dated 5 Safer 1316 AH/13 Haziran 1314).437
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religion or politics (diyanet ve siyaset); that with regard to public morality, it would exclude 
improper pieces, criticisms, personal attacks, as well as ambiguous matters; and finally, that the 
journal was not supposed to accept articles submitted by students and women. In addition to 
these restrictions, it was indicated that the journal should not in any manner indicate sections 
censored by the officer (muayene memuru). The journal was not to exceed sixteen pages, and it 
had to be shown to the local office of education prior to its publication.  438
 This document demonstrates the degree of censorship exercised by the Hamidian regime. 
However, it also exposes the extent of surveillance over publications, which was done to purify 
them of matters that were considered dangerous, such as religion and politics. This intensive 
censorship and control of publications was ensuring that a certain kind of notion of sciences was 
allowed to exist, and that other kinds of possibilities were being suppressed. The Hamidian 
regime was not pursuing a European ideal of separation between science, religion, politics, and 
public morality. Rather, it is evident that these policies emerged from internal Ottoman 
contingencies, such as challenges to the rule of sultans or the Sublime Porte, and interreligious or 
intercommunal conflicts. For instance, in the 1860s, the Young Ottomans were challenging the 
government of Ali Pasha, and attempting to bring about a constitutional government. With regard 
to intercommunal, national, and religious conflict, suffice it to mention Greek independence at 
the beginning of the 1820s, and the intercommunal violence in Mount Lebanon and Damascus in 
1860, and the Bulgarian revolt of 1876. All of these events shaped state policies toward various 
publications, as they “posed danger” to the status quo. 
 BOA, MF. MKT. 402/4.438
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 As mentioned above, the history of such conflicts, as they related to printing, goes back 
to earlier periods. However, the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed an 
unprecedented amount of regulations, state control, and censorship as the reach of print media 
was growing. These interventions by the state produced a separation of sciences, religion, and 
politics. This made possible a certain kind of secularity that was not primarily modeled on 
European styles, but instead emerged from the Ottoman state’s attempt to contain opposition and 
prevent religious disturbances within the Empire. 
   
A Journal of Science without boundaries: Ali Suavi’s Ulûm Gazettes 
 In line with the concerns of the state, many late Ottoman publications indicated and 
limited the subject matter of their periodicals in order to receive necessary permissions for 
publication. As already pointed out, this entailed an ostensible exclusion of matters related to 
religion and politics from scientific journals. Therefore, I argued, such regulations were 
(per)formative in the separation of sciences, religions, and politics in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. However, this was not the case for many journals published prior to such 
strict regulations and surveillance. Moreover, there were newspapers that avoided governmental 
control by publishing abroad. In this section, I discuss Ali Suavi’s  activities as a journalist and 439
his periodical Ulûm Gazettes (Journal of Sciences), published in Paris in 1869-1870. Suavi’s 
biography and the journal illustrate governmental sensitivities as well as possible trajectories for 
publishing a journal of sciences. 
 In the literature on the period, Ali Suavi is usually represented as an unpredictable, contradictory figure, not 439
unlike the way Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghāni has been treated.
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 Ali Suavi was born in Istanbul in 1839, about a month after the Tanzimat Fermanı of the 
same year.  Suavi attended Davutpaşa Rüşdiye Mektebi, which was established according to 440
the new system of education suggested by the commission on education (meclis-i maârif). 
Though it is not clear where and how he studied Ottoman medrese curriculum, he seems to have 
acquired such knowledge by attending teaching circles in mosques. Oddly enough, Suavi never 
referred to his teachers in his writings, neither those in the Rüşdiye nor those in the mosques or 
other venues. He also claimed to have travelled to Mecca for pilgrimage while still a teenager, 
memorizing ḥadīth on his journey to the Hijaz. After his return, he taught at a medrese in a small 
town in Western Anatolia (Simav). Later, Suavi took an exam in order to teach in the Rüşdiyes. 
Abdurrahman Sami Pasha, the minister of education at the time, participated in the examination 
process for selecting Rüşdiye school teachers. Suavi ranked first in the exam, which impressed 
Sami Pasha. After a brief stint as a teacher in Bursa, Suavi returned to the capital, becoming a 
member of Sami Pasha’s household. Later, Suavi travelled to Rumelia (Balkans) on an invitation 
by some friends working for the government. While in Philippopolis, Suavi taught in the 
medreses. He then returned to Istanbul, and continued teaching in Şehzâde Mosque, an imperial 
mosque strategically located between the residential and governmental neighborhoods.  
 In his publication, Suavi provided a brief political autobiography in the context of a series 
to be devoted to the history of the Young Ottomans.  At that time Suavi had severed ties with 441
this oppositional group which itself was dissolving. We should be cautious about elements in this 
 For Suavi’s autobiography see Suavi, “Yeni Osmanlılar Tarihi” [History of Young Ottomans], Ulûm, Volume 15, 440
pp. 892-932. For more on Suavi’s biography see Hüseyin Çelik, Ali Suavı̂ Ve Dönemi [Ali Suavi and His Times] 
(Cağaloğlu, Istanbul: İletişim, 1994) pp. 41-112.
 Suavi, “Yeni Osmanlılar Tarihi,” Ulûm, v. 15, p. 892. 441
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biography, as Suavi wrote it in exile, and was probably foregrounding elements that he thought 
would appeal to the authorities in providing a defense of his involvement with the Young 
Ottomans, or perhaps appeasing the Khedive in Egypt from whom he was getting support.  In 442
the context of giving a brief account of his political life, Suavi started by noting that his favorite 
religious discipline was ḥadīth, and that he memorized Suyūtī’s small collection (Jāmi‘ al-
Saghīr), and Minawi’s Sharḥ on that collection.  Suavi memorized Daylamī’s collection 443
(Firdaws) as well, and summarized Bukhārī’s Sahih while in Bursa. Apparently, while studying 
ḥadīth, Suavi specifically wrote down in his notebook the Prophet’s statements that severely 
condemned injustice (zulüm).  Suavi considered the Prophet Muhammad’s foremost miracle to 444
be his harsh response to injustice. Suavi claimed that the prophetic statements inculcated in him a 
deep hatred of oppressors, so much so that he would not hesitate attacking the oppressor even if 
that meant being killed in the process.  This self-fulfilling prophecy eventually came true when 445
Suavi sought justice for the Muslim population of Philippopolis, and became involved in the 
Çırağan Palace incident in 1878 where he was murdered by the palace security. 
 In his autobiography, Suavi also described his relationship with one of his patrons, 
Mustafa Fazil Pasha. Suavi claimed that he first heard about Mustafa Fazil Pasha, who had 
asserted that it was his right to be the khedive of Egypt, and contested ‘Abbas’s succession, 
while traveling in the Balkans. Suavi heard that Fazil Pasha had told the Sultan that unless he 
 Suavi burned some of his documents, and in fact his wife also burned some of his documents, raising suspicion 442
that he may have erased certain networks and connections. Çelik points out that Suavi was getting some funding 
from the Khedive while publishing Ulûm. See Çelik, Ali Suavi ve Dönemi.
 Muhammad ‘Abd al-Ra’uf al-Mināwī, Fayḍ al-Qadīr Sharḥ al-Jāmi‘ al-Saghīr.443
 Suavi, Ulûm, v. 15, p. 896.444
 Suavi, Ulûm, v. 15, p. 896-897.445
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saves the state by reforming its system of administration, he would be the last sultan of the 
Ottoman dynasty.  Suavi was enamored by Fazil Pasha’s bluntness, and pointed out that he 446
prayed for him whenever he had the opportunity to make a public supplication. However, it 
seems that Suavi wanted to dissociate himself from the Pasha, and thus voiced only sympathy for 
the Pasha. If that was the case, then, it appears that Suavi attracted some attention from Fazil 
Pasha after he began his journalistic writings.  
 It appears that Suavi’s preaching had made him popular enough that one of the 
entrepreneurs in the field of printing asked him to take charge of a new periodical. While 
teaching at Şehzâde Mosque in Istanbul, an Armenian by the name of Filip told Suavi through an 
intermediary named Tevfik Efendi that he was about to publish a newspaper (the future Muhbir), 
and requested that he become the lead writer.  Suavi claimed he recommended that Tevfik write 447
the newspaper, and that he only agreed to contribute some articles occasionally. Suavi 
acknowledged he was the sole author of the newspaper’s first issue, and asserted that he supplied 
the newspaper with some articles later on. Suavi also stated that his purpose in getting involved 
in the newspaper business was to destroy the archaic language of the national newspapers. 
Accordingly he presented his writing in Muhbir as the last and the best in a line of Ottoman 
newspapers, including Takvim-i Vekâyi, Ceride-i Havâdis, Tercümân-ı Ahvâl, and Tasvir-i Efkâr, 
 Suavi, Ulûm, pp. 907-908.446
 Suavi also preached on Fridays, and so was well known. The fact that a preacher was considered as having a 447
potential for drawing a large readership is in itself interesting, and shows how new technology relies on the older or 
more conventional media in order to produce content and audience. In fact, the relationship between preaching and 
printing was made clear in various writings on the impact of periodicals (Mecmua-i Fünûn [Journal of Sciences], 
and Ahmed Midhat in Tercümân-ı Hakikât [Translator of the Truth]).
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which gradually broke away from the older style of writing. Suavi maintained that he destroyed 
the old language, and brought freedom of expression to the country.   448
 Muhbir published a letter by Fazil Pasha in one of its issues that, notwithstanding his 
acknowledgement of his prior sympathy for Fazil Pasha, Suavi rejected accusations that he 
translated and published this letter, which was originally published in the Nord, a newspaper 
from Belgium. Suavi claimed that Filip, the owner of the newspaper, had commissioned the 
translation without his prior knowledge.  However, the Sublime Porte, Suavi claimed, wrongly 449
attributed this act to him, and henceforward he was known as a follower of Fazil Pasha. To 
emphasize his detachment, Suavi alleged that he rejected a meeting with Fazil Pasha’s servant 
(kethüda). Soon after this incident, Suavi published an article on the castle of Belgrade, and was 
involved in arranging an aid campaign for Crete. Both of these places were going through 
political turmoil.  All of these political writings resulted in Suavi’s banishment to Kastamonu, a 450
city in northern Anatolia in March 1867 (mid-Zilkade 1283 AH). Curiously, it was through Fazil 
Pasha’s invitation, financial support, and logistical arrangements that Suavi was able to escape to 
Paris three months later. 
 Fazil Pasha also arranged for the escape of two other Young Ottomans, Namık Kemal and 
Ziya Bey, together with another person, to Europe. There they were supposed to print a journal in 
 Suavi, Ulûm, p. 908. In another article Suavi asserted that for a successful political journal or newspaper, a 448
simple language was key, money was important, and readership was crucial. And for the readership the journal was 
supposed to have an ideology. He gave the example of his own journal Ulûm, which was defending parliament 
(millet meclisi) and the senate or council of the community’s elite (şuray-ı nevab-ı ümmet). Unless a political 
newspaper adheres to a political idea (an ideology), it cannot survive (Ulûm, v. 15, p. 879). From this description we 
can see that he considers his journal as a political newspaper.
 Suavi, Ulûm, p. 910.449
 Suavi, Ulûm, pp. 910-911.450
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Paris, critical of the Ottoman government. Due to the planned visit of Sultan Abdulaziz to the 
Exposition Universelle set to take place that same year (1867), Suavi and his comrades had to 
leave for London due to intensified French circumspection. There Suavi published a newspaper 
entitled Mukhbir, so as to be reminiscent of the one in Istanbul. Fazil Pasha made arrangements 
to meet with the Sultan during the latter’s visit to Europe that year. After the meeting, the Sultan 
allowed Fazil Pasha to return to Istanbul, and appointed him a minister soon afterward. Ali Suavi 
apparently did not produce a newspaper to the taste of his fellow Young Ottomans, and as a 
result his financial support dried up. He was also upset with Fazil Pasha for making peace with 
the Ottoman government, and became critical of Young Ottomans and Fazil Pasha. It was in this 
context that Suavi started a new journal entitled Ulûm Gazettes. 
 Suavi published Ulûm after he returned to Paris from London. This time, Suavi did not 
have the support of Fazil Pasha. Lacking this financial support to acquire a press, Suavi 
published Ulûm using lithography. Ali Suavi presented his new publication as a journal that dealt 
with scientific and theological issues, perhaps trying to distance himself from his earlier work, 
which was assumed to be a mouthpiece of the Young Ottomans.  The journal included various 451
issues and themes ranging from political economy, contemporary history, philosophy, philology, 
geology, mathematics, matters concerning popular religious themes, and crafts such as printing. 
The periodical was supposed to defend theological matters, however such issues did not take up 
a considerable amount of space in the journal. 
 In a later advertisement (p. 232) Suavi announced that his journal contained scientific issues, and that in future 451
the journal will include pictures as he continues writing on the sciences and arts. Suavi added that he will write 
paraphrases or reviews (talikat) of books written by ulema (probably using it here in the technical/terminological 
sense). Suavi also mentioned that he acquired a press with letters, and would soon publish with type letters. In this 
advertisement Suavi also stated that he would take on the task of translating Kashshāf Istilāhāt al-Funūn for 
whoever desires to take on its printing as well as its profit. (Dated 5 Cemaziye’l-Uhra 1286 AH/September 12, 1869)
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 Ulûm is interesting as it reflects the impact of all three elements that I’ve mentioned, 
namely contemporary European political and orientalist discourses, Islamic-Ottoman discursive 
tradition, and contemporary Ottoman realities. Suavi’s articles show that sciences, religion, and 
politics were enmeshed or entangled, as discussions on sciences entailed political and religious 
matters, and vice versa. The following topics in the journal demonstrate how these categories 
were intertwined as they were being reconstituted. 
Orientalism, Racism, Nationalism and Science: Ali Suavi on Sciences in 
the Ottoman-Islamic History 
 Ali Suavi’s first article in Ulûm, entitled “The Turk,” is indicative of the major themes 
preoccupying him in this journal and beyond: science, religion, politics, and language. In the 
article Suavi was at pains to prove the Turkish contribution to political and scientific thought. It 
is clear that the article and the journal were reactions to European Orientalist and racist 
discourses, as evidenced by Suavi’s first sentence: “There is an issue of race in Europe 
(Avrupada râs meselesi var), in other words, it is believed that in order to judge a people’s 
(kavim, ethnic group) capabilities and potentials attention should be paid to the branch [of races] 
to which it belongs.”  It is noteworthy that Suavi did not translate the word “race,” rather he 452
provided the transliteration followed by a brief explanation of the word. This in itself is 
important, as it demonstrates that there were in fact themes and issues that Ottomans were 
encountering in European discourses that they were unfamiliar with and thus, transliterated such 
 Suavi, Ulûm, p. 1.452
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key concepts into Ottoman Turkish. Suavi’s article and his interest in the issue stemmed from the 
European intellectuals’ representation of Turks as a rude heroic nation lacking in intellectual 
capabilities.  Suavi set out to prove them wrong, beginning with the definition of Turk. In this 453
effort to define the Turk, Suavi relied on European sources, or as some scholars asserted, perhaps 
solely relied on A. Lumley Davids’ Grammar of the Turkish Language.  As I will indicate 454
below, Suavi responded to Orientalist charges by adopting their construction of race as a 
category of thought. Yet despite his criticism of Orientalist charges against Turks, Suavi was 
indeed participating in racial discourse by reproducing Turks as a category along the lines of 
European Orientalist-racist thinking. Yet despite this apology, which ensnares him in the web of 
such racist discourses, Suavi did also entertain a more nuanced approach to the issue of race 
owing to Islamic discursive thought. 
 After enumerating the names and works of Turkish and Ottoman scholars in a number of 
fields including law and astronomy, Suavi interestingly pointed out that Turks had knowledge of 
European languages such as French, Latin, and English, and had translated books from these 
languages in the past but more so in the contemporary period. Similarly, Suavi noted that 
Europeans translated books from Arabic and Turkish into Latin, French, Italian, and English. 
Though, this nuanced approach seems to challenge the dichotomy between East and West by 
showing a transmission of knowledge between Turkish and European languages, this is not 
 An example of such view, as reported by Suavi, was Lamartine’s depiction of Turks as a great eastern nation that 453
lacked a knowledge of politics. Ulûm, p. 15.
 Ercüment Kuran, “Ottoman Historiography of the Tanzimat Period,” in Historians of the Middle East, eds. B. 454
Lewis and P. M. Holt (1962) p. 428. cf. Tanpınar for selective approach of Suavi to Lumley’s Grammar (19. Asir 
Turk Edebiyatı, p. 220). Arthur L. Davids, A Grammar of the Turkish Language: With a Preliminary Discourse on 
the Language and Literature of the Turkish Nations, a Copious Vocabulary, Dialogues, a Collection of Extracts in 
Prose and Verse, and Lithographed Specimens of Various Ancient and Modern Manuscripts (London: Parbury & 
Allen, 1832).
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explicitly stated. However, it does suggest that Suavi had a more complex approach to Turkish 
contributions to science, yet he was overwhelmed by the Orientalist-European structure of 
thinking.   455
 At the same time he criticized European Orientalists or intellectuals, Suavi also quoted 
them, sometimes even the same figures, as authorities to support his own arguments when their 
views reflected well on the Ottomans and Muslims. For instance, in responding to the 
widespread Orientalist and European depictions of the Ottoman Empire as politically dull and 
despotic, Suavi declared that the Ottoman government was established on good morals, and that 
there was nothing higher in the Ottoman government than the shari‘a and the law (kanun).  456
Suavi asserted that there were no despots (cebbar) in the Ottoman dynasty, defining a despot as a 
ruler who considered himself above the law. As further evidence to the anti-despotic system of 
the Ottoman Empire, Suavi mentioned the mechanism of khal‘ (deposing the ruler) in Ottoman 
law, which was exercised by the viziers and the community of scholars. He also quoted François-
René de Chateaubriand to the effect that due to this system of dismissal the Ottoman state had a 
limited constitutional government.   457
 Suavi concluded his article by stating that it was clear that the Turks’ power of cognition 
was capable of scientific effort. Unlike the Europeans who attributed sciences to Arabs, Suavi 
claimed that they were mostly a product of Turkish and Eastern people. Suavi alleged that Arabs 
for the most part became storytellers, and that there were few scholars among them, referencing 
 In another series of articles on the history of thought, Suavi conveniently adopted the Orientalist division of East 455
and West, thus writing a history of philosophy in the West and the East.
 Suavi, Ulûm, p. 15.456
 Suavi, Ulûm, p. 15.457
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Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah and Katip Celebi’s Kasfh al-Ẓunūn.  As another article of his on 458
Turkish language indicates, Suavi was responding to a claim by some Orientalists that Turks, 
Persians, and Indians did not contribute to science, since they lacked such contributions in their 
(vernacular) languages. Suavi differentiated between Arabic as a language of Arabs and Arabic 
as a language of Islam and the sciences.  The latter, he maintained, was constructed by non-459
Arabs as a medium for uniting various Muslim nations to avoid divisions and conflicts.  All of 460
these arguments indicate that Suavi was responding to Orientalist scientific racism,  which 461
pitted various Eastern nations against each other and causing rivalries and divisions among them. 
As he was challenging these generalizations, Suavi was also taking part in the racist and 
nationalist discourses, as illustrated by his whole apology for the Turkish contribution to science. 
 Despite his efforts to defend Turkish and Ottoman history against European Orientalist 
representation, Suavi agreed that contemporary Ottomans were lagging behind in science. He 
believed that was due to two mistakes. The first was that for the sake of calligraphers, the 
printing press was limited to publishing non-Islamic books, which prevented this technology 
from flourishing in the Ottoman Empire. This mistake gave Europeans an upper hand by which 
they surpassed the Ottomans by essentially publishing and distributing more books. The second 
mistake was sending students to Europe, rather than opening schools in the Ottoman Empire and 
 See Katip Çelebi, Kashf, v.1 p. 54 (also claimed that Arabs were not given any philosophical sciences, cf. ibid. p. 458
55).
 Suavi, Ulûm, pp. 124-125.459
 Interestingly, Ali Suavi claimed that it was not the Qur’an or religion that made Arabic the language of Islam and 460
the language of sciences, but rather the idea of uniting various Muslim nations and ethnicities against the disruptive 
danger of national and ethnic divisions. Suavi, Ulûm, p. 129.
 For a discussion and analysis of European scientific racism, see Said, Orientalism.461
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attracting scholars to these schools. In fact, the government did open schools in the Ottoman 
Empire, and those sent to Europe for study probably constituted a very small fraction of students 
educated in the new schools in the Ottoman Empire. Suavi concluded the piece by prophesying 
that Oriental people would acquire European know-how and further improve it, again taking for 
granted another European imaginary construction of dividing a whole set of peoples in the world 
into Orient and Occident. 
 Suavi’s short but significant article on the Turk indicates that Ottoman discussions on 
science emerged together with European racist, nationalist and Orientalist discourses. In 
criticizing Orientalist representations of Islamic and Arabic intellectual history, some Ottoman 
Turkish scholars such as Suavi were also adopting the nationalist discourses and hence producing 
an apologetic intellectual history that would influence the later historiography as well. 
Furthermore, the article shows how an Ottoman scholar familiar with the Ottoman-Islamic 
tradition and European history relies on all of these sources while connecting sciences, nations, 
and languages. Yet being raised in a different discursive tradition, i.e. that of Islam, Suavi was at 
times able to challenge such constructions as shown by his note on transfer of knowledge 
between Turkish and European languages via translation. Another example of his counter-
narrative on the Islamic history of sciences was inserted in his defense of al-Ghazālī’s place in 
this history.  
 Living in Paris at the time and engaging with the Société Asiatique,  Suavi probably 462
heard or read Ernest Renan’s criticism of al-Ghazālī, or other such reiterations, which basically 
claimed that after the twelfth century, sciences declined in the Islamic world due to al-Ghazālī’s 
 Suavi actually sent the Asiatic Society of Paris a copy of the journal, and published a letter sent by the secretary 462
of the journal signed by the Orientalist Barbier de Meynard.
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attack on philosophers.  Suavi wrote a few articles in defense of al-Ghazālī’s criticism of 463
philosophy and introduced al-Ghazālī’s complete oeuvre. In this context, Suavi provided one of 
the earliest rejections of the decline paradigm.  Suavi asserted that since Europeans viewed 464
Islamic sciences (Islam ulûmu) as Arabic science (Arab ulûmu), they only studied the 
developments up until the collapse of Baghdad (in 1258), and those who went further, only 
studied the output of scholars in al-Andalus. For instance, with regard to astronomy, Europeans 
appreciated caliph al-Ma’mūn’s efforts in establishing an observatory, and making precise 
measurements in the desert. However, according to Suavi, al-Ma’mūn’s effort was only the 
beginning, and that there were superior astronomical instruments in al-Andalus as well as in 
Maragha. Moreover, Suavi noted that the instruments used by Ibn al-Shatir (d. 1375) made the 
previous instruments seem rather heavy and inaccurate. Even during the later period in 
Samarqand, Ulugh Bey’s observatory, and Jamshid’s astronomical instruments, and Ali Qushji’s 
astronomy require further study.  Suavi contended that if the research were to be extended to 465
the Ottoman period with the study of Taqi al-Dīn al-Rāsid (d. 1585) and the instruments he 
invented as well as the examination of the succeeding works by Kadizâde, Mirim Çelebi, Ibn 
Müeyyed et al., it would show that the sciences were progressing and new inventions were being 
made (terakki ve ihtira) in Islam up until a century ago (meaning 12th century AH, roughly the 
eighteenth century).  Suavi added that for Ottomans, the Islamic sciences leading up to Ibn 466
 For a description and critique of this perspective see Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of European 463
Renaissance.
 Suavi, “er-Redd ala men redde’l-Ghazali,” Ulûm, pp. 342-389.464
 Suavi, “er-Redd ala men redde’l-Ghazali,” Ulûm, pp. 347.465
 Suavi, Ulûm, p. 348.466
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Khaldun’s time, which were known to Europeans, were nothing but mere prerequisite 
knowledge. Suavi claimed that the Ottomans significantly developed the sciences that they had 
received from previous Islamic polities. Suavi concluded that those studying Islamic sciences 
should not ignore the Ottoman period, especially the era following the conquest of Istanbul 
(1453).  467
 Suavi’s criticism of the European historiography of Islamic or Arab sciences shows an 
early rejection of the decline paradigm. It is not clear whether Suavi relied on any of his 
contemporaries with regard to this alternative reading of the history of Islamic sciences in the 
post-Khaldunian period. It is possible that a widely read man such as Suavi had access to 
Cevdet’s translation of Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah. In any case, this shows that Cevdet was not 
alone in attempting to write a history of Islamic sciences that depicted Ottomans in a more 
positive way. Suavi’s historiography is a bit different from that of Cevdet in regards to the period 
of stagnation. According to Suavi, Muslim Ottomans were productive until the nineteenth 
century. However, Cevdet followed the Ottoman perceptions of decline, which (a la Katip 
Çelebi) considered the removal of sciences from medreses in the seventeenth century as the 
beginning of the decline in sciences. Suavi’s narrative of the sciences shows how being 
immersed in Islamic discursive tradition he was able to challenge European Orientalist 
historiography. Suavi treated al-Ghazālī in a manner that was more balanced. He actually put al-
Ghazālī on the same level as Kant and Hegel based on al-Ghazālī’s criticism of metaphysics.   468
 Suavi, “er-Redd ala men redde’l-Ghazali,” Ulûm, p. 348.467
 Suavi was not alone in appreciating al-Ghazālī’s critique of metaphysics; Ahmed Midhat, who will be introduced 468
shortly, also supported al-Ghazālī’s position. For Ahmed Midhat’s positive reception of al-Ghazali, see his Islam ve 
Fünûn, published together with Niza‘-ı İlm u Din as a commentary. The latter is a translation of Draper’s History of 
Conflict between Religion and Science.
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 As we can see from the first article, discourses on nations were tied to their scientific 
capabilities. In fact, European colonial powers treated and categorized the rest of the world 
according to how well they produced science. Europeans saw themselves at the zenith of 
scientific production, and thus always discussed non-Europeans as lacking the high level of 
sciences achieved in Europe. This in return reassured them their superiority and legitimacy in 
dominating and exploiting the rest of the world. Perhaps that is one reason that Ottoman 
intellectuals were adamant about spreading science, and that is why discussions of various 
subjects entailed blueprints for remedying the situation.   469
 Suavi’s articles on disciplines such as geology, mathematics etc. also included theological 
and cultural issues. For instance, his treatise on mathematics makes use of a dialogue between a 
Westernist friend and a synthesizer (Suavi himself) of the old and the new. This article provoked 
a response from a Young Ottoman who claimed that he was the person used as a token in the 
article.  Another article on geological findings also raises theological implication of that 470
knowledge. In short, matters that were increasingly being considered as strictly separate from 
religious and political issues were indeed quite interwoven as these articles demonstrate.  
 In another essay concerning the alphabet and writing, Suavi used the dialogue format (he 
used especially Q&A, es’ile and ecvibe) in order to discuss the benefits of reforming the 
alphabet. The questioner appreciated Suavi’s brief history of the alphabet and writing, stating that 
it would be clear to everybody reading it that they would not be making a bad innovation (bid’at-
 For a study of such Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Blueprints for a Future Society: Late Ottoman Materialists on Science 469
Religion and Arts,” in Elisabeth Özdalga, Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2005).
 Çelik, Ali Suavi ve Dönemi, p. 209.470
                                                                                                                                       
 209
ı seyyie) if they reformed (ıslah) their writing or alphabet (hat), and that in fact it would be a 
good innovation (bid’at-i hasene) based on the good example set by the predecessors (eslaf). In 
response to the questioner, Suavi confirmed that reforming writing and the alphabet was a good 
deed (emr-i hasene), however, he warned that in discussing such matters one should avoid using 
religious terminologies such as bid’a (innovation) since this word, in the terminology of shari’a, 
refers to forging something that is not in the religion (din). However, Suavi maintained that such 
issues as writing have nothing to do with religious matters (umûr-ı diniye), rather they belonged 
to worldly matters. He further claimed that worldly matters could be transformed or changed if 
there was a need to do so. Suavi concluded the issue by quoting the Prophet: “You are more 
knowledgeable in your worldly matters.”   471
 Upon hearing this, the questioner invited Suavi to destroy the alphabet. Suavi asked about 
his intent. The interlocutor wished to replace the Arabic script in order to make it easier for 
people to grasp it faster and with ease, just as Europeans were able to learn their alphabet in ten 
days. Changing the alphabet would make it easier to “spread sciences” (neşr-i ulûm ve maârif), 
so claimed the interlocutor.  Suavi confirmed that there were indeed other people (zevat) who 472
were of the same thought. However, Suavi responded that the desire to destroy something is 
either due to imitation (taklid) or whim (heves). Suavi also rejected the claim that it was easier to 
learn the European alphabet, citing English as an example. In English, the same vowel “a” is 
pronounced differently in each of these, “far, fat, fate, fall, warm, arise,” which makes it 
 Suavi, Ulûm, p. 219.471
 Suavi, Ulûm, p. 220.472
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challenging for students to learn.  From the above article and the preceding ones, Suavi 473
portrayed himself as a moderate synthesizer of the old and the new. Of particular interest to this 
chapter are the entangled subject matter of his articles. Suavi did not just transmit mathematical 
or geological knowledge, but rather presented such knowledge together with religious and 
political issues of the time. In doing so he also made a case for preserving existing knowledge 
(hifẓ al-mawjūd), and encouraged seeking the knowledge that was lacking (ṣayd al-mafqūd). 
Suavi, on the new regulations concerning education 
 In addition to the above-mentioned subjects, Suavi also included in the journal of Ulûm 
his opinion pieces on contemporary developments in the Ottoman Empire. Among these 
commentaries, Suavi’s article on the new regulations on public education is helpful in 
considering how a late Ottoman intellectual viewed changes in the relationship between the state 
and sciences in the modern period. Suavi’s article consists of five points regarding education 
throughout Ottoman history, and provides a critique of the contemporary reforms. First of all, 
Suavi pointed out that seeking knowledge was mandatory for each and every Muslim, hence, in 
the preceding centuries the Ottoman state did not have to mandate education for all.  In other 474
words, the Muslim community voluntarily sought education, which provided a precedent for the 
new policy of spreading education among the population. Secondly, Suavi asserted that 
traditionally there were two institutions of knowledge, namely mekteb-i sıbyân (primary 
 This example was used in the imperial dictionary. Perhaps it was one of the examples through which Suavi 473
learned the nuances of English pronunciation.
 Suavi, Ulûm, p. 390. I should note that Suavi was reformulating the idea of “ilm-i hâl” (the science of 474
conditions), which originally referred to a corpus of religious knowledge consisting of beliefs and practices that each 
Muslim had to acquire. Suavi added the knowledge of the conditions of this world, expanding the concept to include 
secular sciences.
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schools), and medreses, that were widespread in the Empire up until that time (1869), suggesting 
that public education was well established in the earlier periods.  Thirdly, according to Suavi, 475
the government did not spend any money on mektebs and medreses in previous periods, as the 
people themselves funded these schools.  Suavi’s fourth point emphasized the fact that until the 476
modern period, people were free in choosing primary school teachers, medrese professors, and 
preachers; the government did not interfere in these appointments, nor did it interfere with the 
textbooks.  Lastly, Suavi stated that the government left the various non-Muslim communities 477
free in language and education (teaching science). Suavi noted that Europeans were mistaken in 
their belief that the Ottoman government was “sectarian” until it established a commission for 
public education (maârif-i umûmiye heyeti teşkiline değin). Suavi rejected this view, asserting 
that the Ottoman state did not intervene in matters of education in general. The Muslims’ relative 
success in sciences, in times past, was due to efforts of the community, not the state.   478
 Suavi’s reflections on the occasion of the new governmental regulations on education 
shows that the state was becoming the dominant agent in the matters of science. All of his points 
contrasted with the contemporary governmental practice, which was controlling education to an 
unprecedented extent. It is noteworthy that Suavi viewed the modern institutions as being more 
sectarian due to their centralizing ambitions. In other words, while in times past various religious 
 There were one thousand and fifty five primary schools in Istanbul in 1197AH, according to the report on the big 475
fire of Istanbul. During the reign of Sultan Mustafa III, there were two hundred and seventy five medreses in 
Istanbul. Suavi claimed that there were more than four hundred and sixty medreses in Istanbul at the time of his 
writing (Ulûm, p. 392). I should note that medreses had very few students. For instance, a report on the medreses of 
Istanbul during Hamidian period names many medreses, but there were not more than a few students residing in 
each one of them.
 Suavi, Ulûm, p. 393-394.476
 Suavi, Ulûm, p. 394.477
 Suavi, Ulûm, p. 395.478
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communities were free to teach their languages and educate their children, in the nineteenth 
century the government increasingly interfered with such education by promulgating regulations. 
This effectively allowed the state to impinge on the autonomy of the millets. This is further 
evidence that the state was increasingly imposing limitations on sciences by controlling the 
institutions of learning. 
 During the Hamidian period, the state was increasingly overseeing matters of education. 
Examples of state control over education can be seen in Fortna’s Imperial Classroom. Fortna 
notes an inventory containing Zühdü Pasha’s report (from 1890s) that schools abide by certain 
requirements, such as “obtaining certificates for teachers, gaining approval for lesson plans as 
well as books to be taught, and being open to the state inspection.”  Fortna states that "these 479
were prerequisites for obtaining permission to operate”, the purpose being to prevent lessons 
incompatible with the etiquette and politics.  In short, the case of schools, and the curriculum 480
of study are quite similar to state intervention in printing publications.  
 The courses taught in the higher institutions of learning were mostly of natural and 
mathematical sciences. There were very few religious or morality courses in higher education. 
Hence, the more educated one became the less one would study religious disciplines. This, I 
argue, also contributed to an understanding of science as being exclusive of religion. Of course, 
the government was worried about the content of the courses, especially so in schools controlled 
by the various religious communities. Therefore, inspections and regulations were instruments 
for controlling the population, and in turn separating science from politics and religion.  
 Fortna, Imperial Classroom, p. 78.479
 Fortna, Imperial Classroom, p. 78.480
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“God is the sovereign”: Towards an Ottoman-Islamic Political Theology 
 Though Suavi’s journal was supposed to focus on sciences, it incorporated discussions of 
various other issues including politics. In fact, in his article on newspapers in France, Suavi 
stated that propagating a cause was key for a newspaper to succeed and endure. In this regard, he 
presented his journal Ulûm as a political newspaper that defended the idea of assembly and a 
senate comprised of the community’s elite (umma).  In a number of articles, Suavi discussed 481
political issues that show how this domain was being reconstructed against religion.  
 In a series of articles on politics, entitled al-Ḥākim huwallāh (God is the Sovereign), Ali 
Suavi presented various summaries of political thought in Islamic history, which also contained a 
bibliography of texts on this topic. In his attempt to carve out an Islamic literary body of political 
thought, Ali Suavi subsumed a variety of genres including Islamic law (fiqh) and ethics and 
morality (akhlaq) underneath the term politics.  In fact, it seems that a new conception of the 482
“politics” was being forged that encompassed a wide range of themes and issues. The domain of 
politics, which was very limited in the previous periods, was being enlarged exponentially in the 
nineteenth century. Perhaps the rise of political economy in Europe played a key role in this new 
understanding of politics.  In any case, although Suavi attempted to show the existence of 483
 Ulûm, v. 15, p. 879. In other contexts, Suavi noted that his journal dealt with ulûm, i.e. science, and on this 481
occasion he confessed that it had a political purpose. This shows that depending on the context, Suavi emphasized 
various aspects of the journal.
 Suavi, Ulûm, pp. 135-148.482
 Possibly this expansion of the political looms behind Foucault’s idea of governmentality and biopolitical power. 483
See Michel Foucault et al., Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1977-78 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); idem. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège De France, 
1978-79 (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
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politics in a variety of discourses, in doing so he extracted them from the sphere of religious 
disciplines and rendered them as part and parcel of the fledgling field of political thought. In 
other words, a new sense of the political was being constructed, although this was not totally 
new, as previous Muslim philosophers considered Islamic disciplines such as fiqh and kalām as 
the religious counterparts of practical philosophy.  The work entailed a conceptual translation 484
that reduced one discourse to another, thus completely uprooting the former out of its context. By 
equating practices and discourses that were traditionally in the purview of the religious 
disciplines with those of the political, Suavi reduced the former to the latter. This is actually not 
unlike the transformation in European political thought as seen in Carl Schmitt’s essay “Political 
Theology.”  Schmitt pointed out the resemblance between theological concepts of sovereign 485
god and miracles with that of political sovereignty and the state of exception.  
 With regard to this issue as well, Suavi was caught in the web of those very Orientalist 
and European discourses he attempted to counter with a positive image of Islamic political 
history. Perhaps he did this to show that unlike the negative and pessimistic discourses he was 
encountering in Europe, Islamic history had a potential for modern political thought and 
institutions. In an article entitled “Political Power in Islamic States,” Suavi asked whether that 
power was material or spiritual, absolute or constitutional (literally limited), and whether divine 
 The first scholar, to my knowledge, who made such a connection was al-Fārābī. Katip Çelebi stated that Muslim 484
scholars neglected practical philosophy due to the fact that shari’a covers them. Akkirmani’s introduction to his 
translation of Qadi Mir’s commentary on Hidāyat al-Ḥikma of al-Abharī also made similar claims. What is new in 
the nineteenth century is the attempt to find in Islamic history institutions or discourses similar to contemporary 
Western practices.
 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 485
1985).
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judgments formed the basis of law.  This question seems to have been animated by European 486
conversations, as Suavi sidestepped the issue on the grounds that it would require a long 
historical analysis. Suavi briefly noted some contemporary European discussions on politics by 
Chateaubriand, d’Ohsohn and Montesquieu. Suavi rejected Chateaubriand and his ilk as being 
merely poetical, citing Chateaubriand’s brief statement that compared the palace of the Sultan to 
a kind of prison that housed injustice and was surrounded by hopeless guards circumambulating 
the idol (sultan). Suavi thought of d’Ohsohn and Montesquieu as representatives of a more 
serious discourse in Europe. As an Orientalist, the former was considered an authority on Islamic 
political thought while the latter was presented as an authority on political thought in general. 
Suavi represented their views as either locating despotism in the military faction of Islamic 
states, or considering political power in Islamic states as a counterpart of the clerical power in 
Europe.  487
 In his response to these European and Orientalist discourses on politics in Islamic states, 
Suavi dismissed any religious significance attached to the word caliph. Growing up, in Istanbul, 
as a Muslim, he claimed that he did hear other Muslims using the word caliph, but they never 
invoked religious or clerical authority as assumed by Europeans. According to Suavi, the word 
merely meant successor.  Suavi even contended that the meaning of caliphate (successor) could 488
be either positive or negative, thus making room for the use of the word in a negative, and 
 Suavi stated “Düvel-i İslamiyede kudret-i siyasiye cismani mi ruhani mi? Mutlak mı mukayyed mi? Ve esas-ı 486
kanun ahkam-ı ilahiye mi?” in “Kudret-i Siyasiye der Düvel-i İslamiye,” Ulûm, Volume 16, p. 981.
 Ulûm, pp. 982-983.487
 Suavi, Ulûm, pp. 984-985. For a discussion of caliphate in the late Ottoman period, see Ş. Tufan Buzpınar, The 488
Question of Caliphate under the Last Ottoman Sultans, in Yiṣḥāq Waysman, and Butrus Abu-Manneh. 2005. 
Ottoman Reform and Muslim Regeneration: Studies in Honour of Butrus Abu-Manneh. London [u.a.]: Tauris. pp. 
17-36.
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possibly subversive, sense. Even in Islamic terminology, there was a division between a perfect 
and imperfect caliphate. Therefore, there was no consensus that caliph signified holiness, 
sublimeness etc.  After rejecting the notion that the idea of caliphate, and even the title amir al-489
mu’minīn (commander of the faithful), held any religious significance, Suavi drew attention to 
Westernized Ottomans (lit. “the products of the Franks”), who were supposedly trying to adopt 
constitutionalism without damaging the ideas of a sacred caliphate (emphasis by Suavi). Suavi 
was afraid that in their attempt to do good, these “translators of Franks” would end up 
introducing to Islam the idea of a sacred caliphate (hilafet-i mukaddese).  Suavi ended the 490
discussion by noting that a European scholar by the name of Monsieur Obisini (?) had noticed 
that the caliphate was not sacred, stating as such in the first volume [of his book?].  This final 491
orientalist source raises my suspicion that Suavi’s whole argument itself might be a translation 
from the book mentioned, though this needs further verification. 
 Regardless of whether Suavi translated an Orientalist’s view that was in line with his own 
political discourse, his interactions with the European and Orientalist discourses did totally 
dominate his thought, providing the questions and criticism to which Suavi was responding. Of 
course, it matters whether the puzzle was produced in Europe or in the Ottoman Empire. Though 
solutions might differ, raising questions is perhaps more important than providing the answer. 
Questions in themselves limit the paradigm of thinking; it is only within the frame of the 
question that we can think about the issues. Therefore, Suavi’s insistence on separating religious 
 Ulûm, pp. 985-986. 489
 Ulûm, p. 987.490
 Ulûm, p. 989.491
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and political matters can be read as being informed by questions raised by Orientalists and 
European philosophers. However, I do not wish to reduce his whole discussions to apologetics. 
As mentioned before, there were Ottoman grounds for separating these matters, or relegating 
them to different domains. In any case, given the context of his writing in Paris and his frequent 
responses to the Orientalist and European intellectuals, we can read Suavi’s insistence on 
separating religion and politics as being affected by that context. After all, Suavi provided or 
reiterated some powerful arguments by reconstructing religion and politics as separate objects.  
  
Semi-theologian does not destroy religion 
 Among Suavi’s powerful arguments were his ideas of religious reform. In his article 
entitled, “semi jurist-theologian destroys religion (yarim fakih din yıkar),” Suavi pointed out that 
harmful effect of theologians was true of all religions. Suavi asserted that theologians would 
destroy religion and yet go to the extreme in defending it as if it was not destroyed. However, 
Suavi explained that various beliefs held by Jews and Christians were discarded over time, and 
yet the religion did not die out. Examples included beliefs about the age of the earth, the time of 
the apocalypse, and certain restrictions in daily life.  Although these were completely 492
disregarded overtime, the religion did not die out, rather it was “proven” that the clergy held such 
false beliefs. With regard to Islam, Suavi asserted that some jurists (usuliyyun) derived the rules 
of governing a city (tedbir-i medine), the laws of governing a state, and Islamic law from Abu 
Yusuf’s (one of the two famous students of Abu Hanifa, the eponymous founder of Hanafism) 
Arabic text, which entailed Arabic grammar. In other words, they constructed legal theory (usul 
 Suavi, “Yarım Fakih Din Yıkar” [Half Jurist Destroys Religion], Ulûm, Volume 17, pp. 1025-1027.492
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al-fiqh) from literary and linguistic (edebiye ve kavaid-i Arabiye) sources. However, after 
philosophical sciences and rational experiences emerged, it became obvious that the foundations 
of legal theory were corrupt. Yet, according to Suavi, the building remained as it was, 
sarcastically stating “what a powerful construction.”  Suavi concluded that he had sympathy 493
and respect for Islamic legal theory, but not the kind just mentioned. Rather Suavi preferred 
Islamic legal theory that was based on rational and universal principles exemplified by Ibn al-
Nujaym’s al-Ashbāh wa’l-Nazā’ir. The obsession with rational and universal principles was quite 
modern, and European. Incidentally, this led to the reconfiguration of Islamic law as manifested 
in the state-sponsored project of Majalla.   494
 In the succeeding article, unapologetically entitled “Lets reject laws that are based on 
literary studies,” Suavi bolstered his criticism of uṣūl al-fiqh (the principles of law), because they 
were based on the Arabic linguistic sciences (he drew on Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī’s statement in 
Ḥāshiya Tawāli‘, and Irshād al-Qasid by al-Akfani). According to Suavi, the interpretation of 
religious texts based on such contested issues of language did not provide a firm ground for a 
durable and powerful law, and thus politics that were based on such a law were inherently weak. 
Suavi wished that the earlier generation of Muslim scholars did not mix worldly and 
otherworldly issues by including both of them within law (fiqh) books. This separation, Suavi 
contended, would have made it possible to establish politics based on principles derived from 
such disciplines as geography, political economy, and ethics, making good governance of the 
 Suavi, Ulûm, v. 17, p. 1027.493
 Majalla was a compendium of Islamic legal rules, mainly based on the Hanafī School. It was supposed to be 494
applied all around the Ottoman Empire, and thus obviate casuistry prevalent in the traditional courts. This 
commission was led by none other than Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, the translator of the sixth chapter of Ibn Khaldun’s 
Muqaddima, which I discussed in the previous chapter.
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state possible.  As we can see, Suavi mentions three sources that would have made the politics 495
in Islamic states firmer and, as he claims, more rational. These were all disciplines that had 
emerged or were reinvigorated in Europe, especially political economy. Therefore, his criticism 
of Islamic law and legal theory was informed by contemporary European approaches to politics. 
This confirms my previous suspicion that the domain of politics was expanding due to the 
emergence of political economy. In fact, the European dimension did come up as Suavi 
contrasted East and West with regard to their intellectual occupations. Suavi claimed that while 
Europeans were studying astronomical principles and the causes of wealth and civilization, 
Easterners were busy with such matters as abjad calculations for the purpose of interpreting the 
Qur’an.  Clearly Suavi was being informed by European examples and wanted to transform 496
Islamic law in order to make a new kind of politics possible. 
 These two articles, especially the “semi-theologian” one, show that Suavi was aware of 
the power of later generations in reconstructing religion. Therefore, he proposed some radical 
reforms in Islamic law and legal theory by calling for the separation of worldly and otherworldly 
matters, of religious law and the principles of politics. Instead of relying on the older Islamic 
legal theory, which was based on Arabic linguistics, he proposed, in line with the developments 
in Europe, that law be based on universal and rational principles. It therefore appears that he 
cherry-picked Ibn Nujaym’s book in providing a real legal theory as opposed to the widespread 
Hanafī books that relied on Arabic linguistics (and theology). Moreover, Suavi yet again argued 
 Suavi, Ulûm, v. 17, pp. 1028-1030.495
 Suavi, Ulûm, v. 17, p. 1036.496
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alongside European thought that politics should be based on political economy, geography, and 
ethics.  
 I do not wish to accuse Suavi of being a mere translator of European ideas, as he himself 
has characterized his opponents. It is clear that Suavi engaged traditional texts, but he was also 
deeply informed by Orientalist and European discussions. Possibly it was (and still is) very 
difficult for a modern Muslim intellectual to completely dissociate his/herself from Eurocentric 
ideas of the world. As such, Suavi can be portrayed as a hybrid intellectual who was motivated 
by reform in the Ottoman Empire, while defending it against European Orientalist 
representations. He was not alone in such an ambivalent and ambiguous relationship with the 
Orientalists and Europe. The following section will show how that interaction, together with the 
Islamic tradition, were crucial in rethinking the ideas of science, scientist, and philosopher in the 
late Ottoman Empire.  
Authority to Define “Science”, “Scientist”, and “Philosopher” 
 As we have seen, the state with its various agencies was using its authority to separate 
issues related to science, religion, and politics at the larger scale. The smaller scale discussions 
on these concepts were also not devoid of power relations, as the example of Ali Suavi’s journal, 
Ulûm attests to, as will the correspondence between Ahmed Midhat  and Fatma Aliye, daughter 497
of Cevdet Pasha whose translation of the Muqaddimah was discussed in Chapter Three. The 
 Ahmed Midhat was a famous journalist, active from the late 1860s until a couple years prior to his death in 1912. 497
After receiving a basic primary education, he was mainly self-educated. He worked for Midhat Pasha, and was 
engaged in reforms in the provinces of Tuna, and later Baghdad. During his career, he wrote many novels, printed 
journals and newspapers, and wrote a number of non-fiction works. Ahmed Midhat also translated many books from 
French.
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correspondence indicates that the reconfiguration of concepts such as science, knowledge, and 
philosophy entailed a reconsideration of the ideas of scientist, philosopher, literati etc. In their 
correspondence, Ahmed Midhat and Fatma Aliye were taking on the role of teacher and student 
respectively. In this role, Midhat assumes a more patriarchal voice as he instructs an Ottoman 
lady on the correct meaning of these contested words. 
 The correspondence between Ahmed Midhat and Fatma Aliye consists mostly of the 
former’s letters as preserved among Aliye’s papers.  However, we have some of Fatma Aliye’s 498
letters as well, since Ahmed Midhat published them in his newspaper Tercüman-ı Hakikat. The 
correspondence began with Fatma Aliye’s concerns about publishing her translation of Georges 
Ohnet’s Volonte.  It quickly turned into a discussion on prose and verse. Apparently Fatma 499
Aliye aimed to defend her preoccupation with novels against criticism by men who knew of 
other literary Ottoman women only as poets. Fatma Aliye justified her interest in prose by 
pointing to the shift in the conditions of living. She argued that her epoch was the age of prose 
due to the new hectic lifestyle made possible by the invention of ferries, trains, and telegraphy.  500
Commenting on the change brought about by these technologies, Fatma Aliye remarked that it 
became possible for human beings to be relocated instantly to another place (tayy-i mekan),  as 501
if there was time within time. Fatma Aliye further elaborated on this shift in the conditions of life 
 These were recently published together, in modern Turkish transliteration. See Ahmed Midhat, Fazıl ve Feylesof 498
Kızım [Virtuous and Philosophe Daughter].
 Ahmed Midhat, Fazıl ve Feylesof Kızım, p. 3-4.499
 Ahmed Midhat, Fazıl ve Feylesof Kızım, p. 9.500
 This is actually a Sufi concept that is used to describe the power of saints to move instantly from one part of the 501
world to another, for instance while living in Istanbul, a saint could appear instantly in another location such as 
Mecca. The modern technology made that saintly and miraculous event a commonplace experience through 
telegraphy and faster transportation.
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by providing a glimpse of life in Istanbul at the time. She described how in the morning people 
were rushing to catch the ferry, those exiting the ferry ran either to the post office, or hurried to 
send telegraphs, and many others hastened to catch the tramway, or grab a coach. Fatma Aliye 
also alluded to the daily rapid production and collection of newspaper articles, which forced 
many to endure sleepless nights. Fatma Aliye asked rhetorically how people could find time to 
write in verse amidst this hectic life. In further justifying her occupation with prose, Fatma Aliye 
maintained that many scientific discoveries could not possibly be rendered using the medium of 
verse, which would be ambiguous and hence difficult to understand. Thus, it seems that for 
purposes of clarity, and practicality, prose was the medium of the age.  
 This letter was published in Tercüman-ı Hakikat, a newspaper edited by Ahmed Midhat. 
The following issue of the newspaper included Ahmed Midhat’s article on specialism in which 
he claimed that specialization was the main factor behind progress in both matters of education 
and industry.  Ahmed Midhat asserted that the ancient philosophers (kudema-yı hükema) did 502
not have to specialize, as they were able to learn all sciences by heart. However, due to 
diversification of sciences, it had been almost impossible to master even one science let alone the 
rest of the sciences. Therefore, according to Ahmed Midhat, scholars no longer had to master all 
the sciences in order to be called an âlim (knower, learned man). He claimed that the word âlim 
is no longer a generic title, rather it has to be specified as to which subject matter or science a 
person is an âlim of. Midhat provided an example from natural philosophy, which had been 
divided into mineralogy, botany, and zoology. The stakes get higher as Ahmed Midhat began to 
refer to the specialists of these disciplines as ulema (plural of âlim). The word ulema had an 
 Fazıl ve Feylefos Kızım, p. 5.502
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established usage in the Ottoman context that referred to a class or group within the Ottoman 
state structure. Members of this class were medrese-educated scholars who took on the official 
duties of educational, judiciary, and other religious services provided by state officials. Ahmed 
Midhat invited the reader to imagine a person among the leading ulema who did not know 
mathematics, geometry, cosmography, astronomy etc., but only knew zoology, and asked if they 
would consider taking away his title of âlim. Midhat’s answer was an absolute no. In fact, 
Midhat claimed, that person would be the real âlim.  
 Fatma Aliye considered Midhat’s article on specialism a complement to her previous 
letter, and articulated some of her ideas on various notions, such as allâme, hakîm, mütefennin 
(most learned, philosopher, and literatus) in her response. In turn, Fatma Aliye presented her 
discussion as a complement to Midhat’s article. However, given the nature of the ensuing 
discussion, Fatma Aliye probably was implicitly challenging Ahmed Midhat’s use of the word 
âlim and ulema in referring to specialists. Fatma Aliye asserted that those who were superior to 
their peers in all three fields of religious, literary, and philosophical sciences (hikemiye) were 
considered allâme according to Arab scholars. She acknowledged, however, that this was a rare 
qualification in scholars of the past, and even more so in the contemporary period due to the 
diversification of sciences as exemplified by all the sub-specialties in medicine. Consequently, 
she asserted, there was no one around like Ibn Sina who could master all of the philosophical 
sciences (fünûn-ı hikemiye),  but there were many who surpassed Ibn Sina in each field. Those 503
who mastered all of the philosophical sciences were called hakîm and feylesof (sage and 
philosopher), but they lacked knowledge of literary sciences (fünûn-ı edebiye) as well as 
 Fazıl ve Feylesof Kızım, pp. 11-12.503
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religious sciences (ulûm-ı şeriye).  Those who were masters of all three clusters of sciences 504
were considered allâme, however, an adhesion to various sciences in general would make a 
person mütefennin (literatus). These are intellectuals who knew a little about a lot of sciences. 
Fatma Aliye suggested that there was a need for such literati, and that this level was expected of 
the men of letters. Fatma Aliye asked Ahmed Midhat if he were a specialist whether he could 
have written on various sciences and arts the way he did.  It seems that Fatma Aliye suggested 505
that those who specialized in religious sciences were called âlim, and those specializing in 
philosophical sciences were called hakîm, while specialists of literature were known as 
mütefennin, thus insinuating Midhat’s misuse of the word âlim and ulema. As much as Fatma 
Aliye was discussing these categories, she also hinted that Ahmed Midhat was after all a literatus 
and not an allâme, a master of all sciences. In other words, implicit in all of this, I assert, was a 
criticism of Midhat’s undifferentiated usage of the word âlim and ulema, and also a reminder to 
Ahmed Midhat that he was not an âlim himself, but rather a member of the literati.  
 Ahmed Midhat was provoked by Fatma Aliye’s letter, and in his response he focused on 
the words hakîm, feylesof, and allâme. Ahmed Midhat rejected Fatma Aliye’s view that a hakîm 
(sage or philosopher) was only the master of natural-philosophical sciences. Rather, Ahmed 
Midhat suggested that the meaning of the word encompasses religious matters as well by 
employing the meaning of the word hikmet as used in the Qur’an, and resorting to its lexical 
meaning as explained in the Kamus (Turkish translation of Fīrūz-Ābādī’s well-known 
dictionary). He noted, too, that in Europe literary disciplines also fell under the purview of 
 Fazıl ve Feylesof Kızım, p. 12.504
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philosophy, which could be a defense against the implication that he was a mere literatus, and not 
a philosopher. Hence, Ahmed Midhat implied that the word allâme and hakîm were 
interchangeable.  Ahmed Midhat went on to discuss the meaning of philosopher, drawing 506
attention to its original meaning as the lover of reason and knowledge. Accordingly, he declared 
the word feylesof (Turkish for philosopher) synonymous with the word allâme by yet again 
reverting to philological origins.  To put it differently, the main strategy used by Ahmed Midhat 507
in arguing for a more encompassing meaning of hakîm and feylesof beyond their established 
terminological meaning was to return to their lexical meanings, and thus reconstructing them to 
challenge the established terminological uses inherited from earlier periods. In the process, he 
forged a new signified more appropriate for his purposes.  
 Ahmed Midhat did not limit himself to appropriating the ancient meanings of such words 
as philosopher, learned man, etc. He also relied on the philosophers of the European 
enlightenment, in particular Diderot, whom Midhat introduced as the leader of the virtuous 
(reisü’l-fuzala, yet another term used liberally) under whose leadership hundreds of learned men 
(âlim), the most learned men (allâme), sages (hakim), and philosophers (feylesof) gathered, a 
reference to the writers of the Grande Encyclopédie. Ahmed Midhat claimed that according to 
this group, “science (ilim)” is knowledge (bilgi). A learned man (âlim) only expresses what he 
knows. Therefore, an âlim is only a reporter. Examples of such learned men (âlim) include a 
historian transmitting reports, a judge stating what kind of punishment is to be given for a certain 
 Fazıl ve Feylesof Kızım, pp. 15-17.506
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crime, and a geometer stating the measurement of a distance etc.  The most learned man 508
(allâme) was the person who could report knowledge in all of these specialties, and a hakim or 
feylesof would not only be able to judge the level of truth and falsehood in such reported 
knowledge,  but would also consider the reason or causes that made it the truth. Ahmed Midhat 509
concluded this discussion with a reference to Voltaire, who was reported as stating that for 
human beings science (ilim) is only accessible in the realm of possibility, and that for a 
philosopher (hakîm) also it is only the realm of contingency where he could seek proofs.  After 510
confining ilim to mean the knowledge of particulars, Ahmed Midhat preferred being an âlim or 
allâme (scientist) to being a hakîm (philosopher). In line with the positivist spirit of the age, he 
asked whether one could admit as science such claims as “in my view,” “in your view,” “in our 
view.”  511
 Ahmed Midhat’s definition of ilim as the knowledge of particulars rather than universals 
was actually contrary to pre-modern Islamic philosophical conceptions of ‘ilm as articulated by, 
for instance, Ibn Sina, who perceived it as the knowledge of universals, and contrasted it with 
ma‘rifa as the knowledge of particulars. In Ibn Sina’s usage for instance, ‘ilm was the 
paradigmatic philosophical knowledge. It seems that Ahmed Midhat inadvertently inverted the 
concept of ‘ilm in order to translate the concept of science as used by the encyclopedists. Ahmed 
Midhat provided a good example in this regard in that he was primarily informed by the 
 In an article written years before, in his journal Dağarcık [Pouch], Ahmed Midhat differentiated ilim and fen. He 508
made ilim equivalent to knowledge, and fen equivalent to science in the modern sense, i.e. being based on universal 
laws.
 Fazıl ve Feylesof Kızım, p. 18.509
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European counterparts of such words as ilim, âlim, and hakîm, and that he utilized classical 
dictionary meanings in order to overcome established usage, and translated these concepts from 
the contemporary European discourses. To put it differently, Midhat not only adopted a new 
conception of the terms science, philosopher and scientist as they emerged in Europe, but also 
transformed the conventional terminology so that they now refer to these new concepts, thus 
giving them an Islamic idiom. In fact, it is not clear if Ahmed Midhat read Ibn Sina’s discussion 
at all, but I doubt he did since in another letter he acknowledged that he was much more familiar 
with the history of sciences in Europe than with their history in the Arabic-Islamic tradition. 
Even if Midhat was not unaware of the established meanings of science in the classical period, 
the fact that he ignored them demonstrates his desire to obviate that tradition in favor of the new, 
the progressive.  
 As the daughter of Cevdet Pasha, Fatma Aliye was quite familiar with Ibn Khaldun’s 
Muqaddima, especially the sixth chapter concerning sciences, which her father translated into 
Ottoman Turkish, as I discussed in Chapter Three. As someone informed by classical Islamic 
learning, Fatma Aliye, in her response, rejected Ahmed Midhat’s recourse to lexical explications 
in order to justify his understanding of the above-mentioned words, noting that lexical meanings 
were not taken into consideration in the scientific terminology. Fatma Aliye expressed her sorrow 
that Ahmed Midhat’s article included insinuating criticisms of her that were decorated with 
words of admiration. She also did not hesitate to state that she found Ahmed Midhat erring on 
these matters. Fatma Aliye was especially surprised that her supposed teacher or mentor would 
publish her article in his newspaper without revising it and then write a public rejoinder.  512
 Fazıl ve Feylesof Kızım, pp. 40-41512
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Ahmed Midhat responded by stating that though she did not express her permission for her 
article to be published, she neither appended any note that indicated the letter was private. He 
also added that as men of the pen they were public figures (erbâb-ı kalem umûmi adamlardır). 
Therefore, unless there was a specific note, all of her writings would be considered public. With 
regard to the content of the arguments, Ahmed Midhat claimed that he was merely expanding on 
Fatma Aliye’s points as her teacher, and was rather disturbed that Fatma Aliye would mention 
Ibn Sina and Qutb al-Dīn al-Shirāzī as authorities against his (Midhat’s) superior explanations of 
these issues. Ironically, Midhat did not find any problem in resorting to Diderot and Voltaire as 
authorities. 
Ahmed Midhat’s History of Science and Cevdet’s Review 
 Ahmed Midhat was quite ambitious, authoring numerous books, newspaper articles, 
translated texts etc. Noteworthy among these are his translation of Draper’s History of the 
Conflict between Religion and Science and Tarih-i Ulûm (History of the Sciences), a project that 
never reached fruition. Midhat’s work, like that of Suavi, had multiple aims, including providing 
responses to the orientalist and missionary narratives about Islam and science, and contributing 
to the spread of science among the Ottomans via novels, textbooks, etc. Out of his concern over a 
dominant Eurocentric account of sciences and religion, Midhat translated Draper’s work, and 
interspersed it with his own commentaries which constituted a separate text entitled Islam and 
the Sciences (İslam ve Fünûn). In connection with this attempt at rewriting the history of science 
Midhat undertook an independent work, Tarih-i Ulûm (History of the Sciences). Although we do 
not currently have a published copy, as it is not clear whether Ahmed Midhat even completed it, 
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we have some information about the content of this book from Midhat’s correspondence with 
Fatma Aliye, and from Cevdet’s review of the initial part of this project. It is possible that 
Cevdet’s damning critique might have discouraged Midhat from continuing and completing the 
project. In his review, Cevdet pointed out the immensity of the task and the qualifications of a 
member of the literati to undertake that historiography.  
  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have examined archival documents to extract the reasons for the state to 
intervene in and exert control over publications and scientific societies, and to separate the 
categories of science, religion, and politics. I argued that such separation of categories of science 
and religion was not primarily informed by a desire to emulate Europe, but rather it came about 
as a result of attempts to control oppositional politics and prevent inter-religious conflicts and 
polemics, which could cause disturbances. The prospective publishers and editors internalized 
such a separation and would indicate the subject matter of their publications and societies in their 
applications in order to secure permission for their enterprises. This separation, I asserted, could 
also be seen as a significant step in making a kind of secularity possible.  
 In the second section of the chapter, I discussed Ali Suavi’s Ulûm (Sciences) as an 
example of an alternative scientific journal that was not acceptable to the Ottoman government 
since it included all kinds of verboten issues such as political and religious issues, natural-
philosophical disciplines, and polemical responses to Young Ottomans or Orientalists. This 
journal not only provided information on various scientific issues, but underneath the science of 
politics, it also discussed alternative modes of governance that suggested possibilities that could 
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challenge and replace the current form of rule. This was not tolerated by the government at that 
time. 
 Lastly, by focusing on an intimate correspondence between Ahmed Midhat and Fatma 
Aliye, I contended that what the state was attempting on a larger scale was being performed on a 
smaller scale as well between a mentor and a student, a man and a woman. Ahmed Midhat was 
imposing his understanding of such terms as science, scientist, and philosopher (which was itself 
informed by European enlightenment discourses) on Fatma Aliye in a patriarchal and 
authoritative voice. However, Fatma Aliye was not a passive receiver. She challenged Midhat’s 
claims by using the traditional terminological meanings of these words, and inversed the 
supposed roles by kindly and respectfully challenging her mentor.  
 Overall, I do not contest the impact of European colonial-imperial discourses in shaping 
the discourse of science and progress in the Ottoman Empire, as this is evident in Ali Suavi’s 
publications, and in the discursive nature of the reconfiguration of the concepts of science, 
scientist, philosopher etc. by Ahmed Midhat and Fatma Aliye. However, they also prove that 
contemporary European discourses were one among several other reasons for rethinking the 
boundaries of such concepts. The journal and the letters show that Islamic intellectual tradition 
was certainly relevant and present in shaping the discursive reformation of science, religion, and 
politics. The archival material opens up a new vista for noticing yet another party to the 
reformation and reconfiguration of concepts. This player was the reason of state, or biopolitics, 
to use Foucault’s term, referring to the enacting of policies, regulations, and rules in order to 
create docile subjects and avoid challenges to the authority of the state. It is this reason that was 
in effect separating scientific issues from religious and political issues in all kinds of publications 
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and societies. This constant surveillance of course made it easier for the state to control the 
population. These policies were not born out of a desire to emulate Europe, but rather to contain 
resistance, and prevent conflict among various communities. 
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CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation began with a 1919 correspondence between Şeyhülislam (Mustafa Sabri 
Efendi) and Sadrazam (Damat Ferit Pasha) concerning the place of religion in the curriculum of 
public schools in the Ottoman Empire. The correspondence, I noted, revealed the modern tension 
between the sciences and religion, even though the language used by the Şeyhülislam presented 
religious disciplines as sciences. As the dissertation has made clear, the Şeyhülislam was still 
thinking about science in terms understood by early modern scholars. However, the idea of 
science was increasingly reduced to positive sciences during the nineteenth century, and religious 
disciplines were altogether left out of this new reconfiguration. I undertook a longue durée 
genealogical investigation of the concept of science(s) during early modern and modern Ottoman 
history in order to understand the reconstruction and reformation of these categories of science 
and religion in the modern period, in which they are regarded belonging to separate domains.  
 After the introduction, which presented the theoretical background and literature that 
informed my study and to which my study contributes to, I devoted two chapters to the early 
modern understanding of science, and two chapters to its modern reconfiguration. These four 
substantive chapters focused on a range of issues including the concept of science as expressed 
in the Arabic and Ottoman Turkish literature on the classifications of sciences, as well as the 
theoretical discussions on the unity of a scientific discipline (jihat al-waḥda). They also offered 
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analysis of Ahmed Cevdet’s Ottoman Turkish translation of and commentary on the sixth chapter 
of Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah, and last but not least, evaluated the role of the state in 
delineating the boundaries between science, religion, and politics through the regulation of the 
press and scientific societies as well as by controlling education during the long nineteenth 
century. Moreover, I examined a scientific journal by Ali Suavi, and noted the contested meaning 
of “science,” “scientist,” and “philosopher” in the correspondence between Fatma Aliye and 
Ahmed Midhat Efendi in late nineteenth century. I will now recapitulate some of the major 
findings of this dissertation, and note their implications for the writing of intellectual history and 
the history of sciences in the Ottoman period and beyond. 
 As pointed out in the introduction, a new historiography of science and religion after 
mid-twentieth century called for an alternative approach to the category of science and religion, 
which historicized them and showed that these concepts, as understood in the contemporary 
period, have quite a recent history. This approach was made possible by situating science in its 
social, political and cultural environment. Being informed by these theoretical and 
historiographical turns, I investigated the concept of ‘ilm and ‘ulūm (science/s) in the later 
history of the Ottoman Empire (sixteenth to nineteenth centuries). Though this concept was also 
closely connected to the idea of knowledge, I focused on the Ottoman discussions where it was 
strictly used to refer to a body of knowledge that was not randomly collected, but rather had an 
aspect of unity that made it a science.  
 The first chapter approached classifications of sciences with the assumption that they 
would reveal the dominant understanding of science in the early modern period. It is fascinating 
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to see what kind of disciplines were included or excluded from certain classifications, and what 
kind of assumptions about the world dominated the perspectives of scholars. Classifications in 
that regard can be seen as being both reflective (or descriptive) and constitutive of a world. They 
reflect people’s cultural sensitivities, and at the same time create and perpetuate those 
sensitivities. In looking at the classification, I put to test a major claim regarding the sciences in 
Islamic civilization, which asserts that the sciences are essentially divided into religious and non-
religious sciences (the latter being neglected). While it is true that this classification was 
prevalent, my study shows that it was definitely not the only classification. By looking at 
Saçaklızâde’s and Nev’î texts, I showed that various classifications were entertained in different 
contexts. Notwithstanding their shared understanding of the idea of science as being inclusive of 
a variety of disciplines, I demonstrated that these early modern Muslim scholars diverged in their 
hierarchies and particular classifications. In other words, despite some shared cultural and 
religious background, scholars living within Ottoman domains entertained diverging approaches 
to the sciences and ordered them differently.  
 In addition to paying attention to key concepts and ontological views, we need to look at 
the intellectual tradition within which scholars expressed themselves. In pointing out the 
intellectual genealogy of Nev’î and Saçaklızâde’s texts, I noted the genres to which each of their 
texts belong. I showed that Yahya Nev’î’s Netâyic was written in the genre of unmūzaj al-‘ulūm 
(sample of sciences), while Saçaklızâde was writing in the genre of pedagogical texts (ta‘līm al-
muta‘allim). Nev’î’s genre was especially propitious for demonstrating one’s breadth of 
knowledge while seeking patronage. Texts written in this genre were dedicated to the ruling elite. 
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Therefore, there was a close relationship between knowledge and power, as exemplified in the 
“samples of sciences” literature.  
 Saçaklızâde’s genre, on the other hand, was generally oriented toward madrasa students. 
I showed that Saçaklızâde relied on previous texts in this genre, including those by pre-Ottoman 
scholars such as al-Zarnūjī’s Ta‘līm al-Muta’allim, and the book of knowledge in al-Ghazālī’s 
Ihyā’, as well as works by Ottoman period scholars such as Taşköprüzâde. This genre mainly 
concerned the hierarchy and etiquette of learning. Scholars writing within this genre mostly had 
a moral-salvational project in mind that outlined a roadmap for gaining happiness in both worlds. 
Hence, considering the incomparable length of the afterlife, these scholars called for due 
investment in otherworldly sciences.  
 These early modern writings on sciences show that the word science could be used to 
refer to issues (masā’il), their comprehension (idrākāt), and the habit (malaka) acquired from 
their repeated comprehension. In this regard, it was thought that when referring to a discipline 
such as syntax, or mathematics as science, one has in mind either its issues, or comprehension of 
those issues, or the habitus gained by repeating its exercises. 
 I examined a different and more rigorous idea of ‘ilm (science) in chapter two, by 
studying a set of commentaries and glosses on a specific issue, namely the aspect of unity (jihat 
al-waḥda) of science. This issue was raised in the prolegomenon of Fenârî’s commentary on al-
Abharī’s Isagoge (summa of logic). My textual analysis revealed that what constituted a science 
for the early modern scholars was the aspect of unity of its various issues. This aspect of unity 
could be essential, such as a shared subject matter across all issues of a discipline, or it could be 
accidental aspect of unity, as in the shared aim of the issues of a science. I showed that there 
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were disagreements on Fenârî’s passage between commentators and glossators such as 
Burhâneddin Bulgari, Kul Ahmed, Abdurrahim, Muhammed Emin Şirvânî, and Kara Halil. 
These texts revealed that commentaries and glosses were all intertextual and dialogical. I 
therefore argued that the genre of commenting and glossing was open ended, and that there was 
in fact no end to explicating, contesting, and establishing new meanings. Despite a shared 
format, there was also a great opportunity for forging new ideas in the form of discovering 
alternative meanings of a text. Scholars from the period claimed they were discovering the 
meaning of a text by studying it repeatedly. This provided opportunity for innovation through 
purportedly revealing the meaning of archaic works, demonstrating how the old can generate the 
new by becoming a site of productive thinking. I also analyzed the prefaces of these texts in 
order to reveal the social and intellectual context that inspired them. That study revealed that 
knowledge was mainly collectively produced, and that scholars did not write in isolation, but 
rather responded to the shared concerns of colleagues and students.   
 The material I analyzed in the first two chapters shows that scholars from the period 
considered science in its relation to writing. Hence, they called the sciences “al-‘ulūm al-
mudawwana.” The word “mudawwan” refers to written, composed, or collected things. The idea 
of written sciences is significant in showing the connection between the sciences and technology, 
or a craft. Writers of the period were quite aware of the fact that conventional sciences were all 
written. While some nineteenth century scholars still noted the connection, today this connection 
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is almost forgotten.  In the Ottoman and Arabic literature on sciences in general, the connection 513
between writing and science manifested itself in the attribute that was used in conjunction with 
the word science, i.e. written (al-‘ulūm al-mudawwana). Arabic and Ottoman Turkish description 
of sciences as written sciences confirms the recent studies that argue for a greater explanatory 
role for writing as a technology in the emergence of disciplinary forms of knowledge. 
 In addition to emphasizing the written aspect of sciences, the scientific paradigm of the 
early modern Ottoman period also conceived science not in terms of methodology, but in terms 
of the dimension of unity that held together multiple issues. Ontology was the defining character 
of what constituted science, rather than epistemology, which has since gained the upper hand 
beginning with the enlightenment, and continues to inform the modern understanding of science. 
In that sense, criteria for the demarcation of the sciences was rather abstract in the early modern 
period, which allowed all kinds of disciplines to enjoy the privilege of being called a science.  
 While studying Ottoman and Islamic intellectual history, I observed a connection 
between classifications of knowledge and classifications of people (more accurately, sects and 
religions). By examining the classifications of sciences in the early modern period, I found that 
scholars frequently provided revealing information in the introduction or conclusion of such 
classifications. These introductions and conclusions usually propagated a certain kind of belief or 
called for following the true path that guaranteed salvation. This could be seen in the works 
preceding the Ottomans as well. For instance, al-Ghazālī's Deliverance from Error, which 
 For a nineteenth century text regarding this subject, see Medhal-i Ulûm ve Mebde-i Fünûn [Introduction to 513
Sciences and Beginning of Arts], an undated book written for primary school children in Ottoman Turkish that 
begins with the importance of writing, and explains how it is impossible to have sciences and civilization without 
writing. There is a significant body of scholarship on writing and printing technologies, by anthropologists and 
communication scholars, but these are still yet to be incorporated into the thinking around sciences.
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enumerated classes of knowers, began with the Prophets’ statement that his nation would be 
divided into seventy-three sects, but only one of them would be saved.  Similar discourses are 514
also present in Ottoman period classifications. In fact this same ḥadīth was cited in other cases as 
well.  
 My comparison of the above-mentioned two specific books on the classification of the 
sciences, by Yahya Nev‘î and Saçaklızâde, showed that each provided a different order of the 
sciences. However, both books unwittingly made arguments about the right belief while 
intending to present various sciences, or the order in which they should be studied. Nev’î began 
his book Netâyic el-Fünûn (the end of sciences) with a story of a virtuous Muslim who emerged 
victorious in a debate with representatives of various religions in the court of an Abbasid caliph. 
The story itself was adopted from a Persian book on the sciences, in which it was also included 
in the introduction. What should we make of this story and the rest of the book, which was 
intended to be a sample of sciences? By strategically putting together these materials, the authors 
state that knowledge and the sciences provide evidence that Islam is superior to other religions. 
Hence, studying the sciences was akin to studying Islam. 
 Saçaklızâde’s text, on the other hand, did not begin with such a theological statement. 
However, it did end with a conclusion that extolled the virtue of studying the Qur’an and an 
appendix that condemned the study of philosophy, especially metaphysics. Saçaklızâde also 
appended a marginal note to his discussion of philosophy, in which he called for its censure, 
claiming that the recent defeat of Ottoman Muslims at the hands of European Christians was due 
 I came across a manuscript of this book that was called, Tartīb al-‘Ulūm, or something along those lines. It was 514
surprising to me because the book is usually taken as a confession of al-Ghazālī rather than a proper classification of 
sciences. In that regard, it is clear that earlier readers saw it differently and thus considered it a text on hierarchy of 
sciences.
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to its spread, and that it contributed to the neglect of Qur’anic studies in Ottoman lands. Both of 
these scholars from the early modern period wrote on the order of sciences, and these orders 
were closely tied to their social imaginations. Thus we can see how knowledge and power were 
connected, and how discussions on the sciences were also discussions about the righteous 
society. This connection between the sciences and the right theology confirms Shapin and 
Schaffer’s assertion that solutions to the problem of knowledge are also solutions to the problem 
of order. 
 The early modern understanding of science was replaced in the nineteenth century by an 
emergent positivist and nationalist discourse on science. In order to describe the shift in the 
understanding of the sciences, I studied the translation of Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah into 
Ottoman Turkish by Ahmed Cevdet Pasha. In the third chapter, I drew attention to the changing 
notions of science and its history by studying the translation through the perspective of the reader 
and the translator in comparison with the original text. In fact, my research showed that the 
Muqaddimah was particularly appealing to the ruling elite of the Ottoman Empire, especially the 
military and bureaucratic branches. And since the Muqaddimah was indeed first translated by 
Pîrîzâde between 1725 and 1730 for the benefit of those who were not proficient in Arabic this 
also meant that it was addressed to the members of these two branches of government. Through 
studying manuscript copies of the text, I discovered that it was in fact copied and possessed 
mainly by non-ulema elite. Furthermore, the initial translation of the Muqaddimah was 
incomplete, and it took more than a century for the translation of the sixth chapter of the book to 
appear. This new interest in the sixth chapter itself was indicative of the growing interest in 
sciences, the subject matter of that chapter. 
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 This comparative study of the original alongside the translation showed that Cevdet was 
making an extensive commentary on the text based on post-Khaldunian Islamic scholarship and 
contemporary European natural-philosophical knowledge in order to revise and update Ibn 
Khaldun’s account. Cevdet especially criticized Ibn Khaldun’s description of the developments 
in the sciences in the Eastern Islamic lands. Whereas Ibn Khaldun only recognized the work of 
al-Taftāzānī as indicating vibrant interest in rational sciences in the Islamic East (mashriq), 
Cevdet also mentioned al-Jurjānī and many others. With regard to history of specific disciplines, 
Cevdet supplied bibliographies that were lacking in Ibn Khaldun. Another major shift in the 
understanding of the sciences was Cevdet’s remarks concerning natural philosophy. Ibn Khaldun, 
in line with al-Ghazālī, was against the uncritical study of natural philosophy. Cevdet pointed out 
that natural philosophy was no longer subject to such criticism as it had proven its viability as 
shown by experiments. Cevdet also inserted developments in the Ottoman period, thus making 
the text more relevant to its late Ottoman readers. Such interventions in the translation amounted 
to an argument for reform in the Ottoman Empire, which was undergoing changes at the time. 
 The fourth chapter of the dissertation focused on the role of the state in (per)forming 
science, religion, and politics as separate objects. The chapter consisted of three sections. In the 
first section I investigated the long history of Ottoman interventions into printing presses and 
publications. I pointed out that long before extensive contact with Europeans, Ottomans 
demonstrated their sensitivity toward printing political and religious books, as the 1627 
intervention into the Greek press and the 1727 limitations on the activities of the Müteferrika 
press show. What had changed significantly in the nineteenth century was the volume of 
published materials and the number of presses. These raised the Ottoman government’s concerns 
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about the impact of printing due to the fact that there were ongoing conflicts in various parts of 
the Ottoman Empire. Noteworthy are the conflicts caused by rival missionary presses in the 
Levant, as well as nationalist uprisings in the Balkans. 
 I demonstrated in this chapter that the Ottoman government increasingly declared 
regulations on printing presses and periodical publications that barred the prospective publishers 
to discuss religious and political matters in order to contain resistance and to create docile 
subjects. It appears that initially such limitations concerned polemical and provocative issues that 
could cause disturbances. However, as the number of journals on science grew, the government 
declared that they could not include political and religious matters. This act, in my view, 
(per)formed science, religion, and politics as separate objects. I also pointed out that the 
government had strict control in that regard over scientific societies, which just like periodicals 
were officially limited to discussing science, thus also allowed to redefine science in their own 
terms. As a result, publications increasingly avoided religious sciences, which in turn produced a 
de facto separation. Based on the impact of printing regulations, which stemmed from the task of 
governing a multi-ethnic and multi-faith population, I conclude that a kind of (proto)secularity 
was made possible, one that was not primarily based on European models, but came into being as 
a result of internal Ottoman developments. 
 In the second section of the fourth chapter, I analyzed a journal of science (Ulûm 
Gazettes) by Ali Suavi in order to discern what a journal that avoided governmental control 
looked like. Suavi wrote and published this journal in Paris by himself. He included very few 
articles by other intellectuals. Suavi’s journal showed that by being outside governmental control 
he could publish articles that combined science, religion, and politics. For example, an article on 
                                                                                                                                       
 242
mathematics was also an argument for keeping tradition as well as a call for seeking new 
sciences. Politics as a field was being enlarged to an extent that issues previously belonging to 
religious sciences were now put under the label of political thought. Suavi argued that Muslims 
should get rid of the old basis of Islamic legal theory i.e. linguistics and theology, and instead 
build a new theory on universal rational principles. Politics for him should be based on political 
economy, geography, and ethics. Suavi also argued for the separation of religion and politics, of 
worldly and other worldly matters.  
 In all these matters, it is clear that Suavi was well informed by European and Orientalist 
discussions. While at times he was very critical of those discourses, namely for their element of 
racism, he did participate in such talks in an attempt to defend Turkish history. It was clear that 
Orientalists were accusing various non-European nations of lacking any scientific contributions. 
In order to prove them wrong, Suavi provided an account of Turkish history that noted the Turks’ 
contributions in various sciences. In these early writings, religious sciences were still mentioned 
when noting these national contributions. However, overtime, science came to refer to positive 
sciences only, as some journals and later histories indicate. This period in general, and Suavi’s 
contributions specifically, can be best described as a hybrid combining elements of Islamic 
tradition, contemporary Ottoman concerns, and European perspectives.  
 In addition to demonstrating how Orientalist and nationalist discourses were 
interdependent and emerged together, I also argued that the history of the modern notion of 
science is closely connected with the history of the modern form of political power, i.e. 
nationalism. Science in the nineteenth century was increasingly being limited to natural-
mathematical disciplines. In the same century, the political form of state was transformed from 
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dynastic imperial power to the territorial nation state. These two processes of homogenization 
were simultaneous, and show that the purification of the categories of science, religion, and 
politics were closely tied with reasons of governing. 
 By contrasting Suavi’s journal with works subject to governmental regulations on 
printing presses, periodicals, societies, and schools, it is possible to put undue emphasis on the 
European element, especially when focusing on individual intellectuals. However, the internal 
Ottoman contingencies are more apparent when tracing larger governmental reforms through 
archival documents. In fact, Ottoman intellectuals were able to read one or two European 
languages. Suavi, for instance, knew both French and English, and actually wrote some books in 
French. Therefore, if we solely focus on intellectuals then we might assume that all 
transformations in the Ottoman Empire came about through European influence. However, 
following the events in the Ottoman Empire, and the raison d’être in the documents and 
regulations, then we can see the impact of local developments on these changes and 
transformations. I asserted that early modern state intervention into printing presses shows that 
even before heavy contact with Europe, Ottomans were concerned with the impact of 
publications. They therefore intervened when the social order was threatened. In that regard, we 
can see that reasons of state were the driving force behind the reforms and regulations in the late 
Ottoman Empire. 
 Following the fifteenth century Printing Revolution, scholars increasingly came to rely on 
the printed book, as it was more accessible than manuscripts. Also, critical editions of books 
were becoming available. Hence, intellectual historians frequently turned to the printed versions, 
neglecting manuscripts. However, owing to the recent digital revolution, I found it quite helpful 
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to refer to manuscripts when studying early modern texts, commentaries, and glosses. To begin 
with, each manuscript has a history of its own, and reveals information regarding its circulation, 
readership, and ownership. This can help us trace the reception of ideas, and determine the 
audience of the book, which in many cases can allow us to locate the segment of society or 
learned elite that the author was targeting. For instance, as I have already indicated, manuscript 
copies from the Ottoman period show that there was a particular group of people interested in 
Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah. Therefore, by looking at the composition of the manuscript’s 
readers, we can understand why certain books or disciplines enjoyed popularity in a particular 
time and locality.  
 Manuscripts oftentimes include various marginalia by its author, readers, or owners. 
These marginalia can provide information about the content of the book that reveals its 
intellectual context, which would otherwise be lost to later readers. For example, scholars did not 
name their opponents or the authorities they relied on when writing their commentaries and 
glosses. However, those living at the time or immediately afterwards knew very well the stakes 
of the commentary and glosses, and the implicit references to other texts or authors, and they 
would sometimes write in the margin that the author refers to X, or the teacher mentioned was Y. 
This kind of information can help us better understand the texts. Now that digital media has 
made it easier to transport and consult manuscripts, I call for the further use of manuscripts in 
writing the intellectual history of the early modern period. 
 All too often contemporary scholars who write histories of science focus on natural-
philosophical disciplines to the exclusion of literary and religious sciences, and the humanities in 
general. However, in the earlier period these were all considered sciences in their own right, and 
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they should be included in the histories of those periods. To give an example, recent 
encyclopedic treatments on sciences usually do not include any disciplines that are not 
considered hard science today. In my view, this universalizes the modern understanding of 
science, even though it is clearly not universal, but rather the product of a very recent history. In 
that regard, historians of science should question these choices and argue for their particular 
preferences. If as scholars we are concerned about presentism in writing histories of an earlier 
period, then one way of avoiding that would be by paying closer attention to how subjects of our 
histories perceived the sciences and represented them in that period. 
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